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Abstract
Airservices does not currently proscribe any methodology for determining scheduled main-
tenance regimes on equipment that it operates as part of the National Airways System
(NAS). Airservices has expressed an interest in modernising its maintenance practices,
potentially resulting in decreased maintenance costs and increased system performance.
Reliability-Centred Maintenance (RCM) is a structured methodology for developing sched-
uled maintenance regimes that developed out of research conducted towards the end of
1960s. RCM is commonly used in many industries, however, there is no evidence in the
literature that it is used by Air Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) or organisations
with similar equipment profiles. Further, when the United States’ ANSP, the Federal
Aviation Authority (FAA), announced their intention to implement RCM in 2006, vari-
ous unions testified before Congress that the process is unsafe, prompting an investigation
by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO).
This work provides some assurance to Airservices that the RCM process is worth contin-
uing to investigate for potential implementation by modelling the reliability performance
of Airservices Essential VHF system under an RCM-derived maintenance regime and
comparing it with Airservices existing maintenance regime.
This work found that the modelled system reliability performances were approximately
equivalent between maintenance regimes, however the RCM-derived regime required less
maintenance hours. A number of qualitative aspects of the RCM process were identified
during the analysis and form the basis for recommendations for further work. Overall,
Airservices should continue to investigate implementation of the RCM process.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Introduction
Airservices is Australia’s only civil Air Navigation Service Provider (ANSP) and are re-
sponsible for providing safe air traffic services within Australian airspace. In order to
provide these services, Airservices operate a complex network of general and aviation
specific technology across Australia. In recent years, with a changing economic climate,
Airservices have expressed an interest in modernising its maintenance practices, identify-
ing potential efficiency improvements and cost savings.
Reliability-Centred Maintenance (RCM) is a structured methodology for developing main-
tenance regimes that proponents claim maximises equipment reliability whilst simultane-
ously minimising maintenance costs. RCM has become commonplace in general industry
and it appears to be a promising avenue for Airservices to explore.
1.2 The Problem
Airservices’ statutory responsibility is the safety of the aviation industry and the pub-
lic at large. As a result, Airservices necessarily adopts a conservative approach to the
implementation of change. Due to the criticality of aviation systems, Airservices has a
particularly strong ethical and regulatory responsibility to perform robust due diligence
before adopting and implementing any process that has the potential to jeopardise avia-
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tion safety.
There is no evidence in the literature of widespread adoption of RCM in the ANSP
industry. What’s more, the Federal Aviation Authority (FAA), the only ANSP known to
have publicly acknowledged its intention to adopt RCM, was investigated by the Unites
States Government Accountability Office (GAO) after union members testified that RCM
was unsafe.
Whilst RCM is published under a number of standards, those standards do not detail
the specifics of RCM implementation. As a result, there are significant variations in
RCM implementations. Opinions amongst industry experts differ on the significance of
quantitative analysis in maintenance regime development and also the validity of the
Resnikoff conundrum. In one case, concerns have been raised regarding the validity of
the underlying research the RCM methodology is founded upon.
Airservices are not able to implement RCM until they are satisfied that appropriate due
diligence has been performed and that an appropriate level of safety assurance can be
delivered.
1.3 Research Objectives
The aim of this research was to provide assurance to Airservices that the adoption of
the RCM process for developing maintenance regimes would not negatively impact on
operational safety through a critical analysis of the modelled impact of maintenance
regimes on relevant system durability parameters. The methodology was divided into
xxx parts:
1. Review of relevant literature relating to:
(a) Durability
(b) Durability modelling techniques
(c) RCM
(d) Regulations
2. Develop a modelling system through:
(a) Developing user requirements
(b) Developing functional and performance specifications
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(c) Identifying suitable Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) modelling software
(d) Developing modelling architecture designs
(e) Implementing most suitable solution
3. Develop maintenance regimes following the RCM process
4. Model existing and developed maintenance regimes
5. Critically analyse modelling results
1.4 Overview of the Dissertation
This dissertation is organized as follows:
Chapter 2 gives a brief overview of relevant background information including Airservices
role in the aviation industry, the regulatory framework for ANSPs in Australia and the
Reliability, Maintainability & Availability (RMA) concepts.
Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the fundamental concepts behindRCM, its history
and and some common RCM publications.
Chapter 4 provides review of a select literature and a brief case study of one ANSP known
by Airservices to have implemented RCM
Chapter 5 outlines the methodology and the development behind the modelling system.
Chapter 6 details the reliability modelling of Airservices systems and a summary of the
results.
Chapter 7 discusses the results of reliability modelling in more detail and expands on a
number of qualitative details arrising from teh analysis.
Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation, provides recommendations and suggests further
work.
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1.5 Conclusions
The outcomes of this study will be used by Airservices to assist in determining whether
to pursue the implementation of RCM as a viable process for determining maintenance
regimes in the context of an Australian ANSP.
Chapter 2
Background
2.1 Chapter Overview
The chapter gives a brief overview of relevant background information including Airser-
vices role in the aviation industry, the regulatory framework for ANSPs in Australia and
fundamental RMA concepts.
2.2 The Role of Airservices in Australian Aviation
Airservices was established in 1995 by the Australian Federal Government through the
Air Services Act. It is a government owned organisation charged with supplying air nav-
igation services including aviation rescue and fire fighting to the Australian civil aviation
industry. Airservices provides these services throughout Australian airspace, which con-
stitutes approximately 11% of the world’s airspace. Currently, Airservices is Australia’s
only civil ANSP. To deliver its services, Airservices owns, operates and maintains two ma-
jor air traffic control centres, four terminal control units, 29 control towers, approximately
415 ground based navigation aids and fire services at 26 airports.
Airservices operates a complex network of equipment, collectively referred to as the Na-
tional Airways System (NAS), which consists of aviation specific communications, naviga-
tion and surveillance technology (detailed in Table 2.1) as well as more generic supporting
technology such as power systems, data networks, structures and the like.
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Figure 2.1: Australian FIR
2.3 Australian Air Navigation Service Provider Regulatory
Framework
The International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) was established in 1944 through
the signing of the Convention on International Civil Aviation in Chicago by attending
states, a document commonly referred to as the Chicago Convention and now officially
published by International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) as DOC 7300. ICAO
began operating in April of 1947 and became an agency of the United Nations in October
of 1947.
ICAO set Standards and Recommended Practicess (SARPs) that are intended to provide
globally standardised aviation practices. SARPs are published as annexes to DOC 7300.
ICAO SARPs are not directly enforceable. It is left to the industry regulators of signatory
states to adopt and enforce SARPs (ICAO 2006).
The Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) was established in 1995 by the Australian
Federal Government through an amendment to the Civil Aviation Act 1988. Under
this act and the Air Navigation Act 1920, Civil Aviation Safety Authority (CASA) are
responsible for the safety regulation of Australian civil aviation in accordance with any
international treaties to which Australia is subject, including the Chicago Convention.
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Domain Technology
Communication HF USB AM Voice Communication System (HF)
VHF DSB AM Voice Communication System (VHF)
Navigation Non-Directional Beacon (NDB)
Doppler/Conventional VHF Omni-Range (VOR)
Instrument Landing System (ILS)
Distance Measuring Equipment (DME)
Ground Based Augmentation System (GBAS)
Surveillance Advanced Surface Movement Ground Control System (ASMGCS)
Primary Surveillance Radar (PSR)
Secondary Surveillance Radar (SSR)
Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADSB)
Wide Area Multilateration (WAM)
Table 2.1: Aviation Specific NAS Technology
CASA publish regulations as Civil Aviation Safety Regulations (CASR) and associated
guidance materials. ANSPs in Australia are required to be licensed by CASA and operate
in accordance with the regulations documented in CASR Part 171 Aeronautical Telecom-
munications Service and Radio-Navigation Service Provider. CASR Part 171 requires
that provided services comply with appropriate SARPs from ICAO Annex 10 and that
non-conformance is publicly published.
2.4 Airservices Maintenance Practices
Airservices operates approximately 20 maintenance bases across Australia with a total of
around 400 technical staff and 800 Engineering staff. The Engineering staff are loosely di-
vided around teams that are responsible for the delivery of new systems and those respon-
sible for ensuring satisfactory ongoing performance of existing systems. The maintenance
engineering teams specify the maintenance requirements and procedures for equipment.
They are responsible for monitoring failure data to identify performance trends, report-
ing on system performance, assisting technical staff with complex faults and identifying
required equipment modifications.
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Airservices does not proscribe a formalised methodology for developing maintenance
regimes and the exact process followed varies across teams and equipment domains.
In general, maintenance regimes are developed based on Original Equipment Manufac-
turer (OEM) recommendations, contractual obligations, Australian legislation/regula-
tions, Australian standards, personal experience, failure data, input from technical staff,
ICAO recommendations, international standards and industry best practice. For Commu-
nication Navigation Surveillance (CNS) equipment, Airservices maintenance engineering
teams typically specify an annual inspection with tests that verify satisfactory equipment
performance.
Technical staff are responsible for performing preventive and corrective maintenance as
specified by the maintenance engineering teams. If equipment parameters are found to be
outside of prescribed tolerances during an inspection, they are required to either correct
the parameter or obtain engineering approval to leave the equipment in service to be fixed
at a later date. Preventative maintenance is required to be performed at intervals that
are set by the maintenance engineering teams.
The primary function that Airservices’ systems perform are generally used either directly
by the aviation community or by Airservices operational units, such as Air Traffic Control,
to deliver services to the aviation industry. Surveillance equipment, for example, is used
by Air Traffic Control (ATC) to facilitate minimal aircraft separation. The loss of this
system can have a direct impact on the workload of the ATC operator, the maximum
allowable aircraft flow rate within a given airspace sector and aviation safety. To maintain
safety, ATC specify that classes of equipment functions must meet specific availability and
reliability requirements.
The maintenance engineering team report annually on whether the equipment satisfied
its operational requirements. This report is also intended to assess the suitability of the
maintenance regime and identify performance trends that might indicate that a system
modification is required.
Each system function is designated a Service Restoration Time (SRT) by the user of the
function according to the function’s criticality. The SRT is the time within which technical
staff are required to correct equipment failures. SRTs are split into two categories:
SRT Fail A shorter restoration time used when the system’s function is no longer avail-
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able
SRT Fault A longer restoration time used when the system’s function is still available
but some equipment failure has occurred, typically resulting in a loss of redundancy
2.5 Federal Aviation Administration
The Federal Aviation Authority (FAA) is the aviation authority for the United States of
America and performs equivalent functions to both CASA and Airservices within their
own jurisdiction as both an industry regulator and service provider. The Federal Aviation
Authority (FAA) own and operate a similar profile of equipment to Airservices.
Between 1997 and 2000, the FAA tested a pilot maintenance program in the Alaska region
called the Corporate Maintenance Philosophy (CMP). After poor results and industrial
relations problems, the FAA were ordered to end the trial (Government Assurance Office
2006).
In 2005, the FAA publicly announced its intention to implement RCM. Based on ex-
periences with CMP and apparent similarities between RCM and CMP, various unions
testified before US Congress that RCM is unsafe. In December of 2005, the National Air
Traffic Controllers Association (NATCA) made a press release stating:
The Federal Aviation Administration has fundamentally changed the way air
traffic control equipment is maintained and now plans to wait until the equip-
ment actually fails before conducting vital work. By waiting until a potentially
dangerous failure occurs, this new agency policy directly threatens passenger
safety and is the latest example of the agency’s mismanagement, which is
reducing the reliability and integrity of the system by cutting corners.
. . .
“While the FAA refers to it as an ‘event-based’ concept, it can best be de-
scribed as a ‘fix-on-fail’ concept,” said National Air Traffic Controllers Associa-
tion President John Carr. “What they’re doing is switching from preventative
maintenance to a scheme where equipment will be used until it fails and then
fixed. This is like buying a new car, neglecting to do any oil changes and then
waiting until the engine seizes to take it to a mechanic. This is unsafe, unwise
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and will cost the agency more money in the long run than it will save.”
The ConOps scheme is based on the prior Corporate Maintenance Philosophy
that was used in Alaska and was a recognized failure because of the increased
duration of outages when equipment did fail due to multiple component fail-
ures within the unit.
“The whole purpose cited by the agency in the adoption of the new ConOps
is to save money on maintenance. However, quite apart from serious safety
concerns, there is the potential that equipment failures will be so extensive
that the only viable repair will be to replace the entire equipment sets. Does
this really save the agency any money?” said Jim DAgati, a NATCA vice pres-
ident who represents FAA engineers. “The costs associated with restoration
of facilities dramatically increased after the initial period when this scheme
was utilized in Alaska. Now the agency wants to expand this scheme to the
rest of the country.”
The United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) summarised the FAA’s in-
tention to implement RCM in a letter to the US Senate in 2006 discussing the concept of
RCM, the state of RCM adoption in general industry, the FAA’s experience with CMP
and the progress of the FAA’s RCM implementation. The GAO advised that at that
time, the FAA had not developed a clear RCM implementation plan.
2.6 Reliability, Maintainability & Availability
Reliability, Maintainability & Availability (RMA) are sub-fields within the Engineering
specialisation of Dependability, which quantify the failure performance of systems and
their components throughout a system’s lifecycle. Reliability describes the probability
that an item will not fail up to a certain point in time and maintainability describes the
probability that a failed item will be repaired within a certain time. Availability combines
reliability and maintainability to describe the percentage of time that a system is available
for use when it is required (Bazovsky 1961).
Systems can broadly be categorised as either repairable or non-repairable. As their names
suggest, non-repairable systems are not able to be repaired and cease to function once
they fail. Orbiting satellite systems are a common example, where it is often not feasible
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to send a technician into outer space to repair an item. In these cases, the system is
usually characterised only by reliability which is used to determine the probability of
mission success. For repairable systems, items can be replaced or repaired after they fail.
In these cases, availability is often a more meaningful parameter.
For the purposes of RMA analysis, systems are commonly represented using reliability
block diagrams, however, alternative representations such as fault tree diagrams are also
possible. Reliability block diagrams graphically illustrate the reliability relationship be-
tween system elements. Elements in a reliability block diagram that are connected in
series indicate that the failure of any single element will cause the failure of the entire
system. Parallel connection of system elements indicate redundancy and that the failure
of all parallel components is required to cause the failure of the entire system. Figure
2.2 shows how reliability block diagrams differ from a system block diagram for the same
system.
In general, systems can be thought of as a collection of elements that collectively provide
a function. The status of a system’s function can be determined from a reliability block
diagram if it is possible to traverse from the beginning node to the end node, considering
that failed elements can not be traversed.
The concept of parallel connections can be extended to m-of-n parallel connections where
m elements out of a total of n are required for the system’s function to be considered
operating. Other complex redundancy models are also possible. For example, hot standby
elements are usually fully operational by default and available to provide the system’s
functions as soon as another element fails. This contrasts with cold standby elements
which are usually in a non-operational state by default and only switched on when a
failure in another element is detected. In general, the failure characteristics of hot standby
elements remains the same regardless of whether the element is actually providing the
system’s function, however, the failure characteristics of cold standby elements may vary
depending on the state of the element. Often, the switching of elements or the detection
of failures requires additional elements which introduce their own failure characteristics
into the system.
Complex reliability relationships can be illustrated by combinations of series, parallel, m-
of-n and hot/cold standby connections. In some cases, there are reliability relationships
that can not be simplified to series or parallel connections. These cases require the use of
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(a) System Block Diagram (b) Reliability Block Diagram
Figure 2.2: Block Diagrams
Bayesian statistics to solve analytically.
RMA parameters are stochastic in nature. The exact timing of a system element fail-
ure can rarely be predetermined, however, failures within a collection of like elements
will conform to a statistical distribution. In general, there are three types of element
failure; decreasing failure rate (infant mortality), increasing failure rate (wear-out) and
constant failure rate (exponential), where failure rate, λ(t), refers to the number of failure
occurrences per unit time in a collection of like elements (Bazovsky 1961).
Constant failure rates, commonly referred to as exponentially distributed failures or ran-
dom failures and less frequently as catastrophic failures, are failures that randomly occur
in an element due to an overload of stresses at a particular moment in time. Elements
undergoing random failure do not generally exhibit any detectable deterioration in perfor-
mance prior to the failure and can therefore be very difficult to predict (Ma´rquez 2007).
Increasing failure rates are usually caused by some deterioration over time or through
use as a component ages and materials break down or wear out. In many cases, the
deterioration in performance is often detectable and an imprecise time to failure can be
estimated.
Decreasing failure rates can occur in two ways. The first is elements that genuinely im-
prove and become less likely to fail over time. Although rare, there are some circumstances
where this phenomenon does occur, such as concrete structures that continue to harden
over time. In general, however, decreasing failure rates occur due to two or more sub-
populations of elements existing within a larger collection of elements exhibiting different
failure characteristics. The most common example of this is a collection of elements in
which some portion of elements have a higher failure rate due to some manufacturing
defect. As elements in a collection fail over time, the proportion of lower quality elements
with respect to the whole collection reduces, resulting in an average failure rate across
2.6 Reliability, Maintainability & Availability 13
both populations that decreases.
Reliability parameters are related through the following three expressions where R (t) is
the probability of survival up to time t, f (t) is the failure density function giving the
statistical distribution of failures and λ (t) is the failure function describing the rate of
failures in time, sometimes referred to as the hazard function (Bazovsky 1961). Some
sources define hazard function and failure rate as different quantities, this text shall treat
the two parameters as synonyms. Although the functions here are shown with respect
to time, in some contexts, other variables may be more appropriate, such as number of
switching cycles.
f (t) = −dR (t)
dt
(2.1)
R (t) = e
−
t∫
0
λ(t)dt
(2.2)
λ (t) =
f (t)
R (t)
(2.3)
In the special case where λ (t) is constant, (2.1) and (2.2) simplify to negative expo-
nential expressions. For this reason, constant failure rates are commonly referred to as
exponentially distributed. For convenience, the negative is simply implied from context.
In general, the failure density function can take the form of any continuous probability
density function as appropriate (Meeker & Escobar 1998).
Elements may be subject to a number of different failure modes, each exhibiting their own
failure characteristics. As a result, the failure of elements will conform to a combination
of failure characteristics, commonly referred to as a life function (Bazovsky 1961).
L (t) =
n∏
i=0
Ri (t) (2.4)
Over short periods of time, it is generally sufficient to consider the failure rate as constant,
which can greatly simplify the analytical solution of reliability problems. However, as most
elements exhibit some form of wear-out failure over long periods of time, it is necessary
to consider wear-out failures in high reliability or long life applications (Bazovsky 1961).
For the special case of constant failure rate, Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) is
commonly cited instead of the failure rate as a more convenient parameter where:
MTBF =
1
λ
(2.5)
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The mathematical treatment of maintainability is similar to reliability with the parameter
of interest changed from time to failure to time to repair, where M (t) refers to the
probability that a repair process will be completed by time t, m (t) is the repair density
function giving the statistical distribution of repair times and µ (t) is the repair rate
(Bazovsky 1961).
m (t) =
dM (t)
dt
(2.6)
M (t) = e
−
t∫
0
µ(t)dt
(2.7)
µ (t) =
m (t)
1−M (t) (2.8)
As with failure rate, the repair rate can be simplified to a constant more convenient
Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) parameter in the special case that the repair rate is
exponentially distributed.
MTTR =
1
µ
(2.9)
Availability combines the concepts of reliability and maintainability to describe the per-
centage of time that a system was or is available for use. Depending on the period of
time that is considered and whether availability is calculated a priori or a posteriori,
there are a number of definitions for availability. The primary definition for availability of
relevance in this text is operational availability, the ratio of system uptime to total time
as experienced by the end user (ReliaSoft Corporation 2014).
AO =
Uptime
TotalTime
(2.10)
This definition, however, is insufficient for a priori calculation. Inherent availability is
the availability of a system under ideal operation and maintenance (ReliaSoft Corporation
2014).
AI =
MTBF
MTBF + MTTR
(2.11)
Chapter 3
Reliability-Centred Maintenance
3.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides a brief overview of the fundamental concepts underpinning the
RCM process and the history of its development. A brief overview of common current
and publicly accessible RCM publications is also given.
3.2 History
Towards the end of the 1950’s, the FAA had noticed through experience that variations
in the content or frequencies of scheduled overhauls appeared to have no effect on the
failure rates of certain unreliable aircraft engine types. By this time, commercial airline
maintenance expenses were sufficiently high that an investigation into maintenance prac-
tices was deemed warranted. A task force with representatives from Airlines and the FAA
developed the FAA/Industry Reliability Program which ’provided a system of actions to
improve low reliability levels when they exist’. Through the analysis of factors affecting
reliability in aircraft engines, the task force arrived at two surprising conclusions which
challenged the prevailing reliability concepts at the time (Moubray 1997):
1. Scheduled overhaul has little effect on the overall reliability of a complex item unless
the item has a dominant failure mode
2. There are many items for which there is no effective form of scheduled maintenance
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During the design of the Boeing 747, a Maintenance Steering Group (MSG) comprised
of airframe manufacturers, representatives of the FAA and various other suppliers was
formed under the Air Transport Association (ATA). The MSG oversaw the development
of the Boeing 747’s initial maintenance program and published the maintenance program
development process as a manual in 1968 entitled, ”Maintenance Evaluation and Program
Development”, commonly referred to as MSG-1. The process outlined in MSG-1 extended
a decision diagram technique for maintenance program development that had been devised
in 1965, itself expanding on the FAA/Industry Reliability Program.
Two years later, improvements to MSG-1 were published by the ATA’s MSG as ”Airline/-
Manufacturer Maintenance Program Planning”, commonly referred to as MSG-2. The
updated process was used to develop scheduled maintenance programs for the Douglas
DC10 and Lockheed 1011 civil aircraft as well as the military Lockheed S-3 and McDonnell
F4J aircraft (Moubray 1997).
Under the MSG-1 and MSG-2 programs, spare turbine engine inventories were able to
be reduced by more than 50% and maintenance man hours for the Lockheed DC10 were
reduced by 98% compared with the smaller and less complex Lockheed DC8. Reductions
like these resulted in significant maintenance costs savings for airlines without any decrease
in aircraft reliability. On the contrary, it was discovered that an improved understanding
of equipment failures led to improved reliability performance.
In 1978, Nowlan and Heap published ”Reliability-Centred Maintenance”, a report on
the processes used by the civil aviation industry commissioned by the United States
Department of Defence in 1974. The report identified shortcomings in the MSG-1 & MSG-
2 processes and difficulties in their application to other industries. Nowlan and Heap’s
report proposed a more generalised approach that could be applied to any industry using
an analytical procedure without the shortcomings of MSG-1 & MSG-2 (Moubray 1997).
The ATA’s MSG published an update to MSG-2 as ”MSG-3: Airline/Manufacturer Main-
tenance Program Development” in 1980, the latest revision of which is in use today.
MSG-3 was heavily influenced by Nowlan and Heap’s RCM report and largely followed
the same process but remained specific to the aviation industry.
RCM became popular with the US Defence Forces who saw it as an opportunity to
reduce their maintenance costs. RCM process implementations were published as various
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Military Standards in the 1980’s and their use was enforced for military contractors. At
around the same time, the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI), an electrical power
industry research group in the US, modified the RCM process to focus on the reduction
of maintenance costs. The modified RCM process was adopted by the US nuclear power
industry in 1987 (Moubray 1997).
During the 1990’s, RCM became popular in commercial industry. Many different imple-
mentations were proposed by various vendors and organisations, not all of which complied
with the original process published by Nowlan and Heap. The cancellation of many Mil-
itary Standards in 1994 under a memorandum issued by the then Secretary of Defence,
William Perry, compounded the difficulty of understanding exactly what process the term
RCM was referring to when it was used (Moubray 1997).
In partnership with the US Military and commercial industry, the Society of Automo-
tive Engineers (SAE) sponsored the development of a standard published in 1999 entitled
Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-Centred Maintenance (RCM) Processes (SAE JA1011).
This document was not a standardised RCM implementation, rather, it provided criteria
against which a maintenance program development process could be compared to deter-
mine whether or not the process should rightfully be referred to as an RCM process (SAE
International 2011).
3.3 Fundamental Concepts of RCM
Prior to the development of MSG-1, MSG-2 and RCM, the prevailing model of reliability
was that equipment behaved reliably for some period, after which, it would begin to wear
out and its reliability would decrease. Figure 3.1a shows the failure rate for this type of
failure pattern. This model of reliability was expanded somewhat with the introduction
of an infant mortality period, which recognised that new equipment often suffered higher
failure rates, usually due to manufacturing defects. Figure 3.1b illustrates the failure
rate for this type of failure pattern. Both reliability models suggest that the optimum
maintenance strategy for all equipment is to replace items before they exceed their useful
life and that the period of the useful life can be determined from historical data.
During their investigations, Nowlan and Heap determined that these reliability models
did not adequately describe failures experienced by complex equipment, unless dominated
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(a) 1st Generation (b) 2nd Generation
(c) 3rd Generation
Figure 3.1: Failure Patterns
by a particular failure mode. Nowlan and Heap identified six failure patterns, as illus-
trated in Figure 3.1c. Crucially, three of the failure patterns identified by the pair do
not demonstrate any wear out, suggesting that scheduled replacement of items following
these failure patterns would not yield any improvement in reliability. Even worse, sched-
uled replacement of items following failure pattern F would actually cause reliability to
decrease. Nowlan and Heap’s investigations into civil aircraft identified that 4% of items
conformed to failure pattern A, 2% to B, 5% to C, 7% to D, 14% to E and 68% to failure
pattern F (Moubray 1997). Whilst these figures may vary somewhat between industries,
Nowlan and Heap’s report suggested that existing maintenance practices were not valid
for around 89% of items.
Nowlan and Heap’s RCM report proposed a new methodology for determining mainte-
nance actions that are appropriate for the failure patterns exhibited by an item. They
found that it was necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the nature of
equipment performance, equipment failure, the consequences of equipment failure and
the capabilities of maintenance.
RCM differentiates equipment’s initial capability from its desired performance. A water
pump, for example, may initially be capable of pumping a maximum of 1000 litres per
minute. However, it is likely that the process utilising the pump would function correctly
at some lower flow rate, say 800 litres per minute. The difference in performance levels
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allows the pump to deteriorate somewhat before it is considered to have failed. This
implies that the same pump may be considered to have failed at different performance
levels depending on the application in which it is being used. In RCM terminology, this
concept is referred to as the operating context which specifies how equipment is used in
any particular application. The operating context can significantly affect the maintenance
requirements for any given piece of equipment. For example, a pump used to pump water
may deteriorate at a slower rate than the same pump used to pump abrasive slurry,
enabling a longer inspection interval as a result. If two of the same pumps were used in a
redundant main/standby scenario, it may be beneficial to run the main pump to failure
and periodically inspect only the standby pump.
Regardless of what maintenance actions are utilised, it is important to recognise that
no maintenance action is capable of increasing an item’s performance beyond its initial
capability. If desired performance levels exceed an item’s initial capability, the system
must be redesigned in some way.
In fundamental RCM terminology, maintenance actions fall into three categories:
1. Time-directed
2. Condition-directed
3. Failure finding
Time-directed and Condition-directed actions are intended to prevent equipment failure
from occurring. Time-directed maintenance actions involve overhauling equipment at
some specified operating time, towards the end of the equipment’s useful life. Condition-
directed maintenance actions involve overhauling equipment only once it’s performance
level indicates that an overhaul is required. Overhaul, in this case, is intended to mean any
maintenance activity that restores the equipment’s performance level to a point sufficient
to satisfy the desired performance level.
Condition-directed actions are suitable for equipment that exhibit some detectable change
in performance indicating an imminent failure. In this case, the period over which immi-
nent failure detection is possible is referred to as the P-F interval, illustrated in Figure
3.2. For condition-directed actions to be feasible, the P-F interval must be sufficiently
long that an imminent failure can be detected and the item overhauled before the failure
occurs.
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Figure 3.2: P-F Interval
Failure finding actions are intended to detect items that have already failed. They are
suitable for items whose failure is not immediately obvious to system users and requires
a specific test for detection. This situation is commonly encountered with safety devices
that only activate in the case of some unusual event. Many systems will continue to
operate as normal if the safety device has failed. Without a failure finding action, the
failure of a safety device might only be detected once an unusual event has occurred and
the safety device failed to activate.
Failure finding actions are required when the consequence of a failure is not detected or
hidden in RCM terminology. This implies that the consequences of failures influence the
selection of suitable maintenance actions. Under RCM, failure consequences are cate-
gorised as:
1. Hidden
2. Safety
3. Economic/Operational
Safety failure consequences are failure consequences that could result in harm to per-
sonnel or the public. Some RCM publications also include harm to the environment as
safety failure consequences. Economic/Operational failure consequences are failure conse-
quences that could result in loss of organisational capability, such as reduced production
or increased costs. By themselves, hidden failure consequences do not result in any ad-
verse effect, however, there may be significant adverse effects should some other failure
coincide with a hidden failure. The failure consequence categories are hierarchical and
exclusive. A failure consequence can only be attributed to the most significant category.
The fundamental concept of RCM is that maintenance should manage failure consequences
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rather than prevent failure modes from occurring. This means that maintenance effort
should be concentrated on detecting hidden failures and preventing safety failure conse-
quences. Economic/Operational failure consequences can be either prevented or allowed
to occur, depending on the economic merits of the specific maintenance action.
3.4 RCM Process
The RCM process is a structured methodology for determining a maintenance strategy for
some equipment, built on the fundamental maintenance concepts determined by Nowlan
and Heap’s report. Although the specifics of the an RCM process will vary depending on
which publication and implementation is in use, fundamentally, the process answers the
following seven questions in order (Moubray 1997):
1. What are the functions and associated performance standards of the item in its
present operating context (functions)?
2. In what ways does it fail to fulfil its functions (functional failures)?
3. What is the cause of each functional failure (failure modes)?
4. What happens when each failure occurs (failure effects)?
5. In what way does each failure matter (failure consequences)?
6. What can be done to prevent each failure (proactive tasks and task intervals)?
7. What should be done if a suitable preventive task cannot be found (default actions)?
The first four questions form a top down FMEA process that defines a system’s failure
modes. The remaining three questions are answered with in conjunction with a decision
diagram to determine the most appropriate maintenance action. Figure 3.3 gives the
decision diagram from the Nowlan and Heap report.
Generally, the first few questions in a decision diagram determine the failure consequence.
Through their question answers, the user of the decision diagram is directed to the specific
diagram branch for a particular failure consequence. Each branch contains questions the
user answers in turn until a suitable task is identified. If no task can be identified, a
default action is selected. Typically, the order of the questions in each branch results
in on-condition maintenance tasks being preferred over scheduled restoration or overhaul
tasks.
3.5 Reliability-Centred Maintenance Publications 22
Figure 3.3: RCM Decision Diagram (Adapted from ...)
The primary difference between the branches is the default action. For lower significance
failure consequences such as the Economic/Operational category, a default action of no
maintenance is often acceptable. For higher significance failure consequences such as the
Safety category, no maintenance might be unacceptable or require significant justification.
In these cases, a redesign of the system is usually recommended. For the Hidden failure
consequence category, an additional failure finding maintenance task exists.
Once all appropriate maintenance tasks have been determined, maximum task intervals
are derived through consideration of the P-F interval and/or failure pattern as required.
The final maintenance regime implemented on equipment may differ from the periods
indicated through the maximum task intervals after consideration of additional constraints
such as resourcing and scheduling. For example, a derived maximum task interval of one
year and 2 months may be implemented as an annual task to simplify scheduling.
3.5 Reliability-Centred Maintenance Publications
RCM is discussed and detailed in a number of standards, books and publicly available
guides. A number of historically significant RCM publications, particularly United States
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and British military publications, have been cancelled. Many of these publications were
influential in the development of current RCM publications. Despite being cancelled,
many obsolete RCM publications are still accessible on the Internet. For simplicity, only
current publications are discussed.
3.5.1 SAE JA1101 & JA1102
SAE JA1101 is a standard published by the Society of Automotive Engineers (SAE). The
standard is intended to document the true tenets of RCM to facilitate the evaluation
of an RCM process. It is not intended to document a specific RCM implementation
(SAE International 2011). As a result, the SAE JA1101 standard is relatively brief and
describes RCM in fairly broad terms. The standard primarily defines RCM terminology
and the fundamental process steps with a minimum of detail. No specific guidance is
given regarding implementation.
SAE JA1102 is a guide to the SAE JA1101 standard and is also published by SAE. The
guide expands on the RCM process, concepts and rationale in far greater detail, however,
it is not intended to be a comprehensive manual for performing an RCM analysis (SAE
International 2009). There are obvious similarities between the content of SAE JA1102
and Moubray (1997), likely resulting from Moubray’s involvement in the development of
SAE JA1101 and SAE JA1102. Although the guide covers RCM in far greater detail than
the SAE standard, it does not provide any specific guidance on implementation.
3.5.2 AS IEC 60300.3.11
Dependability management Part 3.11 Application guide-Reliability centred maintenance is
an RCM guide published by the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) under
IEC 60300.3.11 and republished as an Australian Standard under AS IEC 60300.3.11.
The guide is one document in a suite of International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC)
documents on the topic of dependability, most of which are also republished as Australian
Standards.
The guide provides a similar level of detail on the RCM process to SAE JA1102 and
similarly, it does not provide any specific guidance on implementation. The primary
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difference between the AS IEC 60300.3.11 and SAE JA1102 is terminology. As an IEC
derived document, AS IEC 60300.3.11 conforms to the terminology defined in IEC 60050-
191 International Electrotechnical Vocabulary - Chapter 191: Dependability and quality of
service.
3.5.3 Reliability-Centred Maintenance II
In the early 1980’s, John Moubray began applying RCM to the mining and manufacturing
sectors. In the course of this work, Moubray identified what he perceived to be deficiencies
in the RCM process as reported by Nowlan and Heap. In 1990, Moubray published
Reliability-Centred Maintenance II (RCM2), a modified version of the RCM process.
Specifically, RCM2 added an environment failure consequence category, which was sub-
sequently included in a later issue of SAE JA1011. Moubray changed some of the termi-
nology used by Nowlan & Heap to remove ambiguities and modified the decision diagram
to include more questions. Moubray claims that RCM2 is fully compliant with the SAE
JA1011 standard.
Moubray’s book, Reliability-Centred Maintenance II (1997), comprehensively discusses
RCM2 including the rationale behind all aspects of the process. It also provides a sig-
nificant amount of additional information regarding general maintenance concepts and
specific guidance on RCM2 implementation.
Moubray (1997) places specific emphasis on the importance of keeping an RCM imple-
mentation in house. The guidance under RCM2 is that the operating context can make
a significant difference to maintenance requirements and that suppliers and/or support
contractors often do not understand the operating context well enough to deliver optimal
results. In addition, Moubray (1997) argues that suppliers and/or support contractors
have a vested interest in over supplying spare parts and over specifying maintenance in
order to increase profits.
3.5.4 NAVAIR 00-25-403
Guidelines For The Naval Aviation Reliability-Centered Maintenance Process, commonly
referred to as NAVAIR 00-25-403, is a publicly released document published by the Naval
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Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) of the United States Navy. The document provides
high level guidance regarding the RCM process and its implementation throughout an
asset’s life-cycle. Much of the guidance and terminology within the document is targeted
to the context of United States Navy aircraft or weaponry equipment and projects.
3.5.5 MIL-STD-3034A
Reliability-Centered Maintenance (RCM) Process, commonly referred to as MIL-STD-
3034A, is a publicly released military standard published by the United States Department
of Defence (DOD). The document provides detailed guidance for the implementation of
RCM within the Department of Defence (DOD) and associated agencies. The document
is heavily tailored to the specific context of the DOD. Under MIL-STD-3034A, the RCM
process is broken into twelve phases:
Phase 1 System partitioning and functional block diagram (FBD)
Phase 2 Functional failure analysis (FFA)
Phase 3 Functionally significant item (FSI) and Additional functionally significant item
(AFSI)
Phase 4 Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)
Phase 5 Decision logic tree analysis (LTA)
Phase 6 Servicing and lubrication analysis
Phase 7 Inactive equipment maintenance (IEM) task identification
Phase 8 Corrective maintenance task identification
Phase 9 Maintenance requirements index (MRI)
Phase 10 Maintenance requirement task definition
Phase 11 Maintenance procedure validation
Phase 12 Maintenance requirement card (MRC) and Maintenance index page (MIP)
The phases loosely follow the process outlined in SAE JA1101 tailored to the context of the
DOD. Phases 1, 2, 4, 5 & 10 essentially implement an RCM analysis as described in SAE
JA1101. As a military standard, MIL-STD-3034A can be used to specify requirements
for military acquisition contracts. This is reflected in some of the phase descriptions and
the detail to which the analysis result documentation formats are specified. The analysis
results documents are used as official Data Item Descriptors (DIDs).
Chapter 4
Literature Review & Case Study
4.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter provides review of a select literature and a brief case study of one ANSP
known by Airservices to have implemented RCM.
4.2 Critical Analysis of RCM
Quantitative analysis of maintenance concepts, especially maintenance optimisation, is
common place in the literature, however, there is relatively limited data specific to the
quantitative analysis of RCM. Typical maintenance textbooks, such as Tsang & Jardine
(2013), discuss the development of optimised preventive maintenance intervals through the
use of various mathematical modelling techniques. Van Horenbeek, Pintelon & Muchiri
(2010) points out that maintenance optimisation models such as these typically optimise
a single objective, usually cost, and have limited real world applicability. Van Horenbeek,
Pintelon & Muchiri develops a multi-objective maintenance optimisation framework that
can be used as the basis for developing multi-objective optimisation models tailored for
a specific business. The multi-objective optimisation framework proposed by Van Horen-
beek, Pintelon & Muchiri includes RCM as an input.
Maintenance optimisation models require accurate input data to deliver meaningful re-
sults (Van Horenbeek, Pintelon & Muchiri 2010). Sanchez, Carlos, Martorell & Villanueva
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(2009) proposed a methodology to optimise maintenance activities with uncertain input
data. Whilst the process of optimising maintenance through modelling may provide
some clarity as to what input data is needed, the Resnikoff Conundrum states that the
most needed failure data only exists when the maintenance program has already failed
(Moubray 1997). In addition, maintenance optimisation models struggle to identify ap-
propriate maintenance actions.
RCM is a structured methodology for determining maintenance actions which, as a largely
qualitative process, can be implemented with minimal failure data. Whilst the implemen-
tation of RCM has had drastic success in some industries (Tsang & Jardine 2013), RCM
has not been without its critics. Sherwin (1999) criticises the original Nowlan & Heap
report claiming that much of their analysis and their resulting conclusions were flawed.
Sherwin refutes the Resnikoff Conundrum and its use as justification that maintenance
regimes need not be based on failure data. Sherwin claims that censored operating data
is still data and that it is essential that maintenance regimes be based on quantitative
analysis.
Zajicek & Kamenicky (2014) argues that a fully quantitative analysis is the most ac-
curate approach to RCM, even considering uncertainty in input data. Zajicek & Ka-
menicky showed through an example that even with uncertain input data, metrics such
as the Maintenance Effectiveness Index (MEI) can still be useful when following the RCM
methodology for determining appropriate maintenance actions.
Pintelon, Nagarur & Puyvelde (1999) conducted a case study of an RCM implementation
tailored for an automotive manufacturing company and specifically applied to new ex-
pensive equipment for which there was little failure data. Pintelon, Nagarur & Puyvelde
states that the RCM analysis was time consuming and that the company considered
it a useful exercise, however, little quantifiable information is provided to support this
position.
Carretero et al. (2003) tailored the RCM process for application in a large scale railway
network. They augmented the classical RCM methodology with additional steps, modi-
fied the decision diagram and applied the new methodology at multiple levels in order to
get buy in from the companies involved. With over 250,000 subsystems, the RCM anal-
ysis found it to be effective to perform ‘generic’ analysis that worked across equipment
classes and to target specific criticality equipment. Through the modified RCM process,
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maintenance time and costs were significantly reduced.
In a critical analysis of Maintenance Steering Group Three (MSG-3), Ahmadi, So¨derholm
& Kumar (2010), concluded that the RCM methodology as defined by SAE JA1011 is
more robust and more clearly defined than MSG-3. Ahmadi, So¨derholm & Kumar also
concludes that, whilst MSG-3 is a structured and practical methodology for developing
maintenance regimes, there is no basis to claim that the delivered maintenance regimes
are in any way optimum or business oriented.
Given the similarities between RCM and MSG-3, it would appear logical that Ahmadi,
So¨derholm & Kumar’s findings regarding maintenance optimisation under MSG-3 also
apply to RCM. This is supported by Mendes & Ribeiro (2014) who were able to optimise
the maintenance intervals for existing RCM-derived maintenance actions for a Just-In-
Time production plant using time sequential Monte-Carlo simulation. They concluded
that quantitative analysis is important for maintenance scheduling in Just-In-Time pro-
duction scenarios which place high demand on production capability.
de Siqueira (2005) optimises the interval for RCM-derived maintenance actions for elec-
tric utilities by modelling maintenance actions as a Markov Chain from which objective
functions are develop that correlate to industry performance indices. Under this opti-
misation strategy, de Siqueira was able to find considerable cost savings and reliability
improvements.
Sillivant (2015) argues that the upfront investment required to implement the Condition
Based Maintenance/Monitoring (CBM) that RCM often requires is generally justifiable
when considering whole of life maintenance costs.
Huang, Bian & Cai (2012) identified a number of deficiencies in the traditional RCM
approach, primarily that the methodology relies too strongly on the experience of experts
rather than empirical data, is not targeted towards critical equipment and performs no
interval optimisation. Huang, Bian & Cai proposes an improved methodology that is
similar to Carretero et al. (2003).
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4.3 Case Study
In general, ANSPs do not publicly discuss their maintenance practices and very little
information is readily available in the literature regarding the ANSP industry’s adoption
of RCM. One ANSP, however, has privately informed Airservices that they have imple-
mented RCM as their primary methodology for developing maintenance strategies and
has agreed to take part in a case study as part of this dissertation. Airservices has agreed
to de-identify references to this ANSP in publicly available publications. This ANSP shall
be referred to as ANSP1 for the remainder of this document.
Before the adoption of RCM, ANSP1 did not follow any formalised methodology for the
determination of maintenance regimes. In general, maintenance requirements for a system
were determined by an Engineering Unit based on experience, knowledge of the design
and manufacturer’s recommendations. Maintenance procedures were modified based on
information gathered from fault occurrences and field staff.
These maintenance regimes were relatively successful in that availability targets for sys-
tems were generally met, however, there were no specific metrics in place measuring the
efficiency of the maintenance strategy.
ANSP1 determined that there was potential to improve the efficiency of their maintenance
practices and the reliability of their systems. ANSP1 developed and implemented a for-
malised RCM program over a period of approximately three years. Under this program,
system maintenance strategies are developed through in person facilitation workshops at-
tended by at least an RCM expert, a system engineer and experienced technicians. Other
relevant stakeholders are able to be phoned in the workshop to provide input or answer
questions on an as needed basis. The scope of systems/equipment considered during a
workshop is determined prior to the workshop commencing and generally coincides with
equipment supplied by one OEM.
During the workshops, maintenance tasks and intervals are determined following the RCM
methodology and considering availability data from sources such as manufacturer’s data,
senior technician experience, modelling during system design and fault history recorded
in a Computer Maintenance Management System (CMMS). ANSP1 conducts bimonthly
system reliability review meetings attended by senior Engineers and maintenance staff.
Evidence of over or under maintenance uncovered during the system reliability review
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triggers a review of the system’s maintenance strategy.
No specific work was undertaken by ANSP1 to determine that the RCM methodology
would deliver maintenance strategies that complied with ANSP1’s operational and regula-
tory obligations. ANSP1’s regulator considered the MSG-3 methodology well established
within the aircraft industry and was satisfied, since the RCM implementation resembled
MSG-3, that it was similarly rigorous and consequently a safe methodology. Although
ANSP1’s maintenance methodology is probably more closely aligned with RCM, they
refer to the process as MSG-3.
ANSP1 have reported that the transition to the RCM philosophy was met with some
resistance from technical staff, who saw the potential for reduced job security. Due to
a conservative safety culture, ANSP1 have also had some difficulty getting RCM work-
shop participants to categorise failure consequences as a category lower than safety con-
sequence. This has resulted in a tendency for developed maintenance regimes to over
specify maintenance, which needs to be actively resisted.
Overall, ANSP1 have reported that the adoption of RCM has largely been positive, result-
ing in a structured and formalised approach to maintenance strategy determination, re-
duced intrusive maintenance and reduced total maintenance man-hours. However, ANSP1
have also found that the adoption of RCM resulted in increased difficulties maintaining
technician competence on equipment as a result of reduced equipment exposure.
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This chapter discussed ...
Chapter 5
Methodology & Modelling
Development
5.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter outlines the methodology and the development of the modelling system.
5.2 Fundamental Methodology
As discussed in Chapter 2, Airservices primarily measures the performance of its systems
through availability and reliability metrics. In simplistic terms, Airservices would be
interested in pursuing RCM further if it could be demonstrated that maintenance regimes
derived using the RCM process did not or were not likely to adversely affect system
performance. For this reason the methodology primarily focused on modelling system
availability for Airservices systems under their current maintenance regimes as well as
maintenance regimes derived following the RCM process.
As with any modelling, a key risk for this work was the inherent uncertainty regarding the
validity of the modelling results. For this reason, the adopted methodology was an adap-
tation of the software development V-model and is illustrated graphically in Figure 5.1.
The methodology involved progressing the work through defined requirements analysis,
solution development, verification, validation and modelling phases. The structure of this
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Figure 5.1: Project Methodology
methodology and the focus on delivering explicit artefacts at each phase was intended to
provide assurance that modelling results were valid.
5.3 System Architecture Designs
5.3.1 User and System Requirements
The functionality that would be required of a reliability modelling system for NAS equip-
ment from the perspective of the user was developed as user requirements and is shown
in B.2. From these requirements, detailed functional performance and specifications and
are shown in B.3. These requirements were used to guide the development of custom
modelling solution and compare and critically assess the suitability of COTS software.
5.3.2 Background Concepts
This section outlines some background concepts that were considered when developing
the architecture designs.
Simulation Methodologies
A number of potential approaches to system availability modelling were determined during
the literature review, namely:
• Analytical
• Markov Chains
• Petrinets
• Time-Sequential Simulation
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• Discrete-Event Simulation
• Monte-Carlo Simulation
Monte-Carlo Simulation involves performing a number of simulation runs of some stochas-
tic process and treating the results as statistically distributed sample results, approxi-
mately equivalent to the results obtained from a physical experiment. The concept can
be applied to almost any simulation methodology. Monte-Carlo simulation, therefore, is
not a standalone simulation methodology. Except for the case of generic COTS Monte-
Carlo simulation software, the concept of Monte-Carlo simulation will not be considered
a separate simulation methodology.
Analytical methods for calculating reliability of systems are only feasible for simple sys-
tems. Analytical solutions become impractical for systems involving:
• complex redundancy models
• maintenance response rates dependent on system state
• non-exponentially distributed reliability and maintainability distributions
• non-statistically independent failure modes
For these reasons, it was determined that it was not appropriate to attempt to calculate
system reliability parameters analytically and that some simulation methodology would
be required. Analytical solutions have not been considered further.
State based methodologies such as Markov Chains and Petrinets suffer from state-space
explosion, which refers to the number of possible states increasing exponentially with the
number of elements. As a result, state based methodologies can be difficult to manage.
Time-sequential simulation involves simulating the system using a fixed time step. As
a result of the fixed time step, the algorithm for time-sequential simulation is relatively
simple. Broadly, time-sequential simulation involves:
1. Determining, for each item, whether:
• the item has failed
• the item is in maintenance
• the item has failed during maintenance
• a failed item has been repaired
2. Determining the system’s state
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3. Repeating the process for each time step
Discrete-event simulation involves simulating the system using a dynamic time step. At
the cost of increased algorithm complexity, the time required to run a simulation can
be greatly reduced compared to time-sequential simulation. In general, discrete-event
simulation involves the generation of event times, stepping the simulation time through
event times and adjusting event times based on previous events as required.
5.3.3 System State Determination Methodologies
State Passing
A simple method of determining the system’s state is to have each item in a Reliability
Block Diagram (RBD), pass an appropriate state to downstream items. The state of the
system at any given time would be the state received by the end node. Each item would
supply its own state logically combined with an input state to downstream items.
This system requires four special node types:
• start node
• end node
• splitter
• combiner
A start node would be the originating source for the system state. Normally the start node
would constantly output an up state. However, in cases where systems are interlocked,
such as Instrument Landing System (ILS) Glide Paths & Localisers or Doppler/Conven-
tional VHF Omni-Range (VOR) collocated with Distance Measuring Equipment (DME),
the start node would be a logical place to input a state reflecting that a system is un-
available to due to the state of a separate interlocking system.
Splitter nodes would copy an input to state to as many downstream items as required.
Combiner nodes would output an appropriate logical combination of input states. This
method allows the simple creation of m-of-n redundancy topologies since combiner nodes
would only be required to check that m out of n input states where up to output an up
state.
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An end node would be a sink for the system state. The state of the end node would
represent the state of the system as a whole. This system could be used to represent more
than
Figure 5.2: State Passing
Any number of states can be represented using this methodology.
Structure Function
The state of a whole system can be calculated analytically through the use of a structure
function. Each system item has a binary state variable X where:
X (t) =

1 if the item is functioning at time t
0 if the item is in a failed state at time t
The state of the system can then be determined through the structure function φ (x) ,
where x is a state vector comprised of binary state variables:
φ (x) = φ (x1, x2, . . . , xn)
Elements connected in series have a multiplicative structure function:
φ (x) = x1 · x2 . . . xn =
n∏
i=1
xi
Elements connected in parallel have a structure function in the following form:
φ (x) =
n∐
i=1
xi
Elements in an m-of-n parallel redundant system have a structure function in the following
form:
φ (x) =

1 if
∑n
i=1 xi ≥ m
0 if
∑n
i=1 xi < m
For simple systems, it is relatively easy to determine the structure function from RBDs
by eye. In the example system from Figure 5.2, the structure function is:
φ (x) = xC [1− (1− xA) (1− xB)]
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It is relatively complex, however, for a software program to derive the structure function.
The architecture of the RBD must be analysed to determine which items are in series and
which items are in parallel.
A structure function relies on each state variable being binary, i.e. that each item can
only have two states, namely failed or not failed.
Depth-First Search
An RBD can be considered a form of acyclic digraph as shown in Figure 5.3. By per-
forming a depth-first search, beginning at the start node (S), it is possible to determine
the state of the system, based on whether it is possible to traverse the graph to the end
node (E).
Figure 5.3: Acyclic Digraph
The general algorithm for a recursive depth-first search is:
1. label node as visited
2. end search if current node is end node
3. for all connections from node, recursively call depth-first search if next node is not
already visited
The general algorithm is relatively simple to implement with a digraph stored as either
an adjacency list or adjacency matrix, however, the general algorithm is insufficient for
systems with m-of-n redundancy. This is because a standard depth-first search will return
true if it finds a single path from the start to the ending nodes, it is not capable of detecting
that there are m paths within the m-of-n redundant portion of the RBD.
The simplest way to extend the depth-first search algorithm is to split the search into
stages, such that a standard depth-first search is performed beginning with the start
node and ending with the last node upstream of the m-of-n redundant nodes. A modified
depth-first search would be need to be performed between the first and last nodes having
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an m-of-n redundant architecture. The modified depth-first search would check that at
least m paths existed between the two nodes by recording the successful paths that were
identified and excluding these paths from the next search. If successful, a normal depth-
first search could continue on from the last node of the redundant portion to the end
node.
For some complex system architectures, this methodology might give erroneous results,
where it might be difficult to accurately identify an exact node that is upstream of the
m-of-n redundancy nodes. This situation could arise where m-of-n architectures contain
embedded m-of-n architectures.
An algorithm capable of appropriately determining start and stop nodes for a modified
depth-first search that would work for all cases would necessarily be complex.
Typically, a depth-first search would identify the binary value of a system state variable,
i.e. whether the system is operating or not operating, given any number of failed com-
ponents. The algorithm could conceivably be extended to facilitate non-binary system
states.
5.3.4 Custom Solutions
Three high level architecture designs were developed as potential modelling solutions with
all of the architecture designs using different simulation approaches. The first architec-
ture design, referred to here as Custom 1, uses time-sequential Monte-Carlo simulation
provided by a bespoke Object-Oriented Programming (OOP) class structure. The sec-
ond architecture design, referred to here as Custom 2, uses discrete-event Monte-Carlo
simulation provided by a bespoke OOP class structure. The third architecture design,
referred to here as Custom 3, uses discrete-event Monte-Carlo simulation provided by
SimPi, an open source process-based discrete-event simulation framework for the Python
programming language.
The three architecture designs are three different implementations of the same modelling
concept, depicted diagrammatically in Appendix B.4. As far as possible, the functionality
and behaviour is intended to be consistent between the three architecture designs. The
overarching concept is that
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All three of the architecture designs, primarily provide a minimal simulation framework
through an OOP class structure, the use of which is depicted diagrammatically in 5.4. The
user would be required to develop a Python script that contains a system for simulation,
built from the provided classes. If desired, the user would be able to extend the provided
classes to deliver additional functionality.
Once the user has simulated the model, the user is able to analyse the simulation results.
Basic analysis tools would be provided within the class structure. If desired, the user
would able to use any Python compatible analysis tool.
Figure 5.4: UML Use Case Diagram
5.3.5 Choice of Programming Language
All of the custom solutions are designed around the Python programming language version
2.7.10. This language was chosen for the speed of development that it offers over its
execution performance, the simplicity and availability of its development environment and
the certainty with which a solution could be developed in it. Other languages considered
were C, C++, MATLAB/Octave and Julia. All languages considered were selected due
to the author’s perceived familiarity and/or confidence with them.
As compiled languages, C and C++ offer better execution performance than Python
at the expense of development time. Development time is generally slower in compiled
languages due to the compilation process. The problem of reliability naturally lends itself
to the consideration of Object-Oriented Programming, excluding C as an option.
As interpreted languages, MATLAB/Octave, Julia and Python offer faster development
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times over execution performance. A common feature of these specific interpreted lan-
guages is the provision of a read-eval-print loop (REPL), sometimes referred to as an
interactive shell. An REPL provides a convenient means for ad-hoc testing of code with-
out developing specific compiled test cases or a generic text parser.
Julia is a relatively new programming language targeted specifically towards high-performance
numerical and scientific computing. Its proponents boast significantly improved execution
performance over comparable Python code. It is unusual though in that its implemen-
tation of multiple dispatch precludes the use of object methods. Thus, in Julia, object
methods are not object member functions, rather, they are functions that accept objects
of particular types. In addition, Julia, only supports a limited form of object inheritance,
in which objects may inherit their type from an abstract type, but not any object contents
or behaviour. For some problems, particularly in scientific computing, this approach is
appropriate. However, for general computing, this approach is a paradigm change from
other OOP implementations. Whilst Julia is a promising option as an interpreted lan-
guage with favourable execution performance, it was determined that its unusual OOP
implementation did not make it a good candidate for the quick development of code for
this project.
5.3.6 Commercial Off The Shelf (COTS) Solutions
Raptor
Raptor is a commercial reliability simulation and analysis tool, currently owned and sold
by the Booz Allen Hamilton engineering consultancy. Raptor was originally developed by
the US Air Force and versions up to Raptor 4.0 are freely available. Aeronautical Radio
Incorporated (ARINC) modified the US Air Force’s original program releasing Raptor
7.0. In 2013, ownership of Raptor 7.0 was transferred to Booz Allen Hamilton.
Raptor 7.0 uses discrete event monte carlo simulation to simulate the reliability of com-
plex systems. Systems are entered as RBDs with series, parallel or complex redundancy
topologies. Components are assigned reliability and maintainability probability distribu-
tions which are used to simulate events. The software is capable of incorporating sparing
strategies and resource allocation into its calculations.
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The software has been used extensively in industry, particularly in military applications.
BlockSim
BlockSim is a commercial system reliability analysis application produced by ReliaSoft. It
uses discrete event simulation for the analysis of repairable systems. Systems are entered
as either RBDs or fault trees, with components assigned reliability and maintainability
probability distributions. The software is able to take sparing strategies and resource
availability into account in the simulations. The software also has a number of additional
features, such as the ability to calculate optimum preventive maintenance intervals.
GoldSim
GoldSim is general purpose Monte-Carlo simulation environment. Models which mathe-
matically describe elements of a system are developed and can be graphically connected
together and run by the software. Although not strictly required, an additional reliability
module exists providing common functionality often required to solve reliability problems.
Systems are entered as a collection of interconnected models, rather than as a strict RBD.
As a more generic Monte-Carlo simulator, GoldSim inherently facilitates components with
multiple failure modes, component failures that are not independent and systems that
change over time.
SimEvents
SimEvents is a discrete-event simulation engine for Simulink developed by MathWorks.
Discrete-event simulations can be run in loops to produce Monte-Carlo simulations. Sim-
ulations involve running models that mathematically describe the behaviour of system
components and can be interconnected. As a generic discrete-event simulation engine,
SmEvents inherently facilitates simulation of systems that are dynamic and/or have com-
ponents that are not-independent.
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RAM Commander
RAM Commander is a modular software program developed by ALD Reliability Engi-
neering Ltd. Each module is able to perform a number of reliability related functions. The
RBD module allows the calculation of reliability parameters for entered RBDs through
Monte-Carlo simulation.
5.3.7 Comparison of Solutions
A trade-off matrix was developed to compare the proposed custom and COTS solutions
against key criteria. The selected criteria was:
• the solution’s ability to provide all FPS items with an essential class
• the solution’s ability to provide all FPS items with an important class
• the solution’s ability to provide all FPS items with a desirable class
• the estimated speed of simulation based on simulation methodology (relative to
other proposed solutions)
• the subjective level of author’s confidence that the solution would be suitable for
delivering the project
• the subjective level of author’s confidence that the solution would allow the project
to be delivered on schedule
• the cost to purchase modelling solution (relative to other proposed solutions)
The custom solutions scored highly against most criteria, primarily because they are
inexpensive to implement and compliance with FPS items can be guaranteed. However,
the development of software will take a significant amount time, subsequently, the custom
solutions scored poorly against the Schedule criteria.
It could not be determined that any of the reliability specific COTS modelling software
would be able to deliver a number of FPS items, the most critical being FPS:1.008 (The
software shall allow repair distributions to depend on system function state), required
to deliver UR:1.004 (The software shall allow system maintainability parameters to com-
ply with Airservices maintenance practices). Consequently, the reliability specific COTS
modelling solutions scored poorly against these criteria.
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As more generic modelling solutions, GoldSim and SimEvents are more likely to be ale to
provide all of the FPS items and so they scored highly against these criteria. However,
being more generic, any solution implemented using them is likely to be more complex,
require more time for user familiarisation and take longer to develop. As a result, this
software scored poorly against the implementation and schedule criteria.
Raptor 4.0 is freely available and Airservices possess an unused licence for Raptor 7.0
so these items scored highly against the cost criteria. All other COTS solutions would
require acquisition.
Table 5.1 gives the scores for all criteria and the totals.
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Essential Requirements 5 5 5 5 4 4 4 5 5 4
Important Requirements 4 5 5 5 2 2 2 5 5 2
Desirable Requirements 3 5 5 5 1 1 1 5 5 1
Simulation Time 2 1 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5
Implementation 4 5 5 5 2 3 3 1 1 3
Schedule 5 3 2 1 4 4 4 3 2 3
Cost 5 5 5 5 5 5 0 0 0 0
Total 162 145 120 154 158 58 79 79 58
Table 5.1: Solution Trade-Off Matrix
The trade-off matrix selected Custom 1 as the preferred solution followed by Raptor 7.0.
In the author’s opinion, use of a COTS modelling solution would be preferred due to the
potential time efficiencies that could be gained by not needing to fully implement a custom
modelling solution. However, the trade-off matrix clearly demonstrates that uncertainty
around COTS software’s ability to satisfy Functional and Performance Specification (FPS)
items, combined with significant acquisition costs renders them ill-suited to the task.
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5.4 Chapter Summary
This chapter discussed ...
Chapter 6
Modelling and Analysis
6.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter details the reliability modelling of Airservices systems and a summary of
the results.
6.2 Scope of RCM Analysis
The VHF DSB AM Voice Communication System (VHF) Essential service was selected
as the first system to be analysed primarily due to the author’s familiarity with the
system. The service provides half-duplex audio communications between Air Traffic Con-
trollers and external third parties, predominantly aircraft, using double side-band ampli-
tude modulation Radio Frequency (RF) transmissions in the aeronautical communication
band (approximately 118-137 MHz).
Essential VHF services are defined by Airservices as ‘‘a system level where the failure of
the ability to communicate between aircraft and operators results in compromised means
of providing separation services within one or more airspace sectors”. This definition
was derived from the FAA document NAS-SR-1000. The FAA document has since been
superseded by NAS-RD-2013 which defines a generic Essential service as “A service that
if lost would significantly raise the risk associated with providing safe and efficient NAS
operations”. Both Airservices and the FAA stipulate that Essential services are required
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Figure 6.1: Scope of RCM Analysis
to achieve a minimum of three nines availability (99.9%). Airservices also stipulate that
Essential VHF services have a minimum Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) of one year.
The performance parameters are achieved if the average (over an annualised period) of
the population of installed Essential VHF services exceeds the requirements. Essential
VHF services are not required to meet the performance parameters individually.
The generic topology of a single VHF Essential service instance is shown in Figure 6.1.
Typically, an Air Traffic Controller, located in one of the major control centres, operates a
voice switch that facilitates audio communication with external parties. The voice switch
consists of a Human-Machine Interface (HMI) that allows the controller to select which
equipment is in use. The voice switch HMI also indicates a simplified summary status for
the equipment to the controller.
The system consists of two almost identical end-to-end redundant paths, allowing the
system to achieve the inherent availability required for an Essential VHF service. Each
redundant path consists of a voice switch multiplexer (MUX), a data bearer, radio MUX,
VHF transceiver, cavity filter, Surge Protection Device (SPD) and antenna. Both anten-
nas are typically situated at different positions on the same tower. The voice switch and
radio MUX interface the VHF transceiver to the voice switch
The redundant paths are differentiated by the terms Main and Standby. The controller is
able to select between the Main and Standby paths using he voice switch HMI. Switching
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between paths is only possible at the controller end of the system by design, as previous
design topologies identified that switching equipment became single points of failure and
decreased overall system reliability.
Variations exist in actual Essential VHF service implementations. For example, data
bearers may be any of a range of technologies such as microwave links, satellite links or
fibre optic links provided by either Airservices or a third party and will depend on what is
available at a particular site. Similarly, specific antenna models are determined by specific
coverage requirements and there are a number of tower types used by Airservices.
Few RCM publications provide guidance on the selection of an appropriate RCM anal-
ysis scope. Moubray (1997) advises that generally an RCM should be conducted at an
intermediate level such that it is possible to identify a suitable failure management policy.
More specifically, Moubray (1997) advises that, for complex systems, an RCM analysis
should be conducted one to two levels higher than initially seems appropriate. Moubray
claims that, in his experience, inexperienced RCM practitioners tend to start an analysis
at too low a level and consequently deliver inefficient results. Moubray also claims that
it is easier to reduce the scope
For this analysis, it was decided that the scope would include all remotely located equip-
ment dedicated to the Essential VHF service as well as the tower. It was deemed that
the analysis would be relatively high, as per Moubray’s guidance, whilst deliberately ex-
cluding complex systems in their own right such as the bearers, voice switch MUX and
voice switch, which likely warrant their own individual analyses. Where specific
6.3 Maintenance Regimes
6.3.1 Exisitng Maintenance Regimes
Airservices existing maintenance regimes for the equipment within the scope of analysis
are described across four documents. The VHF Transceiver, Radio MUX and portions of
the antenna system that can be tested from the equipment room at ground level are tested
annually by radio technicians. Simplified extracts of the maintenance actions performed
under these regimes are detailed in Tables 6.1, 6.3 & 6.2 respectively.
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No. Maintenance Action Interval
1 Unmodulated transmit power 1 year
2 Carrier frequency accuracy 1 year
3 Modulation depth 1 year
4 Modulation bandwidth 1 year
5 Modulation distortion 1 year
6 Carrier noise 1 year
7 Spurious emissions 1 year
8 Press-To-Talk (PTT) Timeout 1 year
9 Modulation on voice 1 year
10 Receiver unmute point 1 year
11 Receiver Signal to Noise Ratio (SNR) 1 year
12 Audio output level 1 year
13 Receiver bandwidth 1 year
14 Adjacent channel rejection 1 year
15 Receiver desensitisation 1 year
16 Documentation & CMMS data check 1 year
17 VHF Transceiver Firmware version check 1 year
18 Monitoring check 1 year
Table 6.1: VHF Transceiver Existing Maintenance Regime
No. Maintenance Action Interval
19 Voltage Standing Wave Ratio (VSWR) of antenna system 1 year
20 Visual inspection of SPD and earthing 1 year
21 CMMS data check 1 year
Table 6.2: Antenna System Existing Maintenance Regime
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No. Maintenance Action Interval
22 Filter check 1 year
23 Power check 1 year
24 Filter replacement 2 years
25 CMMS data check 1 year
Table 6.3: Radio MUX Existing Maintenance Regime
No. Maintenance Action Interval
26 Visual inspection of antenna 2 years
27 Visual inspection of antenna mounting hardware 2 years
28 Visual inspection of coaxial feeder 2 years
29 Visual inspection of coaxial feeder connector sealing 2 years
30 Visual inspection of coaxial feeder earthing 2 years
31 Visual inspection of tower footings 2 years
32 Visual inspection of tower structure and paintwork 2 years
33 Visual inspection of cable trays 2 years
34 Check of drawing accuracy 2 years
Table 6.4: Tower Existing Maintenance Regime
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6.3.2 RCM Derived Maintenance Regime
An RCM facilitation meeting was held at Airservices to develop an RCM maintenance
regime for the equipment within the scope outlined in Figure 6.1. The facilitation meet-
ing was attended by representatives of technical staff, systems maintenance engineers,
operational staff, the Engineering Operations Manager and the Maintenance Engineering
Manager. Attendance at the facilitation meeting was not compulsory and due to com-
peting commitments, not all attendees were able to attend the facilitation meeting in its
entirety.
Three of the meeting attendees had previously completed a three-day Introduction to
RCM2 training course conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers and were familiar with the
RCM process, particularly RCM2, at a theoretical if not practical level. Some of the other
meeting attendees were informally familiar with the fundamental concepts of reliability,
maintenance engineering and RCM as a result of their prior professional experience. In
general, the level of familiarity with RCM concepts amongst facilitation meeting attendees
was low.
The facilitation meeting largely followed the RCM2 approach as outlined by Moubray
(1997). Identified functions, functional failures, failure modes and failure effects were
recorded in an Information Worksheet adapted from the layout described in Moubray
(1997). Failure consequences, appropriate maintenance tasks and initial intervals were
identified following the RCM2 decision diagram supplied by PricewaterhouseCoopers as
part of their RCM2 training course. This decision diagram is similar to the decision di-
agram presented in Moubray (1997), however, it provides additional guidance to assist
in determining whether maintenance tasks are both technically feasible and worth do-
ing. The results of the decision diagram were recorded in a Decision Worksheet adapted
from the layout described in Moubray (1997). The Information Worksheet and Decision
Worksheet are presented in Appendices C.2 and C.3 respectively.
Identified maintenance tasks and their intervals were consolidated into a maintenance
regime. In some cases, task intervals were reduced from the initial interval identified in
the Decision Worksheet to create a homogeneous body of work and for ease of scheduling.
The resulting maintenance regime is shown in Table 6.5. The regime essentially consists
of a body of work performed by radio technicians at two-yearly intervals and a separate
body of work performed by lines staff at three-yearly intervals.
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No. Maintenance Action Interval
1 VSWR of antenna system 2 years
2 Passive Inter-Modulation (PIM) test of antenna system 2 years
3 Replace SPD 4 years
4 Replace VHF Transceiver capacitors 10 years
5 Test and tag VHF Transceiver mains cable 4 years
6 Visual inspection of perspex guard 2 years
7 Visual inspection of equipment rack hardware 2 years
8 Test operation of VHF Transceiver alarms 2 years
9 Replace Radio MUX filter 2 years
10 Test operation of Radio MUX alarms 2 years
11 Check for Beryllium Oxide (BeO) sticker 2 years
12 Check for transmitter label 2 years
13 Check drawing accuracy 2 years
14 Check CMMS data 2 years
15 Visual inspection of antenna 3 years
16 Visual inspection of antenna mounting hardware 3 years
17 Visual inspection of tower infrastructure 3 years
18 Visual inspection of feeder ties 3 years
19 Visual inspection of antenna feeder earthing 3 years
20 Test bolt torque 3 years
21 PIM test of tower structure 3 years
Table 6.5: RCM-derived Maintenance Regime
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Figure 6.2: Modelled Essential VHF System Availability
6.4 Model
Although Airservices maintenance records of equipment failures in CMMS, it was found
that these records are not of sufficient granularity or quality to be used in a reliability
model. Failure modes and their distributions were for the modelled equipment were
identified using an informal Deplhi Method with the results of the RCM analysis as an
input.
6.5 Results
The RCM-derived and existing maintenance regimes were simulated 15 times each for a
simulation period of 15 years with a time-step of five hours. Both simulations took in
excess of 1 hour’s computation time each to complete. The annul availability of the Es-
sential VHF system was calculated under both maintenance regimes and averaged across
each simulation. The total number of hours that the Essential VHF system underwent
maintenance was also calculated under both maintenance regimes and averaged across
each simulation. Table 6.6 shows the mean maintenance hours and the annual system
availability is shown in Figure 6.2.
The Essential VHF system performed similarly under both maintenance regimes, with
system availability approaching 100% for the entirety of the simulation period. The
system appears to have performed slightly better under the existing maintenance regime.
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RCM Existing
Corrective 7927 8711
Preventive 143 287
Total 8070 8998
Table 6.6: Mean Maintenance Hours
There was a large drop in mean availability in the final year under the RCM-derived
maintenance regime due to a single simulation that experienced an availability of just 3%
resulting in a pronounced negative skew.
The existing maintenance regime resulted in approximately 1000 more maintenance hours
over the simulation period.
Chapter 7
Discussion
7.1 Chapter Overview
This chapter discusses the results of reliability modelling in more detail and expands on
a number of qualitative details arrising from teh analysis.
7.2 NATCA Press Release
It is clear that the allegations levelled against the FAA’s adoption of RCM by NATCA in
their press release (2005) represent a somewhat flawed interpretation of RCM. NATCA
claim that the adoption of RCM implies an intention to wait until equipment fails before
conducting vital work as RCM is a ‘fix-on-fail’ concept. They draw the comparison with
purchasing a new vehicle, never changing the oil and waiting until the engine has seized
before taking it to the mechanic. Consequently, they claim that equipment failures will
become more extensive, jeopardise aviation safety and cost more in the long run.
Using the example provided by NATCA, it is difficult to understand how an RCM analysis
could justify waiting until the engine of a newly purchased vehicle had seized before taking
it to the mechanic. Following the RCM process for a generic vehicle, it is likely that an
extract from an information worksheet might include something similar to the details in
Table 7.1.
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The failure effect described in Table 7.1 would most likely qualify as a safety failure
consequence, since the sudden and unpredictable stoppage of the engine could conceivably
result in the death of the operator and/or others in the vicinity. Since the seizing of the
engine should be readily detectable by the operator, it would most likely not qualify as a
hidden failure consequence.
Function To be capable of moving under power in the forward direction at
speeds of up to 110 km/h and in the reverse direction at speeds
of up to 20 km/h.
Functional Failure Unable to move
Failure Mode Engine seized due to poor lubrication
Failure Effect As lubricant levels lower, engine components will begin to wear
causing the sump to collect metallic fragments. As the cylin-
der wears, piston ring may not form tight seal resulting in ex-
cessive lubricant burning in the combustion process. Excessive
engine temperature will be indicated to driver on the temper-
ature gauge. At some point the engine will stop suddenly and
unpredictably.
Table 7.1: Generic Vehicle RCM Information Worksheet Excerpt
In general, decision diagrams for safety failure consequences requires that some mainte-
nance action is performed or that the system be redesigned. The RCM2 decision diagram,
for example, explicitly does not permit no permit no maintenance action to be selected
for safety failure consequences.
Following the RCM process to completion, the decision diagram would require the anal-
ysis and identification of a suitable on-condition maintenance task. This analysis would
presumably find the inspection of oil level at regular intervals to be the most effective
maintenance action.
RCM is not inherently a ‘fix-on-fail’ philosophy. Where no scheduled maintenance is
determined to be the appropriate maintenance action for a specific failure mode, it should
be justified through the prior consideration of the failure consequence and the suitability
of on-condition, scheduled restoration and scheduled discard maintenance tasks. This
thought experiment suggests that NATCA’s arguments and subsequent conclusions are
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difficult to justify.
However, this thought experiment also makes some assumptions regarding the competence
of the practitioners involved, the RCM analysis scope and the specifics of the RCM
implementation. It’s conceivable that an RCM analysis conducted at too low a scope
would identify many unnecessary maintenance tasks or that inexperienced practitioners
may miss a failure mode completely.
As discussed in subsequent chapters, significant variations in RCM implementations exist
and the RCM process itself does not guarantee a positive outcome. NATCA’s press re-
lease made specific mention of a Concept of Operations (ConOps) document that detailed
the FAA’s intentions to implement RCM. In addition, NATCA have had experience with
the FAA’s troubled implementation of CMP. Details of these aspects of the FAA’s main-
tenance practices are not available to the author. It is possible that there are specific
details in these documents that might justify NATCA’s position.
7.3 Maintenance Regime Analysis
The RCM process identified that almost all of the tests performed under the existing
maintenance regime for the VHF Transceiver and Radio MUX do not assist to prevent
functional failures from occurring. This is a consequence of most failure modes for these
equipments manifesting as exponentially distributed with an impractically short P-F in-
terval. Functional failures are prevented primarily through a redundant system topology.
Additionally, the process identified that scheduled maintenance was appropriate to pre-
vent the manifestation of an identified time-dependent failure mode for the VHF Transceiver
that was not identified in the existing maintenance regime.
7.4 RCM Process Observations
The development of an RCM-derived maintenance regime through a facilitation meet-
ing revealed a number of observations regarding the RCM process. First and foremost,
although the process uses a structured approach to derive a maintenance regime, the anal-
ysis is still somewhat subjective. Disagreements about whether the definitions of system
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functions, whether failure modes were reasonably likely and the categorisation of failure
consequences were commonplace.
The process strongly relies on the expertise and experience of the facilitation meeting
attendees to accurately define the system’s functions, functional failures, failure modes,
failure effects and failure consequences. The process has the potential to be considered
dull and tedious, leading to attendee fatigue and the inaccurate listing of relevant de-
tails. Results are likely to be improved by regular reviews of the developed maintenance
regimes. Most RCM publications advocate an iterative RCM process implementation. In
the opinion of the author, additional quality assurance would be provided by the devel-
opment of a formalised methodology for ensuring that relevant equipment performance
field data is input into the process.
The selection of appropriate maintenance tasks may require detailed industry knowledge
of maintenance practices and testing techniques not currently employed within the or-
ganisation. Determination of whether maintenance tasks are economically feasible may
require access to financial data and analyses that are not readily available during a facil-
itation meeting.
It is difficult to identify appropriate boundaries for an RCM analysis. The facilitation
meeting conducted as part of this work did not identify any failure modes relating to the
Tower structure footings, despite maintenance tasks for this in the existing maintenance
regime. The failure modes relating to the tower structure that were identified were poten-
tially somewhat simplistic and may have benefited from more in-depth analysis. In the
opinion of the author, the analysis of the tower structure was limited due to the percep-
tion that the electrical equipment is primarily responsible for delivering the Essential VHF
system. In any case, a complete listing of tower structure failure modes would likely have
resulted in an unmanageably long analysis. Feedback from facilitation meeting attendees
was that the tower structure would have benefited from a separate analysis. There is a
risk, however, that reducing the scope of analysis simply shifts the problem. For example,
it may not be immediately obvious in a separate analysis of the tower structure that the
tower has a secondary function of not causing interference to the Essential VHF service in
addition to a primary function of supporting the Essential VHF system’s antennas. This
distinction is significant because degradation of a tower structure is likely to result in a
secondary functional failure much faster than a primary functional failure, implying that
different maintenance intervals may be appropriate.
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It is important to note that the RCM process only produces a scheduled maintenance
regime. It does not produce specific guidance on appropriate corrective maintenance
or other maintenance engineering concepts such as sparing philosophies and scheduling
optimisation. As such, RCM should be viewed in the context as one element of a broader
maintenance engineering framework.
7.5 Limitations of Modelling
Reliability modelling, in general, models the reliability performance of a system’s primary
function. Most systems also provide many secondary functions, the loss of which may
or may not impact on the primary function. As a result, the true impact of a system’s
maintenance regime may not be reflected in the system’s reliability performance. Admin-
istrative tasks such as checking for a transmitter label or BeO sticker, for example, can
not easily be incorporated into the model and are unable to affect the system’s availabil-
ity, however, they may still be important tasks from teh perspective of the organisation.
Similarly, testing and tagging of the VHF Transceiver mains cable has potential safety
implications but can not be easily incorporated into the model because the cable is only
used in abnormal circumstances.
The model is not able to account for effects that are difficult to quantify and feedback
loops. For example, a reduction in preventive maintenance may result in decreased staff
familiarity with sites and equipment, leading to longer repair times. This was identified
as an issue in a real world RCM implementation by ANSP1. Similarly, the model assumes
perfect maintenance is not capable of accounting for faults induced by technician error or
where spare parts are found to be faulty during corrective maintenance.
Equipment failure modes are modelled as having clearly defined performance levels at
which a functional failure is considered to have occurred. In practice, performance levels
are often continuous with service delivery dependent on the system’s performance level.
This implies that there is the potential for there to be an operational impact before a
functional failure is considered to have happened.
For ease of calculation, the model counts all maintenance time spent rectifying a potential
failure discovered during scheduled maintenance and maintenance time spent rectifying
an actual failure as corrective maintenance. Only the time spent during a scheduled
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maintenance task is counted as preventive maintenance time. These definitions of main-
tenance time conform to Airservices current processes, however, they may not match the
definitions used in other organisations industries. The calculated maintenance times may
not necessarily be appropriate for time based maintenance metrics such as the PM/CM
ratio (Call 2007).
The model uses a purely stochastic process to determine the timing of both corrective and
scheduled maintenance. As a result, the model is not capable of ensuring that equipment
in the main and standby paths do not undergo maintenance simultaneously. In practice,
maintenance is performed by field staff who are capable of limiting the operational impact
of maintenance. Similarly, the model is not capable of performing common scheduling
performance improvements such as performing related maintenance tasks simultaneously.
Combined, these modelling limitations are likely to inflate the calculated maintenance
time and reduce the calculated system availability.
As the scope of analysis was only a portion of the end-to-end Essential VHF service, the
resulting availability characteristics are not necessarily representative of the overall service
availability. As a result, the resulting availability figures can not be used to demonstrate
compliance with the operational availability requirements specified by ATC.
7.6 Modelling Improvements
A number of usability improvements could be made to the modelling framework. Devel-
oping the system to be modelled as a python script is tedious and error prone. The model
could be significantly improved through the development of a Graphical User Interface
(GUI).
A number of features identified in the user requirements and FPS, such as interlock-
ing between functions and message passing between components, were not necessary for
modelling of the Essential VHF system. These features are required for modelling of
systems in other domains, particularly navigation systems where interlocking between
functions is common. The generality and utility of the model would be improved by the
implementation of these additional features.
The design of the model focussed on rapid development. The readability, usability and
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reusability of the code base would benefit from closer adherence to a consistent coding
style such as the recommended python coding style in PEP8 (van Rossum, Warsaw &
Coghlan 2013). No effort has been made to distinguish between public and private class
members and the code-base generally assumes that user entered data is correct. Limited
error checking is performed only where it was useful for debugging. The code could be
improved through the implementation of increased error checking and packaging as a
python module that exports only minimally required class interfaces.
As a Time-Sequential Monte Carlo simulation, the models take a very long time to run,
limiting their practical usefulness. This is primarily due to the inherently inefficient nature
of the time-sequential simulation methodology since the probability of a state change for
every model element must be calculated at each time-step. The time-step must necessar-
ily be small relative to the total simulation period to yield results of sufficient granularity
for analysis. Some efficiency improvements to the existing simulation methodology are
possible through the use of alternative Python implementations such as PyPy or reim-
plementing the computationally intensive portions of the simulation in a non-interpreted
language such as C using Cython or Pyrex. More significant efficiency improvements,
however, are likely to be realised through an alternative simulation methodology, such
as Discrete-Event Monte Carlo simulation that requires approximately one calculation to
determine the timing of each state change.
7.7 Modelling Results
The results of the modelling suggest that the Essential VHF system availability perfor-
mance is similar under both the existing and RCM-derived maintenance regimes. This is
not a surprising result since the RCM process did not identify any failure modes that are
particularly critical to system performance, implying that the system design and level of
redundancy provides a satisfactory level of inherent availability.
The system’s availability under the RCM-derived maintenance regime displayed cyclic
behaviour at four yearly intervals. This may be a consequence of the stochastic determi-
nation of maintenance timing allowing quadrennial and biennial scheduled maintenance
to coincide with each other as well as corrective maintenance.
In the final year of simulation, the mean system availability under the RCM derived
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maintenance regime displayed a significant negative skew due to a single low availability
figure. Although unusual, the low availability figure for a single simulation is still valid
as it represents real world variability. The significant skew this outlier value placed
on the availability distribution indicates that the mean availability value may not be
representative of overall system performance and that alternative measures such as the
median and mode should be considered. Additionally, the impact of outlier events on
mean values may be minimised by running more simulations.
It was expected that the existing maintenance regime would show a decrease in mean avail-
ability after approximately ten years due to the increasing failure rate of VHF Transceivers
with dry capacitors. Whilst there was a slight decrease in availability for the final year of
simulation, the results are inconclusive. A more pronounced effect is likely to be visible
with a larger number of simulations that run for a longer period of time.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
8.1 Modelling
Despite its use for reliability modelling in some academic works and its selection for use
in this work due to the simplicity of its implementation, the inherent inefficiencies in the
Time-Sequential Monte-Carlo simulation methodology make it ill-suited for reliability
modelling of complex systems. Whilst some efficiency improvements might be possible
through refining the design of the modelling system, significant results are more likely
to be yielded through the implementation of a Discrete-Event Monte Carlo simulation
methodology, as evidenced by COTS software packages. The increased complexity of
this simulation methodology over Time-Sequential Monte-Carlo simulation is likely to be
justified by its increased computational efficiency.
8.2 RCM Implementation
Superficially, the foundational concepts behind the RCM process are relatively simple,
however, RCM implementation is likely to be relatively complex. RCM publications gen-
erally provide little guidance on the specific details of RCM implementation. Publications
that do discuss more implementation in more detail tend to be contextualised to agen-
cies of the United States Government. Although the information contained within these
guides is likely to be useful, they are not suitable for use as detailed implementation
guides for Airservices.
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Disagreement exists at a professional level regarding the role of failure analysis data in
the development of maintenance regimes. Moubray (1997) argues that accurate failure
data is often not practically available, particularly if one considers that the operating
context may profoundly affect equipment’s failure performance. Moubray (1997) also
argues that failure data is not particularly necessary, as experienced operators, technicians
and engineers can generally answer decision diagram questions satisfactorily from their
own knowledge. However, the reliance of personal experience has been criticised in the
literature.
Moubray (1997) extends this argument to recommend that RCM development should be
conducted in-house. Moubray (1997) claims that OEM’s have a vested interest in over
specifying maintenance support and are surprisingly unaware of an organisation’s specific
operating context. Moubray (1997) uses simplistic examples of generic mechanical/elec-
trical plant to illustrate the effect that the operating context can have on appropriate
maintenance regimes.
It is unclear whether Moubray[’s] generalisation translate to the aviation specific equip-
ment used by Airservices in the NAS. At first glance, the operating context of this equip-
ment would appear to be far less variable than is possibly seen in other industries due to
the specific nature of the ANSP environment. Accordingly, it would seem plausible that
OEMs are more capable of developing an understanding of specific industries’ operating
contexts, such as ANSPs, compared to more generalised or variable environments.
Despite the use of a standard design, not all Essential VHF services installations are iden-
tical. Variations in specific elements such as antenna models, tower structures, equipment
configuration, bearer technologies, airspace usage and environmental conditions exist. The
excessive number of permutations means that full consideration of the operating context
is practically impossible.
8.3 Consideration of Alternative Methodologies
Although Airservices systems are undoubtedly safety critical, that criticality should be
viewed within the context of other safety critical organisations. The explicit listing of
failure modes, their effects and their consequences under the RCM process identified
only a handful of safety consequence failure effects, for which falling equipment and/or
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structures were the dominant failure modes. No identified failure modes were likely to
result in significant loss of life or some other catastrophic event, such as might be expected
with other safety critical systems such as oil rigs or nuclear power plants.
The lack of safety consequence failure effects are a result of a highly redundant design,
where the Essential VHF services is itself a redundant system within a system of redundant
systems (system of systems architecture). As long as a rigorous system design process
continues to prevent opportunities for safety consequence failure effects to exist, little
additional safety assurance is likely to be yielded by a maintenance regimes. Typically,
non-classical RCM approaches are advised only for non-critical systems. These approaches
may be suitable for Airservices and should not be dismissed offhand.
8.4 Further Work & Recommendations
The analysis conducted qualitatively identified some advantages to the implementation of
RCM and quantitatively identified that the Essential VHF system performance could be
approximately equivalent under RCM-derived maintenance regimes to existing mainte-
nance regimes whilst total maintenance hours are reduced. In the opinion of the author,
Airservices should continue to investigate the potential implementation of RCM. However,
a number of specific aspects of RCM implementation and reliability modelling warrant
further investigation.
It was identified through this work that Airservices’ CMMS and various support contracts
do not yield failure data of sufficient granularity for use in a reliability model. The
failure and repair characteristics used in this modelling should be validated against real-
world experience. A sensitivity analysis of the model should be conducted as part of its
validation.
The modelling was limited to the Essential VHF system. Similar modelling should be
extended to systems from other domains, particularly surveillance and navigation systems
where ICAO published recommended maintenance practices in DOC 8071 may limit the
utility of the RCM process for these systems. Additionally, the application of the RCM
process to these systems may identify potential areas for review in ICAO documentation.
Further modelling should be conducted using a Discrete-Event Monte Carlo simulation
package.
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Questions have been raised regarding the value of failure data, the difficulty in obtaining
relevant failure data, the significance of the operating context in an ANSP environment,
the validity of the Resnikoff conundrum and the suitability of age exploration in the devel-
opment of maintenance regimes. Detailed investigation of these issues and the practical
affect they have on maintenance regime development is recommended.
Detailed analysis of specific implementation details is required before any maintenance
methodology can be implemented. This analysis should consider training, tools, processes
and specific guidance required to deliver an effective process. This analysis should not be
limited to consideration of classical RCM processes. The results of this analysis should
be used to develop a cost benefit analysis that will ultimately determine whether the
advantages of RCM justify the costs of implementation.
References
Ahmadi, A., So¨derholm, P. & Kumar, U. (2010), ‘On aircraft scheduled maintenance
program development’, Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering 16(3), 229–
255.
Bazovsky, I. (1961), Reliability Theory and Practice, Prentice-Hall. Reprinted by Dover
Publications in 2004.
Call, R. (2007), ‘Analysing the Relationship of Preventive Maintenance to Corrective
Maintenance’, Maintenance Technology June.
Carretero, J., Pe´rez, J. M., Garc´ıa-Carballeira, F., Caldero´n, A., Ferna´ndez, J., Garc´ıa,
J. D., Lozano, A., Cardona, L., Cotaina, N. & Prete, P. (2003), ‘Applying {RCM}
in large scale systems: a case study with railway networks’, Reliability Engineering
& System Safety 82(3), 257–273.
de Siqueira, I. (2005), Measuring the Impacts of an RCM Program on Power System
Performance, in ‘Power Engineering Society General Meeting, 2005. IEEE’, pp. 2643–
2645Vol. 3.
Government Assurance Office (2006), ‘Faas proposed plan for implementing a reliability
centered maintenance process for air traffic control equipment’.
Huang, J., Bian, Y. & Cai, W. (2012), Equipment Maintenance Decision-Making Research
Based Improved RCM Analysis, in ‘Quality, Reliability, Risk, Maintenance, and
Safety Engineering (ICQR2MSE), 2012 International Conference on’, pp. 487–490.
ICAO (2006), ‘DOC 7300: Convention on International Civil Aviation’. 9th ed.
Ma´rquez, A. C. (2007), The Maintenance Management Framework: Models and methods
for complex system maintenance, Springer Series in Reliability Engineering, Springer-
Verlag.
REFERENCES 67
Meeker, W. Q. & Escobar, L. A. (1998), Statistical Method for Reliability Data, John
Wiley & Sons Inc.
Mendes, A. A. & Ribeiro, J. L. D. (2014), ‘Establishment of a maintenance plan based
on quantitative analysis in the context of {RCM} in a {JIT} production scenario’,
Reliability Engineering & System Safety 127(0), 21–29.
Moubray, J. (1997), RCM2: Reliability-centered maintenance, 2 revised edn, Industrial
Press Inc.
National Air Traffic Control Association (2005), ‘Faa jeopardizes safety with new fix-on-
fail policy for equipment’.
Pintelon, L., Nagarur, N. & Puyvelde, F. V. (1999), ‘Case Study: RCM – yes, no or
maybe?’, Journal of Quality in Maintenance Engineering 5(3), 182–192.
ReliaSoft Corporation (2014), ‘System Analysis Reference: Reliability, availability & op-
timisation’.
SAE International (2009), ‘SAE JA1012: A Guide to the Reliability-Centred Maintenance
Standard’.
SAE International (2011), ‘SAE JA1011: Evaluation Criteria for Reliability-Centered
Mainenance (RCM) Processes’.
Sanchez, A., Carlos, S., Martorell, S. & Villanueva, J. F. (2009), ‘Addressing imperfect
maintenance modelling uncertainty in unavailability and cost based optimization’,
Reliability Engineering & System Safety 94(1), 22–32. Maintenance Modeling and
Application.
Sherwin, D. (1999), A constructive critique of reliability-centered maintenance, in ‘Reli-
ability and Maintainability Symposium, 1999. Proceedings. Annual’, pp. 238–244.
Sillivant, D. (2015), Reliability centered maintenance cost modeling: Lost opportunity
cost, in ‘Reliability and Maintainability Symposium (RAMS), 2015 Annual’, pp. 1–
5.
Tsang, A. H. & Jardine, A. K. (2013), Maintenance, Replacement, and Reliability: Theory
and applications, 2 edn, CRC Press.
REFERENCES 68
Van Horenbeek, A., Pintelon, L. & Muchiri, P. (2010), ‘Maintenance optimization models
and criteria’, International Journal of System Assurance Engineering and Manage-
ment 1(3), 189–200.
van Rossum, G., Warsaw, B. & Coghlan, N. (2013), ‘Pep 0008 – style guide for python
code’. https://www.python.org/dev/peps/pep-0008/.
Zajicek, J. & Kamenicky, J. (2014), Credibility of rcm analysis results, in ‘Electric Power
Engineering (EPE), Proccedings of the 2014 15th International Scientific Conference
on’, pp. 75–79.
Appendix A
Project Specification
ENG 4111/2 Research Project
Project Specification
For: Nicholas Spurry
Topic: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF RCM IN AN AUSTRALIAN ANSP CONTEXT
Supervisors: Dr Steven Goh
Daniel Field
Sponsorship: Faculty of Health, Engineering & Sciences
Airservices
Project Aim: To provide assurance to Airservices that the adoption of the RCM
methodology for developing maintenance regimes would not neg-
atively impact operational safety compared to current mainte-
nances practices by modelling the impact maintenance regimes
have on various RMA parameters and critically analysing the re-
sults.
Revision: Issue B, 19 March 2015
Program:
1. Research methodologies for calculating relevant RMA parameters.
2. Research methodologies for modelling reliability systems.
3. Develop a number of modelling system architecture designs (custom design and COTS software).
4. Compare architecture designs and completely develop best solution.
5. Develop maintenance regimes using the RCM methodology.
6. Collect relevant system reliability data.
7. Model current and developed maintenance regimes using selected modelling solution.
8. Critically compare modelling results.
9. Submit an academic dissertation
As time and resources permit:
1. Cost comparison.
2. Case studies of maintenance practices for international ANSPs.
Agreed:
Student Name: Nicholas Spurry
Date: 19 March 2015
Supervisor Name: Alexander Kist
Date: 13 April 2015
Appendix B
Modelling Solution Development
B.1 Introduction to this Appendix
This is often helpful, especially when the information following is not text.
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B.2 User Requirements
UR ID
Requirement
Class
FPS ID
UR:1.001The software shall allow the user to enter a system to be modelled
Essential
FPS:1.002, FPS:1.003, FPS:1.004, FPS:1.005, FPS:1.020, FPS:1.021, FPS:1.022, 
FPS:1.023, FPS:1.024, FPS:1.025, FPS:1.026
UR:1.002The software shall allow system reliability parameters to be entered
Essential
FPS:1.006, FPS:1.009, FPS:1.012, FPS:1.013, FPS:1.014, FPS:1.015, FPS:1.016, 
FPS:1.017, FPS:1.018
UR:1.003The software shall allow system maintainability parameters to be entered
Essential
FPS:1.007, FPS:1.008, FPS:1.009, FPS:1.012, FPS:1.013, FPS:1.014, FPS:1.015, 
FPS:1.019
UR:1.004The software shall allow system maintainability parameters to comply with Airservices 
maintenance practices
Essential
FPS:1.008
UR:1.004The software shall model relevant system durability characteristics
Essential
FPS:1.001
UR:1.005The software shall output relevant system durability characteristics
Essential
FPS:2.001,FPS:2.002, FPS:2.003, FPS:2.004, FPS:2.005, FPS:2.006, FPS:2.007, 
FPS:2.008, FPS:2.008, FPS:2.009, FPS:2.010, FPS:2.011, FPS:2.012, FPS:2.013, 
FPS:2.014, FPS:2.015, FPS:2.016, FPS:2.017, FPS:2.018, FPS:2.019, FPS:2.020, 
FPS:2.021, FPS:2.022
UR:1.006The software shall allow non-independent failure modes to be modelled
Important FPS:1.009, FPS:1.010
UR:1.007The software shall allow the effect of maintenance regimes to be modelled
Essential
FPS:1.011, FPS:1.022
UR:2.001The software shall allow the entered system to be reused
ImportantFPS:3.001
1. Functionality
2. Usability
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B.3 Functional & Performance Specifications
FPS ID
Requirement
Class
UR ID
FPS:1.001
The software shall stochastically model durability characteristics of entered systems
Essential
UR:1.004
FPS:1.002
The software shall allow systems to consist of elements
Essential
UR:1.001
FPS:1.003
The software shall allow elements to be connected in series and parallel
Essential
UR:1.001
FPS:1.004
The software shall allow elements to have an m-of-n parallel connections
ImportantUR:1.001, 
FPS:1.005
The software shall allow elements to have hot or cold standby redundancy
Desirable
UR:1.001
FPS:1.006
The  software shall allow elements to have failure distributions
Essential
UR:1.002
FPS:1.007
The software shall allow elements to have repair distributions
Essential
UR:1.003
FPS:1.008
The software shall allow repair distributions to depend on system function state
Essential
UR:1.003, UR:1.004
FPS:1.009
The software shall allow events to trigger changes in element failure and repair distributions
ImportantUR:1.002, UR:1.003, UR:1.006
FPS:1.010
The software shall allow elements to output events
ImportantUR:1.006
FPS:1.011
The software shall allow maintenance actions to output events
ImportantUR:1.007
N/A
The software shall allow distributions to be of the following type:
N/A
N/A
FPS:1.012
exponential
Essential
UR:1.002, UR:1.003
FPS:1.013
2-parameter Weibull
ImportantUR:1.002, UR:1.003
FPS:1.014
3-parameter Weibull
Essential
UR:1.002, UR:1.003
FPS:1.015
log-normal
Essential
UR:1.002, UR:1.003
N/A
The software shall allow reliability random variables to be in the following units:
N/A
N/A
FPS:1.016
system operating time
Essential
UR:1.002
FPS:1.017
element age
Essential
UR:1.002
FPS:1.018
number of element cycles
Essential
UR:1.002
FPS:1.019
The software shall allow maintainability random variables to be units of time.
Essential
UR:1.003
FPS:1.020
The software shall allow elements to have at least two states, up and down (or equivalent)
Essential
UR:1.001
N/A
The software shall allow elements to transition between states due to:
N/A
N/A
FPS:1.021
failures
Essential
UR:1.001
FPS:1.022
maintenance actions
Essential
UR:1.001, UR:1.007
FPS:1.023
external influences
Essential
UR:1.001
FPS:1.024
The software shall allow systems to have one or more functions
Essential
UR:1.001
FPS:1.025
The software shall allow functions to have at least two states, up and down (or equivalent)
Essential
UR:1.001
FPS:1.026
The software shall allow the state of a function to be determined by the states of the system's constituent 
elements
Essential
UR:1.001
N/A
The software shall be able to output the following durability characteristics for each functon request:
N/A
N/A
FPS:2.001
operational availability of the system functions over the life of the system
Essential
UR:1.005
FPS:2.002
operational availability of the system functions per year
Essential
UR:1.005
FPS:2.003
mean time between system function outages over the life of the system
Essential
UR:1.005
FPS:2.004
mean time between system function outages per year
Essential
UR:1.005
FPS:2.005
total number of maintenance actions over the life of the system
Essential
UR:1.005
FPS:2.006
total number of maintenance actions per  year
Essential
UR:1.005
FPS:2.007
total number of maintenance actions for each component type over the life of the system
ImportantUR:1.005
FPS:2.008
total number of maintenance actions for each component type year
ImportantUR:1.005
2. Output
1. Modelling
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FPS ID
Requirement
Class
UR ID
FPS:2.009
total number of maintenance hours over the life of the system
Desirable
UR:1.005
FPS:2.010
total number of maintenance hours per year
Desirable
UR:1.005
FPS:2.011
total number of maintenance hours for each component type over the life of the system
Desirable
UR:1.005
FPS:2.012
total number of maintenance hours for each component type per year
Desirable
UR:1.005
FPS:2.013
total number of equipment failures over the life of the system
Essential
UR:1.005
FPS:2.014
total number of equipment failures per year
Essential
UR:1.005
FPS:2.015
total number of equipment failures for each component type over the life of the system
ImportantUR:1.005
FPS:2.016
total number of equipment failures for each component type per year
ImportantUR:1.005
N/A
The software shall output the following qualifications for each durability characteristic on request:
N/A
N/A
FPS:2.017
minimum value
Essential
UR:1.005
FPS:2.018
1st quartile
Desirable
UR:1.005
FPS:2.019
mean
Essential
UR:1.005
FPS:2.020
median
ImportantUR:1.005
FPS:2.021
3rd quartile
Desirable
UR:1.005
FPS:2.022
maximum value
Essential
UR:1.005
FPS:3.001
The software shall allow entered systems to be saved to a file
Essential
UR:2.001
3. Usability
B.4 System Modelling Concept
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Figure B.1: System Modelling Concept
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B.5 Time-Sequential Simulation UML Activity Diagram
Figure B.2: Time-Sequential Simulation UML Activity Diagram
Appendix C
Maintenance Regime
Development
C.1 Introduction to this Appendix
This is often helpful, especially when the information following is not text.
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C.2 Information Worksheet
Failure Effect
1
ACommunications not possible
1AC/DC & DC/DC PSUs failed
Loss of power to Radio MUX results in Radio MUX failure. Loss of Radio MUX link 
indicated to ATC Operator via voice switch HMI. Equipment failure also indicated at 
Service Desk/TOC. ATC operator selects alternate equipment. Failure mode results 
in increased workload for ATC Operator and reduction in system's capacity to 
handle additional faults. 
2Radio MUX failed
Loss of Radio MUX link indicated to ATC Operator via voice switch HMI. Equipment 
failure also indicated at Service Desk/TOC. ATC operator selects alternate 
equipment. Failure mode results in increased workload for ATC Operator and 
reduction in system's capacity to handle additional faults. 
3VHF transceiver failed
Equipment failure indicated to ATC Operator via voice switch HMI after failed 
attempt to transmit. Equipment failure also indicated at Service Desk/TOC. ATC 
operator selects alternate equipment. Failure mode results in increased workload 
for ATC Operator and reduction in system's capacity to handle additional faults. 
4Cavity filter failed
As per 1A3.
5SPD failed
As per 1A3.
6Antenna failed
As per 1A3.
7Loss of data to Radio MUX
Equipment failure indicated to ATC Operator via voice switch HMI. Equipment 
failure also indicated at Service Desk/TOC. ATC Operator selects alternate 
equipment. Failure mode results in increased workload for ATC Operator and 
reduction in system's capacity to handle additional faults. 
8Loss of 24VDC supply
Loss of 24VDC supply results in failure of VHF transceiver. Equipment failure is 
indicated to ATC Operator via voice switch HMI. Equipment failure is also indicated 
to at Service Desk/TOC. ATC Operator selects alternate equipment. Failure mode 
results in increased workload for ATC Operator and reduction in system's capacity 
to handle additional faults. 
9Mild radio frequency interference
ATC Operator selects alternate equipment. Failure mode results in increased 
workload for ATC Operator and reduction in system's capacity to handle additional 
faults. 
10Severe radio frequency interference
ATC Operator selects alternate equipment but finds that communications are still 
not possible. ATC Operator contacts external party through alternative method 
such as HF or CPDLC. Failure mode results in increased workload for ATC Operator. 
BCommunications unintelligible
1Excessive overmodulation
External party experiences difficulty understanding ATC transmission. Instead of 
reading back the ATC Operator's instruction, the external party replies 'Readability 
0' or similar. The ATC Operator selects alternate equipment and retransmits 
instruction. Failure mode results in increased workload for both the ATC Operator 
and external party. Failure mode also reduces system capacity to handle additional 
faults. 
Function
Functional Failure
Failure mode
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To provide intelligible half-duplex 
voice communications between ATC 
and other VHF airband users at least 
30NM beyond lateral boundaries and 
2000 feet below lower limits (to 
surface limit)
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Failure Effect
Function
Functional Failure
Failure mode
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2Excessive modulation distortion
External party experiences difficulty understanding ATC transmission. Instead of 
reading back the ATC Operator's instruction, the external party replies 'Readability 
0' or similar. The ATC Operator selects alternate equipment and retransmits 
instruction. Failure mode results in increased workload for both the ATC Operator 
and external party. Failure mode also reduces system capacity to handle additional 
faults. 
3Excessive audio distortion
ATC Operator experiences difficulty understanding external party transmissions. 
ATC Operator selects alternative equipment and retransmits instruction. Failure 
mode results in increased workload for ATC Operator and external party. Failure 
mode may also result in temporary increase in channel/network congestion.
4Excessive audio SNR
As per 1B3.
5Excessive RF SNR
ATC Operator experiences difficulty understanding external party transmissions. 
ATC Operator selects alternative equipment and retransmits instruction. Likely that 
alternate equipment is similarly affected. If necessary  ATC Operator contacts 
external party through alternative method e.g. CPDLC, HF or alternative VHF 
frequency. Failure mode results in increased workload for ATC Operator and 
external party. Failure mode may also result in temporary increase in 
channel/network congestion.
6Moderate BER or clock slips through 
bearer 
ATC Operator may experience clicking or popping sounds in audio and/or short 
periods of missing audio, such as missing syllables. ATC Operator selects alternate 
equipment. Failure mode should cause  an alarm on NTM.  Failure mode results in 
increased work load for ATC Operator. 
CCommunications not half-duplex
1Loss of one bearer direction
Loss of bearer path indicated to ATC Operator through Voice Switch. ATC Operator 
selects alternate equipment. Failure mode results in increased work load for ATC 
Operator and reduced capacity for system to handle additional faults. 
2External party beyond designed range 
or below designed altitude due to 
unintended use outside of design 
envelope. 
ATC Operator unable to contact external party or unable to verify through voice 
that instruction was received. ATC Operator selects alternative equipment but is 
still unable to contact external party. ATC Operator contacts external party through 
alternative method if possible, e.g. CPDLC, HF or alternative VHF frequency. Failure 
mode results in increased workload for ATC Operator and potentially also for 
external party.
3Low radio transmit power
ATC Operator unable to contact some external parties depending on location. After 
multiple missed read backs, ATC Operator selects alternative equipment. Failure 
mode results in increased workload for ATC Operator and potentially also for 
external party. The failure mode temporarily results in increased channel/network 
congestion.
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Failure Effect
Function
Functional Failure
Failure mode
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4External RF noise resulting in receiver 
desensitisation (approx. >15dB)
ATC operator unable to receive some external party transmissions depending on 
received signal strength. After multiple missed read backs, ATC Operator selects 
alternative equipment. Failure mode results in increased workload for ATC 
Operator and external party. The failure mode temporarily results in increased 
channel/network congestion.
5Intermodulation occurring within 
feeder system resulting in receiver 
desensitisation
As per 1C4.
6Intermodulation occurring within 
antenna resulting in receiver 
desensitisation
As per 1C4.
7Intermodulation occurring within SPD 
resulting in receiver desensitisation
As per 1C4.
8Intermodulation occurring with tower 
infrastructure resulting in receiver 
desensitisation
As per 1C4.
DCoverage (transmit or receive) 
insufficient
1Low radio transmit power
As per 1C3.
2Cavity filter detuned
Fault indicated to ATC Operator on Voice Switch on transmission and to NTM as 
VSWR alarm. ATC Operator selects alternate equipment. Failure mode results in 
increased workload for ATC Operator.
3Excessive cavity filter insertion loss
ATC Operator unable to contact some external parties depending on location. After 
multiple missed read backs, ATC Operator selects alternative equipment. Failure 
mode results in increased workload for ATC Operator and potentially also for 
external party. 
4Excessive feeder insertion loss
As per 1D3.
5Damaged or broken antenna
As per 1D3.
6Excessive SPD insertion loss
As per 1D3.
7External RF noise resulting in receiver 
desensitisation (approx. >20dB)
ATC Operator unable to receive some external party transmissions from 
extremeties of designed coverage. After multiple missed read backs, ATC Operator 
selects alternative equipment. Failure mode results in increased workload for ATC 
Operator and external party. The failure mode temporarily results in increased 
channel/network congestion.
8Excessive high receiver sensitivity 
(high unmute point)
As per 1D7.
2To continue operating with exposure 
to external elements
AUnable to continue operating with 
external ambient temperatures -25°C 
and 55°C
1Damaged antenna radome
Damaged antenna radome allows water ingress and ice to form in cold weather in 
direct contact with metalic antenna elements resulting in intermittent shorting of 
antenna. Failure mode may result in intermittent VSWR alarms from transceiver 
and may be indicated to ATC operator on Voice Switch HMI. 
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Failure Effect
Function
Functional Failure
Failure mode
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2Radio MUX dirty filters
Dirty fan filters reduce the air flow rate produced by the fans, resulting in the 
internal temperature of the Radio MUX rising. At some point, the radio MUX will 
begin to overheat and wil eventually fail. Failure of Radio MUX is indicated to ATC 
Operator on HMI of Voice Switch.  ATC Operator selects alternate equipment. 
Failure mode results in increased workload for ATC operator and external parties. 
The failure mode may temporarily result in increased channel/network congestion.
3Radio MUX failed fan
Two Radio MUX fans fail resulting in no air flow through the Radio MUX. The Radio 
MUX quickly overheats and then fails. Failure of Radio Mux fans is indicated to 
TOC/SDA. Failure of Radio MUX is indicated to ATC Operator on HMI of Voice 
Switch.  ATC Operator selects alternate equipment. Failure mode results in 
increased workload for ATC operator and external parties. The failure mode may 
temporarily result in increased channel/network congestion.
BUnable to continue operating with 
wind gusts up to 245km/h
1Excessively corroded antenna mountsAntenna falls from tower and either falls to ground or remains suspended from 
tower by feeder cable. Sufficiently strong wind may carry antenna some distance 
from tower during fall. Change in antenna orientation generally results in significant 
change to coverage area. ATC Operator experiences difficulty contacting external 
party and selects alternative equipment. If sufficient damage to feeder/antenna 
connection, ATC Operator will be alerted to fault on Voice Switch HMI due to VSWR 
alarm. 
2Excessively corroded tower 
infrastructure
Tower infrastructure falls from tower and may damage equipment on the way 
down. Sufficiently strong wind may carry tower infrastructure some distance from 
tower during fall. 
3Insufficient bolt torque
As per 2B1 & 2B2.
4Damaged feeder ties
Damaged feeder ties result in feeder that vibrates or sways excessively in the wind. 
Over time, excessive movement results in metal fatigue within the coaxial feeder. 
Eventaully the feeder will snap internally, resulting in a high VSWR alarm that is 
indicated to the ATC Operator on the Voice Switch HMI. Metal fatigue may cause 
tearing of components internal to the feeder long before snapping occurs, resulting 
in passive intermodulation.  ATC Operator will generally be unaware of damage to 
feeder ties. Excessive feeder vibration or swaying may result in the build up of static 
charge, creating interference for the ATC Operator. 
5Poor earthing leading to build up of 
static charges
Poor antenna and feeder earthing may allow static charges to develop, typically 
manifesting as interference for the ATC Operator in windy conditions. 
CUnable to continue operating with 
solar irradiance of up to 2300 kWh/m2
No failure modes identified.
DUnable to continue operating with 
rainfall of up to 100 mm/hour
1Damaged antenna radome
As per 2A1.
C.2 Information Worksheet 82
Failure Effect
Function
Functional Failure
Failure mode
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2Ineffective RF feeder connector 
sealing
Poorly applied or damaged amalgated tape surrounding coaxial feeder connections 
exposed to the elements allows water to enter connectors and eventually the 
coaxial feeder. Water logged feeders and/or connectors may result in high VSWR 
alarms on the transceiver during transmissions. Presence of water inside feeder and 
connector may accelerate the feeder and connector deterioration rates. Water in 
connectors and feeders may evaporate leading to intermittent faults.
EUnable to continue operating in hail of 
up to 6cm.
1Damaged antenna radome
As per 2A1.
2Excessively corroded antenna mountsAs per 2B1.
3Excessively corroded tower 
infrastructure
As per 2B2.
4Insufficient bolt torque
As per 2B3.
3To prevent people contacting 
electrically live components
ADoes not prevent contact with 
electrically live components
1Deterioration AC/DC PSU mains wiringA person may come into contact with live elctricity (+24VDC or 230VAC)  if using 
tools or placing exposed parts of the body in close proximity to  Radio Mux wiring.
2Deterioration of VHF radio mains 
wiring
A person may come into contact with mains electricity if handling VHF mains wiring. 
Typically the VHF transceiver is not powered from mains. This cabling is only used in 
fault conditions.
3Deterioration of perspex PSU guard
Perspex guard no longer protects against inadvertant contact with mains power. A 
person may contact live mains if using tools or placing fingers in close proximity to 
Radio MUX PSU.  
4To support the weight of all associated 
equipment (within scope of analysis)
AUnable to support equipment weight
1Excessively corroded antenna mountsAntenna falls from tower structure and may hit the ground or remain suspended 
from feeder. Antenna mounts may also fall from tower structure and hit the ground 
or remain attached at only a few points depending on construction and extent of 
damage. Fall of antenna would most likely result in damage to feeder system and 
high VSWR, detected by radio as high VSWR alarm. Possible, but unlikely, that 
VSWR remains low and antenna system continues to function with significantly 
altered radiation pattern. Difficult to determine exactly when equipment would fall, 
most likely to coincide with weather event such as wind or rain. Falling equipment 
present safety danger to people below. Once equipment has fallen, ATC Operator 
made aware either through Voice Switch indication or difficulty communicating 
with external parties. ATC Operator selects alternate equipment. Depending on 
antenna location, possible that falling antenna would also damage alternate 
equipment.
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Failure Effect
Function
Functional Failure
Failure mode
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2Excessively corroded tower 
infrastructure
Tower infrastructure falls from tower structure and may hit the ground or remain 
partially attached to tower structure depending on design and extent of damage. 
Structural integrity of tower is compromised and may result in further loss of tower 
infrastructure, including antennas. Loss of tower infrastructure not indicated to 
operational or technical staff unless also accompanied by loss of antenna system. 
Falling tower infrastructure poses a safety risk to people below and may cause 
further damage to other services.  Difficult to determine exact timing tower 
infrastructure will fall, most likely to coincide with weather event such as wind or 
rain.
3Insufficient tower bolt torque
As per 4A2.
4Insufficient, damaged or degraded 
rack mounting bolts
VHF Transceiver, Radio MUX and/or Cavity Filter fall from position in rack. Falling 
equipment may cause damage to other equipment. Falling equipment or damaged 
equipment may become disconnected from the rest of the system.
5To indicate detected equipment 
failures to interested party
AUnable to indicate detected 
equipment failures to ATC Operator
1Incorrect Radio MUX/VHFTransceiver 
alarm configuration
Radio MUX and/or VHF Transceiver faults not indicated to ATC Operator. ATC 
Operator unaware that communications using equipment will be unsuccessful if 
there are also Radio MUX/VHF Transceiver equipment faults. ATC Operator 
attempts to contact external parties but does not receive readback. After a number 
of missed read backs, ATC Operator selects alternate equipment. Failure model 
results in increased workload for ATC Operator and potentially also external party. 
Failure mode may result in temporary congestion of network/channel. Failure 
mode results in decreased capacity to withstand additional faults.
2Failed VHF Transceiver
As per 5A1.
3Failed Radio MUX
As per 5A1.
BUnable to indicate detected 
equipment failures to SDA/TOC.
1Incorrect Radio MUX/VHFTransceiver 
alarm configuration
Radio MUX and/or VHF Transceiver faults not indicated to SDA/TOC. SDA unaware 
of equipment. Technical staff not made aware of equipment faults not apparent to 
ATC Operator resulting in a delay to their rectification.
2Radio MUX Transceiver ALIF Failure
As per 5B1.
6To allow the ATC operator to select 
between redundant radio equipment 
within 20 seconds
AUnable to select alternate equipment
1Alternate equipment already failed
ATC Operator unaware that alternate equipment has failed. Equipment that ATC 
Operator is using fails and ATC Operator selects alternate equipment. This 
equipment also does not work and ATC Operator makes contact using alternative 
service if possible, e.g. alternative VHF frequency, CPDLC or HF.
BEquipment selection takes longer than 
20 seconds
No failure modes identified.
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Failure Effect
Function
Functional Failure
Failure mode
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7To allow the ATC operator to cause 
radio equipment to transmit, with a 
response delay of less than 100 
milliseconds
AUnable to cause radio equipment to 
transmit
1VHF Transceiver PTT input non-
functional
ATC Operator attempts to transmit, however, transmission is not received by 3rd 
party. ATC Operator attempts to transmit the message again. ATC Operator 
becomes aware of equipment fault after multiple missed readbacks. ATC Operator 
selects alternate equipment and retransmits message. Failure mode results in 
increased workload for ATC Operator and potentially for 3rd parties. Failure mode 
may also result in temporary increase in channel congestion.
2Radio MUX PTT output non-functionalAs per 7A1.
BTransmission response delay is greater 
than 100 milliseconds (<500ms)
1Radio MUX/VHF radio faulty
First syllable of ATC Operator's transmission possibly not transmitted. In 
exceptional cases, external party may have difficulty understanding ATC Operator 
and request transmission be repeated.
CTransmission response delay is greater 
than 500 milliseconds
1Radio MUX/VHF radio faulty
First word of ATC Operator's transmission not transmitted. In a number of cases 
external party may have difficulty understanding ATC Operator and request 
transmission be repeated. If sufficient requests to repeat instruction are made, ATC 
Operator will select alternate equipment.
8To allow the ATC operator’s audio to 
unmute in the presence of legitimate 
transmissions, with a response delay 
of less than 100 milliseconds
AATC Operator's audio unable to 
unmute
1VHF radio squelch output non-
functional
ATC Operator unable to receive external party transmissions. Fault indicated to ATC 
Operator on Voice Switch after transmission and also through lack of external party 
response. ATC Operator selects alternate equipment.
BATC Operator's audio unmute 
response time greater than 100 
milliseconds (<500ms)
1Radio MUX/VHF radio faulty
First syllable of external party's transmission possibly not received. In exceptional 
cases, ATC Operator may have difficulty understanding external party and request 
transmission be repeated.
CATC Operator's audio unmute 
response time greater than 500 
milliseconds
1Radio MUX/VHF radio faulty
First word of external party's transmission not received. In a number of cases ATC 
operator may have difficulty understanding external party and request transmission 
be repeated. If sufficient requests to repeat transmissions are made, ATC Operator 
will select alternate equipment.
9To have a maximum end-to-end audio 
delay of 500 milliseconds
AAudio delay exceed 500 milliseconds
1Radio MUX/VHF radio faulty
Delay between ATC Operator instruction and external party read back becomes 
noticeable. Increased risk of stepped on transmissions. ATC Operator may select 
alternate equipment depending on severity.
10To protect equipment from damage 
from medium sized lightning strikes at 
a relatively short distance
AUnable to continue operating after 
lightning strikes
1SPD failed
SPD is failed and unable to continue to protect equipment. Next lightning strike 
damages radio equipment. Failure of SPD is not indicated to ATC Operator or 
SDA/TOC. 
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2Insufficient coaxial feeder earthing
Current in coaxial feeder due to lightning strike is insufficiently attenauted by 
feeder earthing and exceeds SPDs current handling capabilities as a result. Excessive 
lightning current is likely to result in VHF Transceiver and SPD damage. In extremem 
cases, damage ay also be caused to the cavity filter. Excessive lightning current 
through coaxial feeder may also result in damage to ancilliary equipment. There is 
the potential for excessive lightning current to result in arcing that generates 
wideband RF interference. Damage to SPD, cavity filter and/or VHF Transceiver may 
result in intermodulation, potentially causing interference to colocated services. 
There is no mechanism for insufficient feeder earthing to generate alarms either to 
ATC Operator or SDA/TOC.
11To not cause interference to other 
services
ACauses interference to other systems
1Passive intermodulation generated 
within SPD
Mixed signals generate increased noise power present at VHF Transceiver and may 
also be reradiated by the antenna. Intermodulation products may result in 
increased receiver desensitisation and/or cause interference to other services 
depending on power level and frequencies. ATC Operator generally unaware that 
intermodulation products are being generated. Excessively large receiver 
desensitisation may result in reduced reception range as per 1C7. Operator of other 
affected services may detect presence of interfering signals, but often difficult to 
identify the source promptly.
2Passive intermodulation generated 
within coaxial connectors
As per 11A1.
3Passive intermodulation generated 
within antenna
As per 11A1.
4Passive intermodulation generated 
within tower infrastructure 
As per 11A1.
5Active intermodulation generated 
within VHF Transceiver
As per 11A1.
6Spurious emissions from VHF 
Transceiver
Spurious emissions result in interference to other services. ATC Operator generally 
unaware that spurious emissions are occuring. Operators of affected frequency 
may detect interference but generally difficult to determine source promptly. 
12To be protected against interference 
from undesired signals on the 
operating and adjacent channels 
AUnable to be protected against 
interference from undesired signals on 
operating channel
1Excessively sensitive VHF radio 
VHF radio unmutes in the presence of signals that are lower than required to 
achieve desired coverage, leaving the VHF radio susceptible to interference. Failure 
mode is only directly detectable by ATC Operator if radio sensitivity has increased 
sufficiently to be unmuted by noise floor, generating a permanently open squelch. 
BUnable to be protected against 
interference from undesired signals on 
adjacent channels
1VHF radio poor adjacent channel 
rejection
VHF Transceiver may experience interference if a strong signal on an adjacent 
channel is also present. On detection of interference, ATC Operator selects 
alternative equipment. 
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2Cavity filter detuned
Cavity filter does not provide sufficient attenuation to adjacent channels. If a strong 
signal is also present on an adjacent channel, the VHF transceiver may suffer from 
interference. ATC Operators will generally be unaware that cavity filter is detuned. 
Excessively detuned cavity filters may result in VSWR alarm generated by VHF 
Transceiver, indicated on Voice Switch HMI and detected by SDA/TOC. Excessively 
detuned cavity filter may result in attenuation of transmission power and reduction 
of reception range (as in 1D2).
13To comply with appropriate 
regulations, standards, Airservices 
policies, procedures and directives.
ADoes not visually indicate the presence 
of Beryllium Oxide in VHF Transceiver.
1VHF radio BeO sticker not present
Nil operational effect. Lack of BeO sticker constitutes a non-compliance with 
internal directive to affix BeO sticker to VHF radios. BeO quantity and containment 
is such that there are no regulatory requirements for labelling. 
BDoes not comply with ACMA 
Radiocommunications Transmitter 
Labelling (Determination)
1Transmitter label not present.
Nil operational effect. Lack of transmitter label constitutes a non-compliance with 
ACMA regulations. 
CDoes not comply with Airservices 
documentation directives
1Drawings incorrect
Nil operational effect. Incorrect drawings constitutes a non-compliance with 
Airservices documentation procedures. In some cases, incorrect drawings may 
result in difficulties conducting maintenance. Incorrect drawings may also be 
considered a non-compliance with CASR 171 licencing.
2CMMS data incorrect
Nil operational effect. Incorrect CMMS constitutes a non-compliance with data 
integrity procedures. Incorrect CMMS data may result in innaccurate failure and 
system performance data.
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Information 
Reference
Consequence 
Evaluation
H1S1O1N1
H2S2O2N2
H3S3O3N3
Default Tasks
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Information 
Reference
Consequence 
Evaluation
H1S1O1N1
H2S2O2N2
H3S3O3N3
Default Tasks
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2
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Visual inspection of antenna mounting hardware
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B
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Test bolt torque
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Lines
2
D
2
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
2
E
1
N
N
N
N
Y
Visual inspection of antenna radome
5 years
Lines
2
E
2
N
Y
Visual inspection of antenna mounting hardware
5 years
Lines
2
E
3
N
Y
Visual inspection of tower infrastructure
5 years
Lines
2
E
4
N
Y
Test bolt torque
5 years
Lines
3
A
1
N
N
N
N
Y
Visual inspection of power wiring
5 years
Electrical/Radio
3
A
2
N
N
N
N
Y
Test and tag of VHF Transceiver mains cable
5 years
Electrical/Radio
3
A
3
N
N
N
N
Y
Visual inspection of perspex guard
5 years
Electrical/Radio
4
A
1
N
Y
Visual inspection of antenna mounting hardware
5 years
Lines
4
A
2
N
Y
Visual inspection of tower infrastructure
5 years
Lines
4
A
3
N
Y
Test bolt torque
5 years
Lines
4
A
4
N
Y
Visual inspection of equipment rack hardware
5 years
Electrical/Radio
5
A
1
N
N
N
N
Y
Test operation of Radio MUX and VHF Transceiver alarms
2 years
Radio
5
A
2
N
N
N
N
Y
Test operation of VHF Transceiver alarms
2 years
Radio
5
A
3
N
N
N
N
Y
Test operation of Radio MUX alarms
2 years
Radio
5
B
1
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
5
B
2
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
6
A
1
N
N
N
N
Y
Operator functionally test alternate equipment
Daily
Operator
6
B
N/A
7
A
1
N
N
N
N
Y
Operator functionally test alternate equipment
Daily
Operator
7
A
2
N
N
N
N
Y
Operator functionally test alternate equipment
Daily
Operator
7
B
1
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
7
C
1
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
8
A
1
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
8
B
1
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
8
C
1
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
9
A
1
Y
N
N
Y
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
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F
FF
FM
H
S
E
O
H4
H5
S4
Proposed Task
Initial Interval
Resources
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Information 
Reference
Consequence 
Evaluation
H1S1O1N1
H2S2O2N2
H3S3O3N3
Default Tasks
10
A
1
N
N
N
Y
Replace SPD
5 years
Radio
10
A
2
N
N
N
N
Y
Visual inspection of coaxial feeder earthing
5 years
Lines
11
A
1
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
11
A
2
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
11
A
3
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
11
A
4
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
11
A
5
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
11
A
6
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
12
A
1
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
12
B
1
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
12
B
2
N
N
N
N
N
N
No scheduled maintenance
13
A
1
N
N
Y
Check for BeO sticker.
Not critical
Radio
13
B
1
N
N
Y
Check for transmitter label
Not critical
Radio
13
C
1
N
N
Y
Check drawing accuracy
Not critical
Radio/Lines
13
C
2
N
N
Y
Check CMMS data accuracy
Not critical
Radio/Lines
Appendix D
Program Listings
D.1 Introduction
This appendix provides the source code listings, in two parts, for the code that was
used in this project. The framework provided in D.2 provides the class structure and
methods used to model the reliability parameters of an arbitrary system. The framework
is intended to be used in conjunction with a script that contains the details of the specific
system to be modelled, built from the component provided in the framework. The script
used to model the existing VHF maintenance regime is shown in D.3. An almost identical
script was used to model for the RCM-derived maintenance regime, for brevity, only one
of the two scripts is shown.
Both source code listings were developed with Python 2.7.10 using the default CPython
implementation. Comparability with Python 3 and/or other python implementations can
not be guaranteed.
These source codes listings remain copyright of Airservices and all rights are reserved.
Express written permission is required from Airservices before they can be used for any
purpose.
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# −∗− coding : u t f−8 −∗−
# Copyright (C) A i r s e r v i c e s − Al l Righ t s Reserved
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# Unauthorized copying o f t h i s f i l e , v i a any medium i s s t r i c t l y p r o h i b i t e d
# Propr i e tary and c o n f i d e n t i a l
# Written by Nick Spurry <nick . s p u r r y@a i r s e r v i c e s a u s t r a l i a . com>, October 2015
#
”””
Created on Tue Ju l 28 09 :30 :14 2015
@author : Nicho las
”””
import math # Not s t r i c t l y r e qu i r ed but improves IDE performance
import time
import matp lo t l i b . pyplot as p l t
import numpy as np
from numpy import trapz , spac ing
from numpy . random import random sample
from sc ipy . i n t e g r a t e import quad
# Defau l t va lue cons tan t s
DEFAULT SRT FAIL = 6 # 6 hours
DEFAULT SRT FAULT = 24∗30 # 30 days ( in hours )
DEFAULTMAX SIMNUMBER = 100
DEFAULT MAX SIM TIME = 24∗365∗15 # 15 years in hours
DEFAULT SIM STEP = 0.08 # in hours
DEFAULT INPUT NO = 1
DEFAULTOUTPUTNO = 1
ANNUALHOURS = 8760 # number o f hours in one year
de f drange ( s ta r t , stop , s tep ) :
”””A genera tor func t i on t ha t c r e a t e s a range between s t a r t and s top wi th a
s t ep s i z e o f s t ep . This f unc t i on i s e q u i v a l e n t to s c i py . arange ( ) wi th
the l i s t e lements on ly genera ted as they are requ ired , p r even t ing e x c e s s i v e
memory usage f o r long ranges ”””
r = s t a r t
whi l e r <= stop :
y i e l d r
r += step
c l a s s System ( ob j e c t ) :
”””A system c l a s s ”””
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name , f = None , t = None , dt = None , n = None , pm = None ) :
# for s imp l i c i t y o f access , key s imu la t i on parameters are g l o b a l
g l oba l maxSimulationTime
g l oba l s imulationTime
g l oba l s imulat ionTimeStep
g l oba l maxSimulationNumber
s e l f . name = name
s e l f . f un c t i on s = [ ]
i f f i s not None :
s e l f . addFunction ( f )
i f n i s None :
maxSimulationNumber = DEFAULTMAX SIMNUMBER
e l s e :
maxSimulationNumber = n
i f t i s None :
#de f a u l t s imu la t i on time o f
maxSimulationTime = DEFAULT MAX SIM TIME
e l s e :
maxSimulationTime = t
i f dt i s None :
#de f a u l t s imu la t i on s t ep o f
s imulat ionTimeStep = DEFAULT SIM STEP
e l s e :
s imulat ionTimeStep = t
i f pm i s None :
s e l f .PM = [ ]
e l s e :
s e l f .PM = pm
s e l f . debugLevel = 0
s e l f . l o gD i r e c t o ry = ’C: / rcmlog/ ’
s e l f . simRunTime = None
de f addFunction ( s e l f , func ) :
t ry :
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s e l f . f un c t i on s . extend ( func )
except TypeError :
s e l f . f un c t i on s . append ( func )
de f addPM( s e l f , pm) :
t ry :
s e l f .PM. extend (pm)
except TypeError :
s e l f .PM. append (pm)
de f setMaxSimTime ( s e l f , t ) :
g l oba l maxSimulationTime
maxSimulationTime = t
de f setMaxSimNumber ( s e l f , n ) :
g l oba l maxSimulationNumber
maxSimulationNumber = n
de f setSimStep ( s e l f , dt ) :
g l oba l s imulat ionTimeStep
simulat ionTimeStep = dt
de f setDebug ( s e l f , debugLevel ) :
s e l f . debugLevel = debugLevel
de f unsetDebug ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . debug = False
de f s e tLogDirec tory ( s e l f , f i l ename ) :
s e l f . l o gF i l e = f i l ename
de f logWrite ( s e l f , l i n e ) :
s e l f . l o gF i l e . wr i t e ( l i n e )
s e l f . l o gF i l e . f l u s h ( )
de f logOpen ( s e l f , f i l ename ) :
s e l f . l o gF i l e = open ( s e l f . l o gD i r e c t o ry + f i l ename , ’ a+’ )
s e l f . l o gF i l e . f l u s h ( )
de f l ogC lo s e ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . l o gF i l e . c l o s e ( )
de f getSimRunTime ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . simRunTime
de f s imulate ( s e l f ) :
”””Time s e q u en t i a l Monte−ca r l o s imu la t i on method”””
i f s e l f . debugLevel :
simStartDateTime = time . s t r f t ime ( ”%d%m%y%H%M%S” )
f i l ename = simStartDateTime + ’ . l og ’
s e l f . logOpen ( f i l ename )
s e l f . logWrite ( ” Simulat ion s t a r t ed at %s \n” % simStartDateTime )
# for s imp l i c i t y o f access , key s imu la t i on parameters are g l o b a l
g l oba l maxSimulationTime
g l oba l s imulationTime
g l oba l s imulat ionTimeStep
g l oba l maxSimulationNumber
g l oba l simulationNumber
# i n i t i a l i s e s imu la t i on r e s u l t s
s t a t eRe su l t s = {}
t imeResu l t s = {}
s t a r t t ime = time . time ( )
# perform number o f s imu la t i on s
f o r n in range (maxSimulationNumber ) :
simulationNumber = n
# se t a l l e lements in system to appropr ia t e s t a r t i n g s t a t e
# fo r beg inn ing o f s imu la t i on
# mannualy s e t simulationTime g l o b a l to i n i t i a l va lue f o r any
# i n i t i a i l s i n g f unc t i on s t ha t use i t
s imulationTime = 0
f o r f in s e l f . f un c t i on s :
# put in i n i t i a l r e s u l t s
s t a t eRe su l t s . update ({ f . id : [ f . g e tS ta t e ( ) ] } )
t imeResu l t s . update ({ f . id : [ 0 ] } )
f . r e s e t ( )
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f o r c in f . getComponents ( ) :
f o r fm in c . getFai lureModes ( ) :
fm . un t r i g g e r ( )
c . resetAge (0 )
c . r e s e tCyc l e ( )
c . resetOperat ingTime (0)
f o r p in s e l f .PM:
p . un t r i g g e r ( )
# loop through time s t e p s
# Time s t a r t s a t f i r s t time step , not 0 , s ince c ond i t i ona l
# p r o b a b i l i t y i n v o l v e s i n t e g r a t i n g from 0 to f i r s t time s t ep
f o r t in drange ( simulationTimeStep , maxSimulationTime , \
s imulat ionTimeStep ) :
s imulationTime = t
# Loop through each func t i on
f o r f in s e l f . f un c t i on s :
# loop through each component
f o r c in f . getComponents ( ) :
# loop through each f a i l u r e mode
f o r fm in c . getFai lureModes ( ) :
note = ””
rand = None
# Check i f c o r r e c t i v e maintenance f o r f a i l u r e mode
# has a l r eady s t a r t e d
i f fm . cmTriggered ( ) :
rand = random sample ( )
#cond i t i ona l p r o b a b i l i t y o f r epa i r d i s t
condProb = fm . getCondProb ( )
i f rand < condProb :
fm . cmUntrigger ( )
fm . un t r i g g e r ( )
note = \
”Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Fixed Fa i l u r e Mode( s ) ”
# Check i f f a i l u r e mode i s a l r eady t r i g g e r e d
e l i f fm . ge tFa i l ed ( ) :
# Fai lu re has p r e v i o u s l y reached f a i l u r e po in t
# in P−F i n t e r v a l . I f the f a i l u r e mode a f f e c t s
# component s t a t e , the component has f a i l e d .
# I f the component f a i l u r e i s ev ident , c o r r e c t i v e
# maintenance i s t r i g g e r e d . I f the f a i l u r e i s
# not e v i d en t the f a i l u r e may not t r i g g e r
# co r r e c t i v e maintennace .
# Determine i f f a i l u r e mode i s r epa i r ed during
# curren t time s t ep
# Generate uniform random number in range [ 0 , 1 )
rand = random sample ( )
condProb = fm . getCondProb ( )
i f rand < condProb :
fm . cmTrigger ( )
note = ”Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Started ”
e l i f fm . getDetected ( ) :
# Fai lu re has p r e v i o u s l y been de t e c t e d by
# schedu l ed maintenance
rand = random sample ( )
condProb = fm . getCondProb ( )
i f rand < condProb :
fm . cmTrigger ( )
note = ’ Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Started ’ \
’ ( I n i t a t ed by scheduled Maintenance ) ’
e l i f fm . ge tTr iggered ( ) :
# Fai lu re mode has p r e v i o u s l y been t r i g g e r e d but
# has not ye t reached the f a i l u r e po in t . Determine
# whether f a i l u r e mode f a i l s dur ing the time s t ep
f a i lT ime = fm . getTriggeredTime ( ) + \
fm . getPFInterva l ( )
i f s imulationTime >= fa i lT ime :
fm . f a i l ( )
note = ” Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l ed ”
e l s e :
# Fai lu re mode not p r e v i o u s l y t r i g g e r d
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# Determine whether f a i l u r e mode occurs during
# curren t time s t ep
rand = random sample ( )
condProb = fm . getCondProb ( )
i f rand < condProb :
fm . t r i g g e r ( )
# for cases where P−F i n t e r v a l i s 0
# check whether f a i l u r e mode i n s t a n t l y
# f a i l e d
i f fm . ge tFa i l ed ( ) :
note = ” Fa i l u r e Mode Tr iggered & Fai l ed ”
e l s e :
note = ” Fa i l u r e Mode Tr iggered ”
i f s e l f . debugLevel >= 1 :
i f note :
s e l f . logWrite ( ’Num: %s Time : %s C:%s FM:%s ’ \
’R: %s CP: %s %s \n ’ % (n , t , c . name , fm . name , \
rand , condProb , note ) )
e l i f s e l f . debugLevel >= 2 :
s e l f . logWrite ( ’Num: %s Time : %s C:%s FM:%s ’ \
’R: %s CP: %s %s \n ’ % (n , t , c . name , fm . name , \
rand , condProb , note ) )
# determine func t i on s t a t e
s t a t e = f . g e tS ta t e ( )
i f s t a t e i s not s t a t eRe su l t s [ f . id ] [ − 1 ] :
# s t a t e changed during time s t ep
# Dup l i ca te prev ious s t a t e to c r ea t e v e r t i c a l s t a t e
# t r a n s i t i o n s
tempState = s t a t eRe su l t s [ f . id ]
tempTime = t imeResu l t s [ f . id ]
tempState . append ( tempState [−1])
tempTime . append ( simulationTime )
# Record change in r e s u l t s
tempState . append ( s t a t e )
tempTime . append ( simulationTime )
# Store r e s u l t s
s t a t eRe su l t s . update ({ f . id : tempState })
t imeResu l t s . update ({ f . id : tempTime})
# Loop through p r e v en t a t i v e maintenance
f o r p in s e l f .PM:
rand = random sample ( )
note = ””
i f p . ge tTr iggered ( ) :
condProb = p . getDurationCP ( )
i f rand < condProb :
p . un t r i g g e r ( )
note = ”Scheduled Maintenance Fin i shed ”
e l s e :
condProb = p . getOccurrenceCP ( )
i f rand < condProb :
p . t r i g g e r ( )
note = ”Scheduled Maintenance Started ”
i f s e l f . debugLevel >= 1 :
i f note :
s e l f . logWrite ( ’Num: %s Time : %s M:%s R: %s CP: %s ’ \
’%s \n ’ % (n , t , p . name , rand , condProb , note ) )
e l i f s e l f . debugLevel >= 2 :
s e l f . logWrite ( ’Num: %s Time : %s M:%s R: %s CP: %s ’ \
’%s \n ’ % (n , t , p . name , rand , condProb , note ) )
# add data po in t f o r the end o f s imu la t i on time
f o r f in s e l f . f un c t i on s :
tempState = s t a t eRe su l t s [ f . id ]
tempTime = t imeResu l t s [ f . id ]
tempState . append ( tempState [−1])
tempTime . append ( simulationTime )
# Record change in r e s u l t s
tempState . append ( s t a t e )
tempTime . append ( simulationTime )
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# s to r e s imu la t i on r e s u l t s
f . s imResul ts (n , t imeResu l t s [ f . id ] , s t a t eRe su l t s [ f . id ] )
s e l f . simRunTime = time . time ( ) − s t a r t t ime
i f s e l f . debugLevel >= 1 :
simEndDateTime = time . s t r f t ime ( ”%d%m%y%H%M%S” )
s e l f . logWrite ( ” Simulat ion ended at %s ” % simEndDateTime )
s e l f . l ogC lo s e ( )
c l a s s Function ( ob j e c t ) :
”””A func t i on c l a s s ”””
p r e f i x = ”F”
nextID = 0 # Next a v a i l a b l e ID number i s shared amongst a l l f unc t i on s
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name , nodes = None , s r tFau l t = None , s r t F a i l = None , \
outMessage = None , system = None ) :
# Set ID number
s e l f . id = Function . p r e f i x + s t r ( Function . nextID )
Function . nextID += 1 # Increment next a v a i l a b l e ID number
#Set name
s e l f . name = name
# Set nodes
s e l f . nodes = [ ]
i f nodes != None :
s e l f . addNode ( nodes )
# Set SRTs
i f s r tFau l t == None :
s e l f . s r tFau l t = DEFAULT SRT FAULT
e l s e :
s e l f . setSRTFault ( s r tFau l t )
i f s r t F a i l == None :
s e l f . s r t F a i l = DEFAULT SRT FAIL
e l s e :
s e l f . setSRTFail ( s r t F a i l )
# i n i t i a l i s e parent system
s e l f . parent = system
# i n i t i a l i s e s imu la t i on r e s u l t s
s e l f . r e s u l t s ={}
s e l f . cmResult = {}
s e l f . pmResult = {}
s e l f . f a i lT ime = None
de f setSRTFault ( s e l f , s r t ) :
s e l f . s r tFau l t = s r t
de f setSRTFail ( s e l f , s r t ) :
s e l f . s r t F a i l = s r t
de f addNode ( s e l f , node ) :
t ry :
s e l f . nodes . extend ( node )
except TypeError :
s e l f . nodes . append ( node )
node . setFunct ion ( s e l f )
e l s e :
f o r n in node :
n . setFunct ion ( s e l f )
de f r e s e t ( s e l f ) :
# Set Function up f o r beg inn ing o f s imu la i t on
s e l f . f a i lT ime = None
de f setPM( s e l f ) :
t ry :
pm = s e l f . pmResult [ simulationNumber ] [ ’pm ’ ]
time = s e l f . pmResult [ simulationNumber ] [ ’ time ’ ]
except KeyError :
pm = [ 0 ]
time = [ 0 ]
# check t ha t system isn ’ t a l r eady in maintenance
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i f pm[−1] i s not 1 :
# Dup l i ca te prev ious s t a t e to c r ea t e v e r t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n s
pm. append (pm[−1])
time . append ( simulationTime )
# Add new s t a t e
pm. append (1)
time . append ( simulationTime )
s e l f . pmResult . update ({ simulationNumber : { ’pm ’ : pm, ’ time ’ : time }})
de f unsetPM( s e l f ) :
t ry :
pm = s e l f . pmResult [ simulationNumber ] [ ’pm ’ ]
time = s e l f . pmResult [ simulationNumber ] [ ’ time ’ ]
except KeyError :
pm = [ 0 ]
time = [ 0 ]
# check t ha t system isn ’ t a l r eady in maintenance
i f pm[−1] i s not 0 :
# Dup l i ca te prev ious s t a t e to c r ea t e v e r t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n s
pm. append (pm[−1])
time . append ( simulationTime )
# Add new s t a t e
pm. append (0)
time . append ( simulationTime )
s e l f . pmResult . update ({ simulationNumber : { ’pm ’ : pm, ’ time ’ : time }})
de f setCM( s e l f ) :
t ry :
cm = s e l f . cmResult [ simulationNumber ] [ ’cm ’ ]
time = s e l f . cmResult [ simulationNumber ] [ ’ time ’ ]
except KeyError :
cm = [ 0 ]
time = [ 0 ]
# check t ha t system isn ’ t a l r eady in maintenance
i f cm[−1] i s not 1 :
# Dup l i ca te prev ious s t a t e to c r ea t e v e r t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n s
cm. append (cm[−1])
time . append ( simulationTime )
# Add new s t a t e
cm. append (1)
time . append ( simulationTime )
s e l f . cmResult . update ({ simulationNumber : { ’cm ’ : cm, ’ time ’ : time }})
de f unsetCM( s e l f ) :
t ry :
cm = s e l f . cmResult [ simulationNumber ] [ ’cm ’ ]
time = s e l f . cmResult [ simulationNumber ] [ ’ time ’ ]
except KeyError :
cm = [ 0 ]
time = [ 0 ]
# check t ha t system isn ’ t a l r eady in maintenance
i f cm[−1] i s not 0 :
# Dup l i ca te prev ious s t a t e to c r ea t e v e r t i c a l t r a n s i t i o n s
cm. append (cm[−1])
time . append ( simulationTime )
# Add new s t a t e
cm. append (0)
time . append ( simulationTime )
s e l f . cmResult . update ({ simulationNumber : { ’cm ’ : cm, ’ time ’ : time }})
de f getComponents ( s e l f ) :
”Outputs a l i s t o f nodes that are components attached to the func t i on ”
return [ c f o r c in s e l f . nodes i f i s i n s t a n c e ( c , Component ) ]
de f ge tS ta t e ( s e l f ) :
# au toma t i c a l l y f i nd end node in func t i on
endNode = [ c f o r c in s e l f . nodes i f i s i n s t a n c e ( c , End ) ]
# l i s t comprehension s t o r e s r e s u l t as a l i s t
s t a t e = endNode [ 0 ] . outputState ( )
# i f s t a t e i s down f a i l −> s t o r e time o f f i r s t occurence
# t h i s i s r e qu i r ed to f a c i l i t a t e t r a n s i t i o n from SRT Faul t to SRT Fa i l
# f a i l u r e r epa i r d i s t r i b u t i o n s .
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i f ( s t a t e <= State . down fa i l u r e ) :
p r i n t ” State i s f a i l e d ” + s t r ( s imulationTime )
i f s e l f . f a i lT ime i s None :
p r i n t ”Record i s a l s o empty ” + s t r ( s imulationTime )
s e l f . f a i lT ime = simulationTime
e l s e :
s e l f . f a i lT ime = None
return s t a t e
de f getFai lTime ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . f a i lT ime
de f s imResul ts ( s e l f , n , time , s t a t e ) :
# save s imu la t i on r e s u l t s as a mul t id imens iona l d i c t i ona r y
d1 = { ’ time ’ : time , ’ s t a t e ’ : s t a t e }
d2 = {n : d1}
s e l f . r e s u l t s . update ( d2 )
de f setSystem ( s e l f , system ) :
s e l f . parent = system
def getSystem ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . parent
de f p l o tS ta t e ( s e l f , n = None ) :
””” P lo t s the r e s u l t s o f s imu la t i on ”””
i f n i s None :
n = 0
f i g , ax = p l t . subp lo t s ( )
p l t . p l o t ( s e l f . r e s u l t s [ n ] [ ’ time ’ ] , s e l f . r e s u l t s [ n ] [ ’ s t a t e ’ ] )
p l t . ax i s ( [ 0 , maxSimulationTime , State . min state , State . max state ] )
ax . s e t y t i c k l a b e l s ( s ta t eT i ckLabe l s ( ) )
p l t . show ( )
de f g e tTo t a lAva i l a b i l i t y ( s e l f , n = None ) :
i f n i s not None :
# return a v a i l a b i l i t y f o r p a r t i c u l a r t r i a l n
# s imp l i f y s imu la t i on r e s u l t s t a t e s to up (1) or down (−1)
# copy r e s u l t s so t ha t o r i g i n a l r e s u l t s aren ’ t i n a d v e r t an t l y modi f ied
s t a t e = map( lambda x : 1 i f x>=State . up s t a t e s e l s e 0 , \
s e l f . r e s u l t s [ n ] [ ’ s t a t e ’ ] )
time = l i s t ( s e l f . r e s u l t s [ n ] [ ’ time ’ ] )
# uptime i s then i n t e g r a t i o n o f s im p l i f i e d s t a t e
uptime = trapz ( s tate , time )
re turn uptime/maxSimulationTime
e l s e :
# return average a v a i l a b i l i t y o f a l l t r i a l s
uptime = [ ]
f o r i in s e l f . r e s u l t s :
s t a t e = map( lambda x : 1 i f x>=State . up s t a t e s e l s e 0 , \
s e l f . r e s u l t s [ i ] [ ’ s t a t e ’ ] )
time = l i s t ( s e l f . r e s u l t s [ i ] [ ’ time ’ ] )
uptime . append ( trapz ( s ta te , time ) )
re turn summariseStats ( uptime )
de f ge tAnnua lAva i l ab i l i t y ( s e l f , n = None ) :
numYears = maxSimulationTime / ANNUALHOURS
# determine whether s imu la t i on per iod i s an in t enge r annual per iod
# or has some remainder
i f maxSimulationTime % ANNUALHOURS:
count = range (0 , numYears+1)
e l s e :
count = range (0 , numYears )
a v a i l a b i l i t y = {}
i f n i s not None :
# return annua l i sed a v a i l a b i l i t y f o r p a r t i c u l a r t r i a l n
# conver t s t a t e s imu la t i on r e s u l t s to s imp l i f i e d s t a t e s
# t h i s a l l ow s i n t e g r a t i n g to f i nd up time r e s u l t s are s l i c e d
# in to annua l i sed t imeframes s ince r e s u l t s are s t o r ed as s t a t e
# t r a n s i t i o n s ra the r than r e gu l a r samples , s l i c e s need to be
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# manually c rea t ed
s t a t e = map( lambda x : 1 i f x>=State . up s t a t e s e l s e 0 , \
s e l f . r e s u l t s [ n ] [ ’ s t a t e ’ ] )
time = l i s t ( s e l f . r e s u l t s [ n ] [ ’ time ’ ] )
p r i n t s t a t e
p r i n t time
s ta r t Index = 0
# I n i t i a l s t a r t i n g va l u e s ( important i f t h e r e are no s t a t e
# changes in a year )
prependState = 1
prependTime = 0
f o r i in count :
# f ind index o f l a s t l i s t va lue w i th in annual per iod
i f i > numYears−1:
# l a s t s l i c e w i l l on ly be a por t i on o f one year
# take a l l v a l u e s up to the end o f the l i s t
s t a t e S l i c e = s t a t e [ s t a r t Index : ]
t imeS l i c e = time [ s t a r t Index : ]
p r i n t ” Or i g ina l ”
p r i n t s t a t e S l i c e
p r i n t t imeS l i c e
e l s e :
# f ind appropr ia t e po in t to s l i c e
stopIndex = next ( idx f o r idx , va lue in enumerate ( time ) \
i f va lue >= ( i +1)∗ANNUALHOURS)
pr in t ” Start Index : ” + in t ( s t a r t Index )
p r i n t ”StopIndex : ” + in t ( stopIndex )
# s l i c e r e s u l t s a t found index
s t a t e S l i c e = s t a t e [ s t a r t Index : stopIndex ]
t imeS l i c e = time [ s t a r t Index : stopIndex ]
p r i n t ” Or i g ina l ”
p r i n t s t a t e S l i c e
p r i n t t imeS l i c e
# add r e s u l t a t s l i c e po in t s so t ha t i n t e g r a t i o n occurs over
# en t i r e year
appendTime = ( i +1)∗ANNUALHOURS
# copy most recen t s t a t e i f i t e x i s t s , o the rw i s e copy
# prepend s t a t e
i f s t a t e S l i c e :
appendState = s t a t e S l i c e [−1]
e l s e :
appendState = prependState
t imeS l i c e . append ( appendTime )
s t a t e S l i c e . append ( appendState )
# prepend s t a t e and time t ha t was appended f o r l a s t year
pr in t ”Prepend State : ” + s t r ( prependState )
p r i n t ”Prepend Time : ” + s t r ( prependTime )
t imeS l i c e [ : 0 ] = [ prependTime ]
s t a t e S l i c e [ : 0 ] = [ prependState ]
p r i n t ”After ammending”
p r in t s t a t e S l i c e
p r i n t t imeS l i c e
# ca l c u l a t e a v a i l a b i l i t y f o r annual per iod
uptime = trapz ( s t a t e S l i c e , t imeS l i c e )
totalTime = t imeS l i c e [−1] − t imeS l i c e [ 0 ]
a v a i l a b i l i t y . update ({ i : ( uptime/ totalTime )} )
# update f o r next loop
s t a r t Index = in t ( stopIndex ) + 1
prependTime = appendTime
prependState = appendState
re turn a v a i l a b i l i t y
e l s e :
# return average annua l i sed a v a i l a b i l i t y f o r a l l t r i a l s
r e s u l t s = {}
s t a t e = {}
time = {}
f o r simNo in range (0 , maxSimulationNumber ) :
# conver t s t a t e s imu la t i on r e s u l t s to s imp l i f i e d s t a t e s
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# t h i s a l l ow s i n t e g r a t i n g to f i nd up time r e s u l t s are s l i c e d
# in to annua l i sed t imeframes s ince r e s u l t s are s t o r ed as s t a t e
# t r a n s i t i o n s ra the r than r e gu l a r samples , s l i c e s need to be
# manually c rea t ed
s t a t e . update ({ simNo : \
map( lambda x : 1 i f x>=State . up s t a t e s e l s e 0 , \
s e l f . r e s u l t s [ simNo ] [ ’ s t a t e ’ ] ) } )
time . update ({ simNo : l i s t ( s e l f . r e s u l t s [ simNo ] [ ’ time ’ ] ) } )
p r i n t s t a t e
p r i n t time
s ta r t Index = 0
annua lAva i l ab i l i t y = [ ]
prependState = 1
prependTime = 0
# loop through years
f o r year in count :
# f ind index o f l a s t l i s t va lue w i th in annual per iod
i f year > numYears−1:
# l a s t s l i c e w i l l on ly be a por t i on o f one year
# take a l l v a l u e s up to the end o f the l i s t
s t a t e S l i c e = s t a t e [ simNo ] [ s t a r t Index : ]
t imeS l i c e = time [ simNo ] [ s t a r t Index : ]
p r i n t ” Or i g i na l ”
p r i n t s t a t e S l i c e
p r i n t t imeS l i c e
e l s e :
# f ind appropr ia t e po in t to s l i c e
stopIndex = next ( idx f o r idx , va lue in \
enumerate ( time [ simNo ] ) \
i f va lue >= ( year+1)∗ANNUALHOURS)−1
p r in t ” Start Index : ” + s t r ( s t a r t Index )
p r i n t ”StopIndex : ” + s t r ( stopIndex )
# s l i c e r e s u l t s a t found index
s t a t e S l i c e = s t a t e [ simNo ] [ s t a r t Index : stopIndex ]
t imeS l i c e = time [ simNo ] [ s t a r t Index : stopIndex ]
p r i n t ” Or i g i na l ”
p r i n t s t a t e S l i c e
p r i n t t imeS l i c e
# add r e s u l t a t s l i c e po in t s so t ha t i n t e g r a t i o n occurs
# over en t i r e year
appendTime = ( year+1)∗ANNUALHOURS
# copy most recen t s t a t e i f i t e x i s t s , o the rw i s e copy
# prepend s t a t e
i f s t a t e S l i c e :
appendState = s t a t e S l i c e [−1]
e l s e :
appendState = prependState
t imeS l i c e . append ( appendTime )
s t a t e S l i c e . append ( appendState )
# prepend s t a t e and time t ha t was appended f o r l a s t year
t imeS l i c e [ : 0 ] = [ prependTime ]
s t a t e S l i c e [ : 0 ] = [ prependState ]
p r i n t ”After ammending”
p r in t s t a t e S l i c e
p r i n t t imeS l i c e
# ca l c u l a t e a v a i l a b i l i t y f o r annual per iod
uptime = trapz ( s t a t e S l i c e , t imeS l i c e )
totalTime = t imeS l i c e [−1] − t imeS l i c e [ 0 ]
annua lAva i l ab i l i t y . append ( uptime/ totalTime )
# update f o r next loop
s t a r t Index = in t ( stopIndex ) + 1
prependTime = appendTime
prependState = appendState
# s to r e annual a v a i l a b i l i t y
r e s u l t s . update ({ simNo : annua lAva i l ab i l i t y })
# ca l c u l a t e min , max & average
time = [ ]
avg = [ ]
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maximum = [ ]
minimum = [ ]
stdDev = [ ]
f o r year in count :
va lue s = [ ]
f o r simNo in range (0 , maxSimulationNumber ) :
va lue s . append ( r e s u l t s [ simNo ] [ year ] )
average = sum( va lue s )/ f l o a t ( l en ( va lue s ) )
var iance = map( lambda x : (x−average )∗∗2 , va lue s )
# ca l c u l a t e sample
s tandardDeviat ion = math . s q r t (sum( var iance )/ ( f l o a t ( l en ( var iance ))−1))
maximum. append (max( va lue s ) )
minimum . append (min ( va lue s ) )
stdDev . append ( standardDeviat ion )
avg . append ( average )
a v a i l a b i l i t y . update ({ ’max ’ : maximum})
a v a i l a b i l i t y . update ({ ’min ’ : minimum})
a v a i l a b i l i t y . update ({ ’ avg ’ : avg })
a v a i l a b i l i t y . update ({ ’ stdDev ’ : stdDev })
a v a i l a b i l i t y . update ({ ’ year ’ : count })
re turn a v a i l a b i l i t y
de f p l o tAnnua lAva i l ab i l i t y ( s e l f , n=None , sigma=None ) :
a v a i l a b i l i t y = s e l f . g e tAnnua lAva i l ab i l i t y (n)
k = a v a i l a b i l i t y . keys ( )
v = a v a i l a b i l i t y . va lue s ( )
i f n i s not None :
p l t . f i g u r e ( )
p l t . p l o t (k , v , ’ r ’ )
p l t . ax i s ( [ 0 , max(k ) , 0 , 1 . 1 ] )
t i t l e = s e l f . name + ’ Annual Av a i l a b i l i t y \nSimulat ion ’ + s t r (n)
p l t . t i t l e ( t i t l e )
p l t . show ( )
e l s e :
i f sigma i s None :
sigma = 1
x = a v a i l a b i l i t y [ ’ year ’ ]
yMax = a v a i l a b i l i t y [ ’max ’ ]
yMin = a v a i l a b i l i t y [ ’min ’ ]
yAvg = a v a i l a b i l i t y [ ’ avg ’ ]
# crea t e d e s i r e d number o f s tandard d e v i a t i o n s
stdDev = [ sigma ∗ j f o r j in a v a i l a b i l i t y [ ’ stdDev ’ ] ]
ySigmaHigh = map( lambda x , y : x+y , yAvg , stdDev )
ySigmaLow = map( lambda x , y : x−y , yAvg , stdDev )
p l t . f i g u r e ( )
p l t . p l o t (x , yMax , ’ g ’ , x , yAvg , ’b ’ , x , yMin , ’ r ’ , x , ySigmaHigh , x , ySigmaLow)
p l t . ax i s ( [ 0 , max(x ) , 0 , 1 . 1 ] )
t i t l e = s e l f . name + ’ Annual Av a i l a b i l i t y ’
p l t . t i t l e ( t i t l e )
p l t . show ( )
de f getCMTime( s e l f , n = None ) :
i f n i s not None :
cm = s e l f . cmResult [ n ] [ ’cm ’ ]
time = s e l f . cmResult [ n ] [ ’ time ’ ]
i f time [−1] != maxSimulationTime :
time . append (maxSimulationTime )
cm. append (cm[−1])
re turn trapz (cm, time )
e l s e :
r e s u l t = [ ]
f o r i in range (0 , maxSimulationNumber ) :
cm = s e l f . cmResult [ i ] [ ’cm ’ ]
time = s e l f . cmResult [ i ] [ ’ time ’ ]
i f time [−1] != maxSimulationTime :
time . append (maxSimulationTime )
cm. append (cm[−1])
r e s u l t . append ( trapz (cm, time ) )
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i f l en ( r e s u l t ) == 1 :
re turn r e s u l t [ 0 ]
e l s e :
r e turn summariseStats ( r e s u l t )
de f getAnnualCMTime( s e l f , n = None ) :
numYears = maxSimulationTime / ANNUALHOURS
# determine whether s imu la t i on per iod i s an in t enge r annual per iod
# or has some remainder
i f maxSimulationTime % ANNUALHOURS:
count = range (0 , numYears+1)
e l s e :
count = range (0 , numYears )
cmTime = [ ]
year = [ ]
i f n i s not None :
# Return annual c o r r e c t i v e maintenance time f o r p a r t i c u l a r t r i a l n
t ry :
cm = s e l f . cmResult [ n ] [ ’cm ’ ]
time = s e l f . cmResult [ n ] [ ’ time ’ ]
except KeyError :
r a i s e ValueError ( ’No c o r r e c t i v e maintenace r e s u l t s ’ \
’ in s imu la t i on %s ’ % s t r (n ) )
# Dup l i ca te f i n a l va lue in r e s u l t s so t ha t r e s u l t s are f o r en t i r e
# s imu la t i on per iod
cm. append (cm[−1])
time . append (maxSimulationTime )
# Resu l t s are sperara t ed in t o annual s l i c e s . Since only t r a n s i t i o n s
# are recorded , s l i c e s need to be manual ly c rea t ed
s t a r t Index = 0
prependCM = 0
prependTime = 0
f o r i in count :
# f ind index o f l a s t l i s t va lue w i th in annual per iod
i f i > numYears−1:
# Last s l i c e w i l l on ly be a por t i on o f one year
# take a l l v a l u e s up to the end o f the l i s t
cmSl ice = cm[ s ta r t Index : ]
t imeS l i c e = time [ s t a r t Index : ]
e l s e :
# Find appropr ia t e po in t to s l i c e
stopIndex = next ( idx f o r idx , va lue in enumerate ( time ) \
i f va lue >=( i +1)∗ANNUALHOURS)
# S l i c e r e s u l t s a t i d e n t i f i e d index
cmSl ice = cm[ s ta r t Index : stopIndex ]
t imeS l i c e = time [ s t a r t Index : stopIndex ]
# Add r e s u l t s a t s l i c e po in t s so t ha t i n t e g r a t i o n occurs
# over en t i r e year
appendTime = ( i +1)∗ANNUALHOURS
# copy most recen t s t a t e i f i t e x i s t s , o the rw i s e copy
# prepend s t a t e
i f cmSl ice :
appendCM = cmSl ice [−1]
e l s e :
appendCM = prependCM
t imeS l i c e . append ( appendTime )
cmSl ice . append (appendCM)
# prepend s t a t e and time t ha t was appended f o r l a s t year
# don ’ t prepend f o r the f i r s t year
t imeS l i c e [ : 0 ] = [ prependTime ]
cmSl ice [ : 0 ] = [ prependCM ]
pr in t ’ Year : ’ + s t r ( i )
p r i n t ’ TimeSl ice : ’
p r i n t t imeS l i c e
p r i n t ’ cmSl ice : ’
p r i n t cmSl ice
# ca l c u l a t e c o r r e c t i v e maintenamce hours f o r annual per iod
cmTime . append ( trapz ( cmSlice , t imeS l i c e ) )
year . append ( i )
p r i n t ’ \n ’
# update f o r next loop
s t a r t Index = stopIndex
prependTime = appendTime
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prependCM = appendCM
return { ’CM’ : cmTime , ’ year ’ : year }
de f getPMTime( s e l f , n = None ) :
i f n i s not None :
t ry :
pm = s e l f . pmResult [ n ] [ ’pm ’ ]
time = s e l f . pmResult [ n ] [ ’ time ’ ]
except KeyError :
r e turn 0 .0
e l s e :
i f time [−1] != maxSimulationTime :
time . append (maxSimulationTime )
pm. append (pm[−1])
re turn trapz (pm, time )
e l s e :
r e s u l t = [ ]
f o r i in s e l f . pmResult :
pm = s e l f . pmResult [ i ] [ ’pm ’ ]
time = s e l f . pmResult [ i ] [ ’ time ’ ]
i f time [−1] != maxSimulationTime :
time . append (maxSimulationTime )
pm. append (pm[−1])
r e s u l t . append ( trapz (pm, time ) )
i f l en ( r e s u l t ) == 1 :
re turn r e s u l t [ 0 ]
e l s e :
r e turn summariseStats ( r e s u l t )
c l a s s Node ( ob j e c t ) :
”””A node c l a s s ”””
p r e f i x = ”N”
nextID = 0 # Next a v a i l a b l e ID number i s shared amongst a l l nodes
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name , inputNo = DEFAULT INPUT NO, \
outputNo = DEFAULTOUTPUTNO, inNode = None , outNode = None , \
f unc t i on = None ) :
# Set ID number
s e l f . id = Node . p r e f i x + s t r (Node . nextID )
Node . nextID += 1
# Set name
s e l f . name = name
# Set input / output connect ion numbers
s e l f . inputNo = inputNo
s e l f . outputNo = outputNo
# Set input / output nodes
s e l f . inNode = [ ]
i f inNode != None :
s e l f . connectInputNode ( inNode )
s e l f . outNode = [ ]
i f outNode != None :
s e l f . connectOutputNode ( outNode )
# Set func t i on
s e l f . f unc t i on = func t i on
de f connectInputNode ( s e l f , node ) :
t ry :
s e l f . inNode . extend ( node )
except TypeError :
s e l f . inNode . append ( node )
i f l en ( s e l f . inNode ) > s e l f . inputNo :
r a i s e ValueError ( ’Node connect i ons exceed input connector s ’ \
’ f o r %s ’ % s e l f . name)
de f connectOutputNode ( s e l f , node ) :
t ry :
s e l f . outNode . extend ( node )
except TypeError :
s e l f . outNode . append ( node )
i f l en ( s e l f . outNode ) > s e l f . outputNo :
r a i s e ValueError ( ’Output node connect i ons exceed output ’ \
’ connector s f o r %s ’ % s e l f . name)
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de f outputState ( s e l f ) :
max state = max( ( n . outputState ( ) f o r n in s e l f . inNode ) )
min state = min ( ( n . outputState ( ) f o r n in s e l f . inNode ) )
# combine min and max s t a t e so t ha t f a i l u r e , maintenance e t c i s
# preserved wh i l s t maintaining up or down o v e r a l l s t a t e
i f min s tate <= State . down states and max state >= State . up s t a t e s :
s t a t e = min state + State . down states
e l s e :
s t a t e = min state
re turn s t a t e
de f d isp layNodes ( s e l f ) :
p r i n t ”Nodes connected to ” + s e l f . name + ” : ”
f o r n in s e l f . inNode :
p r i n t n . name
f o r n in s e l f . outNode :
p r i n t n . name
de f setFunct ion ( s e l f , f unc t i on ) :
s e l f . f unc t i on = func t i on
de f getFunct ion ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . f unc t i on
c l a s s Sta r t (Node ) :
”””A s t a r t node c l a s s ”””
de f i n i t ( s e l f , outNode = None , inMessage = None ) :
name = ” S ta r t ”+ s t r ( Sta r t . nextID ) # Create gener i c s t a r t node name
# Pass to s up e r c l a s s cons t ruc t o r
Node . i n i t ( s e l f , name , 0 , 1 , None , outNode )
de f connectFunct ion ( s e l f , f ) :
s e l f . inMessage . append ( f )
de f outputState ( s e l f ) :
r e turn State . up
c l a s s End(Node ) :
”””An end node c l a s s ”””
de f i n i t ( s e l f , inNode = None ) :
name = ”End ” + s t r (End . nextID ) # Create gener i c end node name
# Pass to s up e r c l a s s cons t ruc t o r
Node . i n i t ( s e l f , name , 1 , 0 , inNode , None )
c l a s s S p l i t t e r (Node ) :
”””A s p l i t t e r node c l a s s ”””
de f i n i t ( s e l f , outputNo , inNode = None , outNode = None ) :
# Create gener i c s p l i t t e r node name
name = ” S p l i t t e r ” + s t r ( S p l i t t e r . nextID )
# Pass to s up e r c l a s s cons t ruc t o r
Node . i n i t ( s e l f , name , 1 , outputNo , inNode , outNode )
c l a s s Combiner (Node ) :
”””A combiner node c l a s s ”””
de f i n i t ( s e l f , inputNo , inNode = None , outNode = None ) :
# Create gener i c combiner node name
name = ”Combiner ” + s t r (Combiner . nextID )
# Pass to s up e r c l a s s cons t ruc t o r
Node . i n i t ( s e l f , name , inputNo , 1 , inNode , outNode )
c l a s s Component (Node ) :
”””A component node c l a s s ”””
de f i n i t ( \
s e l f , name , inNode = None , outNode = None , fa i lu reModes = None ) :
# Pass to s up e r c l a s s cons t ruc t o r
Node . i n i t ( s e l f , name , 1 , 1 , inNode , outNode )
# Set d e f a u l t s t a t e and s t o r e in d i c t i ona r y
# Dic t ionary used so t ha t consequence o f mu l t i p l e f a i l u r e modes and
# maintenance ac t i on s can be s t o r ed s imu l t aneous l y
s e l f . r e s e t S t a t e ( )
# Set d e f a u l t s t a r t i n g age
s e l f . ageOf f s e t = 0
# Set d e f a u l t operat ime time
s e l f . operat ingTimeOf f set = 0
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# Set d e f a u l t number o f c y c l e s
s e l f . c y c l e = 0
s e l f . prevCycle = 0
# Assign f a i l u r e modes
s e l f . f a i lu reModes = [ ]
i f f a i lu reModes != None :
s e l f . a s s i gn f a i l u r eMode s ( fa i lu reModes )
de f s e tS t a t e ( s e l f , s t a t eD i c t ) :
# Add supp l i e d d i c t i ona r y va lue−key pa i r to e x i s t i n g s t a t e d i c t i ona r y
s e l f . s t a t e . update ( s t a t eD i c t )
de f unsetState ( s e l f , stateKey ) :
# Remove value−key pa i r f o r s upp l i e d key from s t a t e d i c t i ona r y
i f stateKey in s e l f . s t a t e :
de l s e l f . s t a t e [ stateKey ]
de f r e s e t S t a t e ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . s t a t e = { s e l f . id : State . up}
de f ge tS ta t e ( s e l f ) :
# Get s t a t e o f component
re turn min ( s e l f . s t a t e . va lue s ( ) )
de f getCyc le ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . c y c l e
de f getPrevCycle ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . prevCycle
de f outputState ( s e l f ) :
# Get s t a t e to output to downstream component
# Combination o f own s t a t e and s t a t e from upstream component
re turn min ( [ s e l f . inNode [ 0 ] . outputState ( ) , s e l f . g e tS ta t e ( ) ] )
de f ass ignFai lureMode ( s e l f , f a i lu reModes ) :
t ry :
s e l f . f a i lu reModes . extend ( fa i lu reModes )
except TypeError :
s e l f . f a i lu reModes . append ( fa i lu reModes )
fa i lu reModes . se tParent ( s e l f )
e l s e :
f o r fm in fa i lu reModes :
fm . setParent ( s e l f )
de f getFai lureModes ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . f a i lu reModes
de f incrementCycle ( s e l f , count = 1 ) :
s e l f . c y c l e += count
de f r e s e tCyc l e ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . c y c l e = 0
s e l f . prevCycle = 0
de f getAge ( s e l f ) :
g l oba l s imulationTime
return simulationTime − s e l f . ageOf f s e t
de f resetAge ( s e l f , va lue = None ) :
g l oba l s imulationTime
i f va lue i s None :
s e l f . ageOf f s e t = simulationTime
e l s e :
s e l f . ageOf f s e t = value
de f getOperatingTime ( s e l f ) :
g l oba l s imulationTime
return simulationTime − s e l f . operat ingTimeOf f set
de f resetOperat ingTime ( s e l f , va lue = None ) :
g l oba l s imulationTime
i f va lue i s None :
s e l f . operat ingTimeOf f set = simulationTime
e l s e :
s e l f . operat ingTimeOf f set = value
de f r ep l a c e ( s e l f ) :
# re s e t appropr ia t e va l u e s i f the component i s r ep l a ced
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f o r fm in s e l f . f a i lu reModes :
fm . un t r i g g e r ( )
s e l f . resetOperat ingTime ( )
s e l f . r e s e tCyc l e ( )
c l a s s FailureMode ( ob j e c t ) :
”””A f a i l u r e mode c l a s s ”””
p r e f i x = ”FM”
nextID = 0 # Next a v a i l a b l e ID number i s shared amongst a l l f a i l u r e modes
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name , t = False , f a i l u r eD i s t = None , \
f a i lR ep a i rD i s t = None , f au l tRepa i rD i s t = None , acs = True , \
parent = None , maintenancePlan = None , iVar = None , pf = None ) :
# Set ID number
s e l f . id = FailureMode . p r e f i x + s t r ( FailureMode . nextID )
FailureMode . nextID += 1
# Set name
s e l f . name = name
# Set t r i g e r e d va lue
s e l f . t r i g g e r e d = t
# Set f a i l e d va lue
s e l f . f a i l e d = False
# Set d e f a u l t t r i g g e r e d time
s e l f . t r iggeredTime = None
# Set d e f a u l t f a i l u r e time
s e l f . f a i l edTime = None
# Does f a i l u r e mode cause component to f a i l ?
s e l f . a f fectComponentState = acs
# Link to parent node
s e l f . parent = parent
# Fai lu re d i s t r i b u t i o n
s e l f . f a i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n = f a i l u r eD i s t
# Repair d i s t r i b u t i o n
s e l f . f a i l u r eR epa i rD i s t r i b u t i o n = f a i lR ep a i rD i s t
s e l f . f a u l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on = fau l tRepa i rD i s t
# Maintenace plan
s e l f . maintenancePlan = maintenancePlan
# Set d e f a u l t f a i l u r e mode type ( independent v a r i a b l e )
i f iVar i s None :
s e l f . iVar = FailureModeType . age
e l s e :
s e l f . iVar = iVar
# Set d e f a u l t P−F i n t e r v a l
i f p f i s None :
s e l f . p f I n t e r v a l = 0
e l s e :
s e l f . p f I n t e r v a l = pf
s e l f . t r iggerCount = {}
s e l f . startTime = 0
s e l f . r e s u l t s = {}
s e l f . de tec ted = False
de f t r i g g e r ( s e l f ) :
# Set f a i l u r e mode s t a t e to t rue
s e l f . t r i g g e r e d = True
# Store t r i g g e r time
s e l f . t r iggeredTime = simulationTime
# Increment t r i g g e r counter
t ry :
# Get t r i g g e r counter va lue i f i t a l r eady e x i s t s
count = s e l f . t r iggerCount [ simulationNumber ]
except KeyError :
# i n i t i a l i s e t r i g g e r counter i f doesn ’ t a l r eady e x i s t
s e l f . t r iggerCount . update ({ simulationNumber : 1})
e l s e :
# incremenet
s e l f . t r iggerCount . update ({ simulationNumber : count + 1})
# Apply consequence o f f a i l u r e mode s t a t e to parent component
# i f P−F i n t e r v a l exceeded
f a i lT ime = s e l f . t r iggeredTime + s e l f . p f I n t e r v a l
i f s imulationTime >= fa i lT ime :
s e l f . f a i l ( )
# Store opera t ing time f o r MTBF ca l c u l a t i o n
f a i lT ime = s e l f . p f I n t e r v a l + s e l f . t r iggeredTime
upTime = fa i lT ime − s e l f . startTime
try :
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upTimeResult = s e l f . r e s u l t s [ simulationNumber ] [ ’ uptime ’ ]
f a i lT imeResu l t = s e l f . r e s u l t s [ simulationNumber ] [ ’ f a i l t im e ’ ]
except KeyError :
upTimeResult = [ upTime ]
f a i lT imeResu l t = [ fa i lT ime ]
e l s e :
upTimeResult . append (upTime)
fa i lT imeResu l t . append ( fa i lT ime )
s e l f . r e s u l t s . update ({ simulationNumber : \
{ ’ uptime ’ : upTimeResult , ’ f a i l t im e ’ : f a i lT imeResu l t }})
de f un t r i g g e r ( s e l f ) :
# Set f a i l u r e mode s t a t e to f a l s e
s e l f . t r i g g e r e d = False
# Set f a i l u r e mode s t a t e to f a l s e
s e l f . f a i l e d = False
# Remove f a i l u r e time
s e l f . t r iggeredTime = None
# Remove f a i l u r e time
s e l f . f a i l edTime = None
# Remove consequence o f f a i l u r e mode s t a t e from parent component
s e l f . parent . unse tState ( s e l f . id )
# Reset f a i l u r e mode s t a r t time
s e l f . startTime = simulationTime
# Reset dec t i on
s e l f . undetect ( )
de f getDetected ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . de tec ted
de f de t e c t ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . de tec ted = True
s e l f . detectedTime = simulationTime
de f undetect ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . detectedTime = None
s e l f . de tec ted = False
de f f a i l ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . f a i l e d = True
s e l f . f a i l edTime = simulationTime
i f s e l f . a f fectComponentState :
s e l f . parent . s e t S t a t e ({ s e l f . id : State . down fa i l u r e })
e l s e :
s e l f . parent . s e t S t a t e ({ s e l f . id : State . u p f a i l u r e })
de f se tParent ( s e l f , component ) :
s e l f . parent = component
de f s e tPFInte rva l ( s e l f , p f ) :
s e l f . p f I n t e r v a l = pf
de f setACS ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . a f fectComponentState = True
de f ge tTr iggered ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . t r i g g e r e d
de f g e tFa i l ed ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . f a i l e d
de f getPFInterva l ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . p f I n t e r v a l
de f getTriggeredTime ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . t r iggeredTime
de f getFai ledTime ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . f a i l edTime
de f cmTriggered ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . maintenancePlan . ge tTr iggered ( )
de f cmTrigger ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . maintenancePlan . t r i g g e r ( )
s e l f . cmTriggeredTime = simulationTime
de f cmUntrigger ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . maintenancePlan . un t r i g g e r ( )
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s e l f . cmTriggeredTime = None
de f cmCondProb( s e l f ) :
T2 = simulationTime − s e l f . maintenancePlan . getTriggeredTime ( )
T1 = T2 − s imulat ionTimeStep
return s e l f . maintenancePlan . getDurationCP (T1 , T2)
de f setMaintenancePlan ( s e l f , cm ) :
s e l f . maintenancePlan = cm
def set IVar ( s e l f , iVar ) :
s e l f . iVar = iVar
de f s e tF a i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n ( s e l f , d i s t ) :
s e l f . f a i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n = d i s t
de f s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( s e l f , d i s t ) :
s e l f . f a i l u r eR epa i rD i s t r i b u t i o n = d i s t
de f s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( s e l f , d i s t ) :
s e l f . f a u l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on = d i s t
de f getCondProb ( s e l f ) :
s t a t e = s e l f . parent . getFunct ion ( ) . g e tS ta t e ( )
i f s e l f . g e tFa i l ed ( ) :
# return r epa i r p r o b a b i l i t y i f f a i l u r e mode a l r eady f a i l e d
i f s t a t e <= State . down fa i l u r e :
T2 = simulationTime − s e l f . parent . getFunct ion ( ) . getFai lTime ( )
T1 = T2 − s imulat ionTimeStep
return s e l f . f a i l u r eR epa i rD i s t r i b u t i o n . c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y (T1 , T2)
e l s e :
T2 = simulationTime − s e l f . f a i l edTime
T1 = T2 − s imulat ionTimeStep
return s e l f . f a u l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on . c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y (T1 , T2)
e l i f s e l f . getDetected ( ) :
# return r epa i r p r o b a b i l i t y i f f a i l u r e mode de t e c t e d by schedu l ed maintenace
i f s t a t e <= State . down fa i l u r e :
T2 = simulationTime − s e l f . parent . getFunct ion ( ) . getFai lTime ( )
T1 = T2 − s imulat ionTimeStep
return s e l f . f a i l u r eR epa i rD i s t r i b u t i o n . c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y (T1 , T2)
e l s e :
T2 = simulationTime − s e l f . detectedTime
T1 = T2 − s imulat ionTimeStep
return s e l f . f a u l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on . c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y (T1 , T2)
e l s e :
# return f a i l u r e p r o b a b i l i t y i f not t r i g g e r e d
# ge t independent v a r i a b l e i f not based on age
i f s e l f . iVar i s FailureModeType . operatingTime :
T2 = s e l f . parent . getOperatingTime ( )
T1 = T2 − s imulat ionTimeStep
return s e l f . f a i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n . c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y (T1 , T2)
e l i f s e l f . iVar i s FailureModeType . age :
T2 = s e l f . parent . getAge ( )
T1 = T2 − s imulat ionTimeStep
return s e l f . f a i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n . c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y (T1 , T2)
e l i f s e l f . iVar i s FailureModeType . c y c l e :
C2 = s e l f . parent . getCyc le ( )
C1 = s e l f . parent . getPrevCycle ( )
re turn s e l f . f a i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n . c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y (C1 , C2)
de f getAvgOccurrence ( s e l f ) :
va lue s = s e l f . t r iggerCount . va lue s ( )
re turn sum( va lue s )/ f l o a t ( l en ( va lue s ) )
de f getMTBF( s e l f , n = None ) :
uptime = [ ]
i f n i s None :
f o r va lue in s e l f . r e s u l t s . i t e r v a l u e s ( ) :
uptime . extend ( value [ ’ uptime ’ ] )
e l s e :
uptime = s e l f . r e s u l t s [ n ] [ ’ uptime ’ ]
t ry :
r e s u l t s = summariseStats ( uptime )
except ZeroDiv i s i onErro r :
r e turn ”No f a i l u r e s in s imu la t i on per iod ”
e l s e :
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re turn r e s u l t s
de f getAnnualMTBF( s e l f , n = None ) :
numYears = maxSimulationTime / ANNUALHOURS
# determine whether s imu la t i on per iod i s an in t enge r annual per iod
# or has some remainder
i f maxSimulationTime % ANNUALHOURS:
count = range (0 , numYears+1)
e l s e :
count = range (0 , numYears )
time = [ ]
MTBF = [ ]
f o r year in count :
s tar tHours = year ∗ ANNUALHOURS + simulat ionTimeStep
endHours = ( year + 1) ∗ ANNUALHOURS
i f endHours > maxSimulationTime :
endHours = maxSimulationTime
uptime = [ ]
f o r key in s e l f . r e s u l t s :
# Get up time va l u e s f o r f a i l u r e s t ha t occurred during the per iod
# of i n t e r e s t
tempUptime = s e l f . r e s u l t s [ key ] [ ’ uptime ’ ]
tempFailt ime = s e l f . r e s u l t s [ key ] [ ’ f a i l t im e ’ ]
simAnnualUptime = [ i f o r ( i , j ) in z ip ( tempUptime , tempFailt ime ) \
i f j >= startHours and j <= endHours ]
# Store uptime f o r each s imu la t i on
uptime . extend ( simAnnualUptime )
# Store MTBF ca l c u l a t i o n s
MTBF. append ( summariseStats ( uptime ) )
time . append ( year )
re turn { ’ time ’ : time , ’MTBF’ : MTBF}
c l a s s D i s t r i bu t i on ( ob j e c t ) :
”””A s t a t i s t i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n c l a s s ”””
p r e f i x = ”D”
nextID = 0 # Next a v a i l a b l e ID number i s shared amongst a l l d i s t r i b u t i o n s
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name ) :
# Set ID number
s e l f . id = D i s t r i bu t i on . p r e f i x + s t r ( D i s t r i bu t i on . nextID )
D i s t r i bu t i on . nextID += 1
#Set name
s e l f . name = name
c l a s s Exponent ia l ( D i s t r i bu t i on ) :
”””An exponen t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n c l a s s ”””
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name , ra t e ) :
s e l f . r a t e = ra t e
# Pass to s up e r c l a s s cons t ruc t o r
Di s t r i bu t i on . i n i t ( s e l f , name)
de f c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y ( s e l f , T1 , T2 ) :
# Exp l o i t i n g the memoryless nature o f the the e xponen t i a l d i s t r o b u t i o n
# and t ha t i t has a c l o s ed form equat ion , i n t e g r a t e e xponen t i a l f unc t i on
# from 0 to T, us ing func t i on ra the r than samples to improve accuraccy
T = T2 − T1
Q = quad ( lambda t : s e l f . r a t e ∗math . exp(− s e l f . r a t e ∗ t ) , 0 , T)
# The f i r s t e lement o f the t u p l e re turned by quad i s the p r o b a b i l i t y
# The second element i s the upper bound o f the error
re turn Q[ 0 ]
c l a s s LogNormal ( D i s t r i bu t i on ) :
”””An exponen t i a l d i s t r i b u t i o n c l a s s ”””
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name , mean , var ) :
# Where mean i s the a r i t hme t i c mean and var i s the a r i t hme t i c var iance
# Ca l cu l a t e the l o c a t i o n (mu) and s c a l e ( sigma ) parameters f o r the
# log−normal d i s t r i b u t i o n from the a r i t hme t i c mean and var iance
sigmaSquared = math . l og (1+var / f l o a t (mean∗∗2))
s e l f . sigma = math . s q r t ( sigmaSquared )
s e l f .mu = math . l og (mean) − sigmaSquared /2 .0
# Pass to s up e r c l a s s cons t ruc t o r
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Di s t r i bu t i on . i n i t ( s e l f , name)
de f c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y ( s e l f , T1 , T2 ) :
””” Ca l cu l a t e s the c ond i t i o na l p r o b a b i l i t y o f a s t a t i s t i c a l d i s t r i b u t i o n
in the i n t e r v a l between two po in t s ( u s u a l l y in time ) .
Based on the mathematical e xp l ana t i on in R e l i a b i l i t y Theory and Prac t i c e :
F(T2 − T1) = P(T2 − T1)/R(T1) = (Q(T2) − Q(T1)/R(T1)) ”””
i f T2 < T1 :
r a i s e ValueError ( ’ I nva l i d minimum and maximum bounds f o r ’ \
’ c ond i t i o na l p r obab i l i t y o f %s ’ % s e l f . name)
# Ca l cu l a t e Q(T2)
# In t e g r a t e from spac ing (0) in s t ead o f 0 s ince lognormal i s not de f ined
# at x=0
i f T2 > 0 . 0 :
Q2 = quad ( lambda x : 1/(x∗ s e l f . sigma∗math . sq r t (2∗math . p i ) )∗ \
math . exp(−(math . l og (x)− s e l f .mu)∗∗2/(2∗ s e l f . sigma ∗∗2) ) , \
spac ing ( 0 ) , T2 ) [ 0 ]
e l s e :
Q2 = 0 .0
# Ca l cu l a t e Q(T1)
# In t e g r a t e from spac ing (0) in s t ead o f 0 s ince lognormal i s not de f ined
# at x=0
i f T1 > 0 . 0 :
Q1 = quad ( lambda x : 1/(x∗ s e l f . sigma∗math . sq r t (2∗math . p i ) )∗ \
math . exp(−(math . l og (x)− s e l f .mu)∗∗2/(2∗ s e l f . sigma ∗∗2) ) , \
spac ing ( 0 ) , T1 ) [ 0 ]
e l s e :
Q1 = 0 .0
# Ca l cu l a t e R(T1)
R1 = 1 − Q1
# Ca l cu l a t e F(T2 − T1)
t ry :
Q = (Q2 − Q1)/R1
except ZeroDiv i s i onErro r :
Q = 1 .0
# quad i n t e g r a t i o n can r e s u l t in sma l l p r o b a b i l i t y e r ro r s so l im i t s are
# not e x a c t l y 0 .0 and 1.0
i f Q < −0.5:
r a i s e ValueError ( ’ Ca lcu lated c ond i t i o na l p r obab i l i t y o f %s i s ’ \
’ l e s s than zero (Q: %s T1 : %s T2 : %s ) ’ % ( s e l f . name , s t r (Q) , \
s t r (T1) , s t r (T2 ) ) )
e l i f Q > 1 . 2 :
r a i s e ValueError ( ’ Ca lcu lated c ond i t i o na l p r obab i l i t y o f %s i s ’ \
’ g r e a t e r than one (Q: %s T1 : %s T2 : %s ) ’ % ( s e l f . name , s t r (Q) , \
s t r (T1) , s t r (T2 ) ) )
re turn Q
c l a s s Zero ( D i s t r i bu t i on ) :
”””A c l a s s wi th zero p r o b a b i l i t y ”””
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name ) :
# Pass to s up e r c l a s s cons t ruc t o r
Di s t r i bu t i on . i n i t ( s e l f , name)
de f c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y ( s e l f , T1 , T2 ) :
r e turn 0 .0
c l a s s One( D i s t r i bu t i on ) :
”””A c l a s s wi th p r o b a b i l i t y o f one”””
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name ) :
# Pass to s up e r c l a s s cons t ruc t o r
Di s t r i bu t i on . i n i t ( s e l f , name)
de f c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y ( s e l f , T1 , T2 ) :
r e turn 1 .0
c l a s s Maintenance ( ob j e c t ) :
””” A maintenance plan c l a s s ”””
p r e f i x = ”MP”
nextID = 0 # Next a v a i l a b l e ID number i s shared amongst a l l maintenance p lans
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name , durat ionDis t = None , \
upMaintenanceState = None , downMaintenanceState = None , \
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r e sCyc l e = None , incCyc le = None , resAge = None , resOpTime = None ) :
s e l f . id = Maintenance . p r e f i x + s t r (Maintenance . nextID )
Maintenance . nextID += 1
s e l f . name = name
s e l f . r e s e tCyc l e = [ ]
i f r e sCyc l e != None :
s e l f . connectResetCycle ( r e sCyc l e )
s e l f . incrementCycle = [ ]
i f incCyc le != None :
s e l f . connectIncrementCycle ( incCyc le )
s e l f . resetAge = [ ]
i f resAge != None :
s e l f . connectResetAge ( resAge )
s e l f . resetOperat ingTime = [ ]
i f resOpTime != None :
s e l f . connectResetOperatingTime ( resOpTime )
s e l f . du ra t i onD i s t r i bu t i on = durat ionDis t
s e l f . t r i g g e r e d = False
s e l f . upMaintenanceState = [ ]
i f upMaintenanceState != None :
s e l f . addUpMaintenanceState ( upMaintenanceState )
s e l f . downMaintenanceState = [ ]
i f downMaintenanceState != None :
s e l f . addDownMaintenanceState ( downMaintenanceState )
s e l f . replaceComponent = [ ]
de f t r i g g e r ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . t r i g g e r e d = True
s e l f . t r iggeredTime = simulationTime
s e l f . performMaintenance ( )
s e l f . getFunct ion ( ) . setCM()
f o r c in s e l f . downMaintenanceState :
c . s e t S t a t e ({ s e l f . id : State . down maintenance })
f o r c in s e l f . upMaintenanceState :
c . s e t S t a t e ({ s e l f . id : State . up maintenance })
de f un t r i g g e r ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . t r i g g e r e d = False
s e l f . t r iggeredTime = None
f o r c in s e l f . downMaintenanceState :
c . unse tState ( s e l f . id )
f o r c in s e l f . upMaintenanceState :
c . unse tState ( s e l f . id )
f o r c in s e l f . replaceComponent :
c . r ep l a c e ( )
s e l f . getFunct ion ( ) . unsetCM()
de f ge tTr iggered ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . t r i g g e r e d
de f getTriggeredTime ( s e l f ) :
r e turn s e l f . t r iggeredTime
de f getFunct ion ( s e l f ) :
t ry :
r e turn s e l f . f unc t i on
except Att r ibuteError :
# Finds a component as s i gned to the maintenance p lan somewhere and
# re turns a l i n k to the Function . Although not e l egan t , t h i s
# approach avo ids the user needing to manual ly l i n k the func t i on
i f s e l f . resetOperat ingTime :
s e l f . f unc t i on = s e l f . operatingTime [ 0 ] . getFunct ion ( )
e l i f s e l f . resetAge :
s e l f . f unc t i on = s e l f . resetAge [ 0 ] . getFunct ion ( )
e l i f s e l f . r e s e tCyc l e :
s e l f . f unc t i on = s e l f . r e s e tCyc l e [ 0 ] . getFunct ion ( )
e l i f s e l f . replaceComponent :
s e l f . f unc t i on = s e l f . replaceComponent [ 0 ] . getFunct ion ( )
e l i f s e l f . downMaintenanceState :
s e l f . f unc t i on = s e l f . downMaintenanceState [ 0 ] . getFunct ion ( )
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e l i f s e l f . upMaintenanceState :
s e l f . f unc t i on = s e l f . upMaintenanceState [ 0 ] . getFunct ion ( )
e l i f s e l f . incrementCycle :
s e l f . f unc t i on = s e l f . incrementCycle [ 0 ] . getFunct ion ( )
e l s e :
r a i s e ValueError ( ’ Maintenance \’%s \ ’ does not conta in a path ’ \
’ to parent Function ’ % s e l f . name)
re turn s e l f . f unc t i on
de f setDurat ion ( s e l f , durat ion ) :
s e l f . du ra t i onD i s t r i bu t i on = durat ion
de f connectResetCycle ( s e l f , component ) :
t ry :
s e l f . r e s e tCyc l e . extend ( component )
except TypeError :
s e l f . r e s e tCyc l e . append ( component )
de f connectIncrementCycle ( s e l f , component ) :
t ry :
s e l f . incrementCycle . extend ( component )
except TypeError :
s e l f . incrementCycle . append ( component )
de f connectResetAge ( s e l f , component ) :
t ry :
s e l f . resetAge . extend ( component )
except TypeError :
s e l f . resetAge . append ( component )
de f connectReplaceComponent ( s e l f , component ) :
t ry :
s e l f . replaceComponent . extend ( component )
except TypeError :
s e l f . replaceComponent . append ( component )
de f addUpMaintenanceState ( s e l f , component ) :
t ry :
s e l f . upMaintenanceState . extend ( component )
except TypeError :
s e l f . upMaintenanceState . append ( component )
de f addDownMaintenanceState ( s e l f , component ) :
t ry :
s e l f . downMaintenanceState . extend ( component )
except TypeError :
s e l f . downMaintenanceState . append ( component )
de f performMaintenance ( s e l f ) :
# perform a l l maintenance ac t i on s
f o r c in s e l f . r e s e tCyc l e :
c . r e s e tCyc l e ( )
f o r c in s e l f . incrementCycle :
c . incrementCycle ( )
f o r c in s e l f . resetAge :
c . resetAge ( )
f o r c in s e l f . resetOperat ingTime :
c . resetOperat ingTime ( )
# update s t a t e s o f a l l components
f o r c in s e l f . downMaintenanceState :
c . s e t S t a t e ({ s e l f . id : State . down maintenance })
f o r c in s e l f . upMaintenanceState :
c . s e t S t a t e ({ s e l f . id : State . up maintenance })
de f getDurationCP ( s e l f ) :
T2 = simulationTime − s e l f . t r iggeredTime
T1 = T2 − s imulat ionTimeStep
return s e l f . du ra t i onD i s t r i bu t i on . c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y (T1 , T2)
c l a s s ScheduledMaintenance (Maintenance ) :
”””A c l a s s f o r schedu l ed maintenance . Acts as a conta iner f o r maintenance
ac t i on s ”””
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name , occur r enceDi s t = None , durat ionDi s t = None , \
upMaintenanceState = None , downMaintenanceState = None , \
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r e sCyc l e = None , incCyc le = None , resAge = None , resOpTime = None ) :
# Pass to s up e r c l a s s cons t ruc t o r
Maintenance . i n i t ( s e l f , name , durat ionDist , \
upMaintenanceState , downMaintenanceState , \
resCycle , incCycle , resAge , resOpTime )
s e l f . o c cur r enceDi s t = occur r enceDi s t
s e l f . l a s tOccur r ence = 0
s e l f . d e t e c tFa i l u r e = [ ]
de f s e tOccurrenceDis t ( s e l f , d i s t ) :
s e l f . o c cur r enceDi s t = d i s t
de f s e tDe t e c tFa i l u r e ( s e l f , fm ) :
t ry :
s e l f . d e t e c tFa i l u r e . extend ( fm)
except TypeError :
s e l f . d e t e c tFa i l u r e . append ( fm)
de f t r i g g e r ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . t r i g g e r e d = True
s e l f . t r iggeredTime = simulationTime
s e l f . getFunct ion ( ) . setPM ()
f o r c in s e l f . downMaintenanceState :
c . s e t S t a t e ({ s e l f . id : State . down maintenance })
f o r c in s e l f . upMaintenanceState :
c . s e t S t a t e ({ s e l f . id : State . up maintenance })
de f un t r i g g e r ( s e l f ) :
s e l f . performMaintenance ( )
s e l f . t r i g g e r e d = False
s e l f . l a s tOccur r ence = simulationTime
s e l f . t r iggeredTime = None
f o r c in s e l f . downMaintenanceState :
c . unse tState ( s e l f . id )
f o r c in s e l f . upMaintenanceState :
c . unse tState ( s e l f . id )
f o r c in s e l f . replaceComponent :
c . r ep l a c e ( )
s e l f . getFunct ion ( ) . unsetPM ()
de f getOccurrenceCP ( s e l f ) :
T2 = simulationTime − s e l f . l a s tOccur r ence
T1 = T2 − s imulat ionTimeStep
return s e l f . o c cur r enceDi s t . c ond i t i o n a lP r obab i l i t y (T1 , T2)
de f performMaintenance ( s e l f ) :
# I f f a i l u r e i s d e t e c t e d during schedu l ed maintenance , i n i t i a t e
# co r r e c t i v e maintenance
f o r fm in s e l f . d e t e c tFa i l u r e :
i f fm . ge tTr iggered ( ) :
fm . de t e c t ( )
# cont inue wi th s up e r c l a s s f unc t i on
Maintenance . performMaintenance ( s e l f )
c l a s s Correct iveMaintenance (Maintenance ) :
”””A c l a s s f o r c o r r e c t i v e maintenance . Acts as a conta iner f o r maintenance
ac t i on s ”””
de f i n i t ( s e l f , name , occur r enceDi s t = None , durat ionDi s t = None , \
upMaintenanceState = None , downMaintenanceState = None , \
r e sCyc l e = None , incCyc le = None , resAge = None , resOpTime = None ) :
# Pass to s up e r c l a s s cons t ruc t o r
Maintenance . i n i t ( s e l f , name , durat ionDist , \
upMaintenanceState , downMaintenanceState , \
resCycle , incCycle , resAge , resOpTime )
c l a s s State ( ob j e c t ) :
””” S ta t e enumeration c l a s s ”””
down fa i l u r e = 1
down maintenance = 2
down inte r lock = 3
up f a i l u r e = 4
up maintenance = 5
up i n t e r l o c k = 6
up = 7
# cu t o f f po in t s f o r up and down s t a t e s
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# e . g . i f s t a t e<=Sta t e . down s ta t e s a l l ow s you to determine i f
# s t a t e i s any o f the down s t a t e s , s im i l a r l y s t a t e>=Sta t e . u p s t a t e s
# a l l ows you to determine i f s t a t e i s any o f the up s t a t e s
down states = 3
up s t a t e s = 4
# he l p e r a t t r i b u t e s f o r fo rmat t ing graphs
min state = 1
max state = 7
# long t e x t d e s c r i p t o r s f o r s t a t e
di sp = { down fa i l u r e : ’Down Fa i l u r e ’ , down maintenance : ’Down Maintenance ’ , \
down inte r lock : ”Down In t e r l o c k ” , u p f a i l u r e : ”Up Fa i l u r e ” , \
up maintenance : ”Up Maintenance” , up : ”Up” , up i n t e r l o c k : ”Up In t e r l o c k ”}
de f s t a t eD i sp l ay ( key ) :
r e turn State . d i sp [ key ]
de f s ta t eT i ckLabe l s ( ) :
r e turn map( lambda i : s t a t eD i sp l ay ( i ) , range ( State . min state , State . max state+1))
c l a s s FailureModeType ( ob j e c t ) :
”””Enumeration c l a s s f o r the independent v a r i a b l e o f a f a i l u r e mode . I .E.
whether a f a i l u r e mode i s dependent on the cyc l e , age or opera t ing time o f
some equipment ”””
cy c l e = 1
age = 2
operatingTime = 3
de f summariseStats ( va lue s ) :
stdDev = f l o a t (np . std ( values , ddof=1)) # ddof=1 app l i e s Besse l ’ s c o r r e c t i on
avg = f l o a t (np .mean( va lue s ) )
re turn { ’mean ’ : avg , \
’ stdDev ’ : stdDev , \
’ highStdDev ’ : avg + stdDev , \
’ lowStdDev ’ : avg − stdDev , \
’ median ’ : f l o a t (np . median ( va lue s ) ) , \
’min ’ : min ( va lue s ) , \
’max ’ : max( va lue s )}
# Enumerated o b j e c t s
s t a t e = State ( )
D.3 System Modelling Script
# −∗− coding : u t f−8 −∗−
# Copyright (C) A i r s e r v i c e s − Al l Righ t s Reserved
# Unauthorized copying o f t h i s f i l e , v i a any medium i s s t r i c t l y p r o h i b i t e d
# Propr i e tary and c o n f i d e n t i a l
# Written by Nick Spurry <nick . s p u r r y@a i r s e r v i c e s a u s t r a l i a . com>, October 2015
#
”””
T i t l e : VHF Es s en t i a l − Ex i s t i n g
Descr ip t i on : S imula tes the E s s en t i a l VHF system with the e x i s t i n g
maintenance regime .
Author : Nicho las Spurry
Date : 20/10/2015
Version : 1 .0
”””
import rbd
# Constants
s r tFau l t = 42∗24 # 42 days
srtFault mean = s r tFau l t
s r tFau l t va r = 1056∗24
s r t F a i l = 8
sr tFa i l mean = s r t F a i l
s r t F a i l v a r = 16/9.0
l inesFau l t mean = rbd .ANNUALHOURS
l i n e sFau l t v a r = 2131600
l i n e sFa i l mean = l inesFau l t mean
l i n e s F a i l v a r = l i n e sFau l t v a r
# Scheduled maintenance d i s t r i b u t i o n parameters
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TOL = 0.25 # Maintenance s chedu l i n g t o l e r anc e
STD DEV = 3.0 # Maintenance s chedu l i n g s tandard d e v i a t i on
annual mean = rbd .ANNUALHOURS
annual var = (TOL∗annual mean/STD DEV)∗∗2
biennia l mean = 2 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
b i e nn i a l v a r = (TOL∗ biennia l mean /STD DEV)∗∗2
t r i enn i a l mean = 3 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
t r i e n n i a l v a r = (TOL∗ t r i enn i a l mean /STD DEV)∗∗2
quadrennial mean = 4 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
quadrenn ia l var = (TOL∗quadrennial mean/STD DEV)∗∗2
pentennia l mean = 5 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
pent enn i a l va r = (TOL∗pentennia l mean /STD DEV)∗∗2
decennia l mean = 10 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
dec enn i a l va r = (TOL∗decennia l mean /STD DEV)∗∗2
# Fai lu re v a r i a b l e s
AC DC mu = 1/ f l o a t (20 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS) # u = 1/MTBF
DC DC mu = 1/ f l o a t (20 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS) # u = 1/MTBF
MUX Fans mu = 1/ f l o a t (5 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS)
MUX Fans PF = rbd .ANNUALHOURS
MUX Filters mu = 3 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
MUX Filters var = 8526400
MUX Filters PF = rbd .ANNUALHOURS
MUXmu = 1/ f l o a t (15∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS)
VHF CAP mu = 12∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
VHF CAP var = 76737600 # Variance o f one year
VHF mu = 10∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
CF mu = 1/ f l o a t (40∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS)
CF PF = 4∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
SPD mu = 8 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
SPD var = 34105600
ANT RAD mu = 17.5∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
ANT RAD var = 479610000
ANT RAD PF = 4∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
ANT VSWRmu = 1/ f l o a t (30∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS)
ANT VSWR PF = 4 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
CON 1 mu = 100
CON 1 var = 278
CON 1 PF = 4 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
CON 2 mu = 100
CON 2 var = 278
CON 2 PF = 4 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
CON 3 mu = 10∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
CON 3 var = 213160000
CON 3 PF = 4 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
ANTMOUNTmu = 2∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
ANT MOUNT var = 76737600
ANTMOUNTPF = 4 ∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
TWRmu = 5∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
TWR var = 76737600
TWRPF = 10∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
TWRFOOTmu = 40∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
TWR FOOT var = 4911206400
TWR FOOT PF = 10∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS
# Correc t i v e maintenance v a r i a b l e s
VHF CM mu = 3
VHF CM var = 1/9 .0
PSU CM mu = 2
PSU CM var = 1/9 .0
MUX Fans CM mu = .5
MUX Fans CM var = 4/225.0
MUX Filters CM mu = .5
MUX Filters CM var = 4/225.0
MUXCMmu = 1
MUX CM var = 1/36.0
CF CM mu = 2
CF CM var = 1/9 .0
SPD CM mu = 1
SPD CM var = 1/36.0
ANT CMmu = 8
ANT CM var = 16/9.0
ANTMOUNTCMmu = 8
ANT MOUNT CM var = 16/9.0
TWRCMmu = 8
TWR CM var = 16/9.0
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CON 1 CM mu = 2
CON 1 CM var = 1/9 .0
CON 2 CM mu = 2
CON 2 CM var = 1/9 .0
CON 3 CM mu = 8
CON 3 CM var = 16/9.0
# Scheduled maintenance v a r i a b l e s
Radio SM mu = 2
Radio SM var = (1/STD DEV)∗∗2
Lines SM mu = 8
Lines SM var = (4/STD DEV)∗∗2
# Create the s t a r t and end nodes
startNode = rbd . Sta r t ( )
endNode = rbd .End ( )
# Create j o i n i n g nodes ( s p l i t e r s and combiners )
s p l i t t e r 1 = rbd . S p l i t t e r (2 ) # 2 output connec t ions
s p l i t t e r 2 = rbd . S p l i t t e r (2 ) # 2 output connec t ions
s p l i t t e r 3 = rbd . S p l i t t e r (2 ) # 2 output connec t ions
combiner 1 = rbd . Combiner (2 ) # 2 input connec t ions
combiner 2 = rbd . Combiner (2 ) # 2 input connec t ions
combiner 3 = rbd . Combiner (2 ) # 2 input connec t ions
# Create the Main components
AC DC 1 = rbd . Component ( ”AC/DC PSU 1” )
DC DC 1 = rbd . Component ( ”DC/DC PSU 1” )
MUXM = rbd . Component ( ”Main Radio MUX” )
MUX M Filters = rbd . Component ( ”Main Radio MUX F i l t e r s ” )
MUX M Fans = rbd . Component ( ”Main Radio MUX Fans” )
VHFM = rbd . Component ( ”Main VHF Transce ive r ” )
CON 1 M = rbd . Component ( ”Main Coax Connector 1” )
CF M = rbd . Component ( ”Main Cavity F i l t e r ” )
CON 2 M = rbd . Component ( ”Main Coax Connector 2” )
SPD M = rbd . Component ( ”Main SPD” )
CON 3 M = rbd . Component ( ”Main Coax Connector 3” )
ANTM = rbd . Component ( ”Main Antenna” )
ANTMOUNTM = rbd . Component ( ”Main Antenna Mounts” )
# Create the Standby components
AC DC 2 = rbd . Component ( ”AC/DC PSU 2” )
DC DC 2 = rbd . Component ( ”DC/DC PSU 2” )
MUX S = rbd . Component ( ”Standby Radio MUX” )
MUX S Filters = rbd . Component ( ”Standby Radio MUX F i l t e r s ” )
MUX S Fans = rbd . Component ( ”Standby Radio MUX Fans” )
VHF S = rbd . Component ( ”Standby VHF Transce ive r ” )
CON 1 S = rbd . Component ( ”Standby Coax Connector 1” )
CF S = rbd . Component ( ”Standby Cavity F i l t e r ” )
CON 2 S = rbd . Component ( ”Standby Coax Connector 2” )
SPD S = rbd . Component ( ”Standby SPD” )
CON 3 S = rbd . Component ( ”Standby Coax Connector 3” )
ANT S = rbd . Component ( ”Standby Antenna” )
ANTMOUNT S = rbd . Component ( ”Standby Antenna Mounts” )
# Create the common components
TWR = rbd . Component ( ”Tower St ruc ture ” )
TWRFOOT = rbd . Component ( ”Tower Foot ings ” )
# Connect nodes t o g e t h e r f o r VHF Es s en t i a l t opo l o gy
startNode . connectOutputNode ( s p l i t t e r 1 )
s p l i t t e r 1 . connectInputNode ( startNode )
s p l i t t e r 1 . connectOutputNode ( s p l i t t e r 2 )
s p l i t t e r 2 . connectInputNode ( s p l i t t e r 1 )
s p l i t t e r 2 . connectOutputNode (AC DC 1)
s p l i t t e r 2 . connectOutputNode (DC DC 1)
AC DC 1 . connectInputNode ( s p l i t t e r 2 )
DC DC 1 . connectInputNode ( s p l i t t e r 2 )
AC DC 1 . connectOutputNode ( combiner 1 )
DC DC 1 . connectOutputNode ( combiner 1 )
combiner 1 . connectInputNode (AC DC 1)
combiner 1 . connectInputNode (DC DC 1)
s p l i t t e r 1 . connectOutputNode ( s p l i t t e r 3 )
s p l i t t e r 3 . connectInputNode ( s p l i t t e r 1 )
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s p l i t t e r 3 . connectOutputNode (AC DC 2)
s p l i t t e r 3 . connectOutputNode (DC DC 2)
AC DC 2 . connectInputNode ( s p l i t t e r 3 )
DC DC 2 . connectInputNode ( s p l i t t e r 3 )
AC DC 2 . connectOutputNode ( combiner 2 )
DC DC 2 . connectOutputNode ( combiner 2 )
combiner 2 . connectInputNode (AC DC 2)
combiner 2 . connectInputNode (DC DC 2)
# Main path
combiner 1 . connectOutputNode (MUXM)
MUXM. connectInputNode ( combiner 1 )
MUXM. connectOutputNode (MUX M Filters )
MUX M Filters . connectInputNode (MUXM)
MUX M Filters . connectOutputNode (MUX M Fans)
MUX M Fans . connectInputNode (MUX M Filters )
MUX M Fans . connectOutputNode (VHFM)
VHFM. connectInputNode (MUX M Fans)
VHFM. connectOutputNode (CON 1 M)
CON 1 M. connectInputNode (VHFM)
CON 1 M. connectOutputNode (CF M)
CF M. connectInputNode (CON 1 M)
CF M. connectOutputNode (CON 2 M)
CON 2 M. connectInputNode (CF M)
CON 2 M. connectOutputNode (SPD M)
SPD M. connectInputNode (CON 2 M)
SPD M. connectOutputNode (CON 3 M)
CON 3 M. connectInputNode (SPD M)
CON 3 M. connectOutputNode (ANTM)
ANTM. connectInputNode (CON 3 M)
ANTM. connectOutputNode (ANTMOUNTM)
ANTMOUNTM. connectInputNode (ANTM)
ANTMOUNTM. connectOutputNode ( combiner 3 )
mainPath = [AC DC 1 , DC DC 1 , MUXM, MUX M Filters , MUX M Fans , VHF M, \
CON 1 M, CF M, CON 2 M, SPD M, CON 3 M, ANTM, ANTMOUNTM]
# Standby Path
combiner 2 . connectOutputNode (MUX S)
MUX S. connectInputNode ( combiner 2 )
MUX S. connectOutputNode (MUX S Filters )
MUX S Filters . connectInputNode (MUX S)
MUX S Filters . connectOutputNode (MUX S Fans)
MUX S Fans . connectInputNode (MUX S Filters )
MUX S Fans . connectOutputNode (VHF S)
VHF S . connectInputNode (MUX S Fans)
VHF S . connectOutputNode (CON 1 S)
CON 1 S . connectInputNode (VHF S)
CON 1 S . connectOutputNode (CF S)
CF S . connectInputNode (CON 1 S)
CF S . connectOutputNode (CON 2 S)
CON 2 S . connectInputNode (CF S)
CON 2 S . connectOutputNode (SPD S)
SPD S . connectInputNode (CON 2 S)
SPD S . connectOutputNode (CON 3 S)
CON 3 S . connectInputNode (SPD S)
CON 3 S . connectOutputNode (ANT S)
ANT S . connectInputNode (CON 3 S)
ANT S . connectOutputNode (ANTMOUNT S)
ANTMOUNT S. connectInputNode (ANT S)
ANTMOUNT S. connectOutputNode ( combiner 3 )
standbyPath = [AC DC 2 , DC DC 2 , MUX S, MUX S Filters , MUX S Fans , VHF S , \
CON 1 S , CF S , CON 2 S , SPD S , CON 3 S , ANT S, ANTMOUNT S]
# Common
combiner 3 . connectInputNode (ANTM)
combiner 3 . connectInputNode (ANT S)
combiner 3 . connectOutputNode (TWR)
TWR. connectInputNode ( combiner 3 )
TWR. connectOutputNode (TWRFOOT)
TWRFOOT. connectInputNode (TWR)
TWRFOOT. connectOutputNode ( endNode )
endNode . connectInputNode (TWRFOOT)
commonNodes = [ endNode , startNode , s p l i t t e r 1 , s p l i t t e r 2 , s p l i t t e r 3 , \
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combiner 1 , combiner 2 , combiner 3 , TWR, TWRFOOT]
# Create func t i on
ESSENTIAL VHF SERVICE = rbd . Function ( ” E s s en t i a l VHF Se rv i c e ” )
# Add nodes to func t i on
a l lNodes = commonNodes + mainPath + standbyPath
ESSENTIAL VHF SERVICE . addNode ( a l lNodes )
# Create system
ESSENTIAL VHF SYSTEM = rbd . System ( ” E s s en t i a l VHF System” )
ESSENTIAL VHF SYSTEM. addFunction (ESSENTIAL VHF SERVICE)
# Common repa i r d i s t r i b u t i o n s
srtFault RD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”SRT Fault Repair D i s t r i bu t i on ” , srtFault mean , \
s r tFau l t va r )
srtFai l RD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”SRT Fa i l Repair D i s t r i bu t i on ” , srtFai l mean , \
s r t F a i l v a r )
l inesFault RD = rbd . LogNormal ( ” Lines Fault Repair D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
l inesFault mean , l i n e sFau l t v a r )
l ine sFa i l RD = rbd . LogNormal ( ” Lines Fa i l Repair D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
l i ne sFa i l mean , l i n e s F a i l v a r )
#### AC/DC PSU Fai l u re Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s ####
AC DC 1 FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”AC/DC PSU 1 Fa i l u r e Mode” )
AC DC 2 FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”AC/DC PSU 2 Fa i l u r e Mode” )
AC DC FM FD = rbd . Exponent ia l ( ”AC/DC PSU Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
AC DC mu)
AC DC 1 FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (AC DC FM FD)
AC DC 1 FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
AC DC 1 FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
AC DC 1 . ass ignFai lureMode (AC DC 1 FM)
AC DC 2 FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (AC DC FM FD)
AC DC 2 FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
AC DC 2 FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
AC DC 2 . ass ignFai lureMode (AC DC 2 FM)
#### DC/DC PSU Fai l u re Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s ####
DC DC 1 FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”DC/DC PSU 1 Fa i l u r e Mode” )
DC DC 2 FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”DC/DC PSU 2 Fa i l u r e Mode” )
DC DC FM FD = rbd . Exponent ia l ( ”DC/DC PSU Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
DC DC mu)
DC DC 1 FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (DC DC FM FD)
DC DC 1 FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
DC DC 1 FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
DC DC 1 . ass ignFai lureMode (DC DC 1 FM)
DC DC 2 FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (DC DC FM FD)
DC DC 2 FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
DC DC 2 FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
DC DC 2 . ass ignFai lureMode (DC DC 2 FM)
#### Radio MUX Fai lu re Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s ####
MUX M Fans FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main Radio MUX Fans Fa i l u r e Mode” )
MUX S Fans FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby Radio MUX Fans Fa i l u r e Mode” )
MUX Fans FD = rbd . Exponent ia l ( ’ Radio MUX Fans Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , MUX Fans mu)
MUX M Fans FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (MUX Fans FD)
MUX S Fans FM . s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (MUX Fans FD)
MUX M Fans FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
MUX M Fans FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
MUX S Fans FM . s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
MUX S Fans FM . s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
MUX M Fans FM. se tPFInte rva l (MUX Fans PF)
MUX S Fans FM . se tPFInte rva l (MUX Fans PF)
MUX M Fans FM. set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . operatingTime )
MUX S Fans FM . set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . operatingTime )
MUX M Fans . ass ignFai lureMode (MUX M Fans FM)
MUX S Fans . ass ignFai lureMode (MUX S Fans FM)
MUX M Filters FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main Radio MUX F i l t e r s Fa i l u r e Mode” )
MUX S Filters FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby Radio MUX F i l t e r s Fa i l u r e Mode” )
MUX Filters FD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’ Radio MUX F i l t e r s Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , MUX Filters mu , MUX Filters var )
MUX M Filters FM . s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (MUX Filters FD )
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MUX S Filters FM . s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (MUX Filters FD )
MUX M Filters FM . s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
MUX M Filters FM . s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
MUX S Filters FM . s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
MUX S Filters FM . s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
MUX M Filters FM . se tPFInte rva l (MUX Filters PF )
MUX M Filters FM . set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . operatingTime )
MUX S Filters FM . set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . operatingTime )
MUX S Filters FM . se tPFInte rva l (MUX Filters PF )
MUX M Filters . ass ignFai lureMode (MUX M Filters FM)
MUX S Filters . ass ignFai lureMode (MUX S Filters FM )
MUXMFM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main Radio MUX Fa i l u r e Mode” )
MUX S FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby Radio MUX Fa i l u r e Mode” )
MUXFD = rbd . Exponent ia l ( ”Radio MUX Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , MUXmu)
MUXMFM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (MUXFD)
MUX S FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (MUXFD)
MUXMFM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
MUXMFM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
MUX S FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
MUX S FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
MUXM. ass ignFai lureMode (MUXMFM)
MUX S. ass ignFai lureMode (MUX S FM)
### VHF Tranceiver Fa i l u re Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s ####
VHFM FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main VHF Transce ive r Fa i l u r e Mode” )
VHF S FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby VHF Transce ive r Fa i l u r e Mode” )
VHF FD = rbd . Exponent ia l ( ”VHF Transce ive r Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , VHF mu)
VHFM FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (VHF FD)
VHF S FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (VHF FD)
VHFM FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
VHFM FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
VHF S FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
VHF S FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
VHF M FM CAP = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main VHF Transce ive r Capacitor Fa i l u r e Mode” )
VHF S FM CAP = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby VHF Transce ive r Capacitor Fa i l u r e Mode” )
VHF FD CAP = rbd . LogNormal ( ’VHF Transce ive r Capacitor Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , VHF CAP mu, VHF CAP var)
VHF M FM CAP. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (VHF FD CAP)
VHF S FM CAP. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (VHF FD CAP)
VHF M FM CAP. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
VHF M FM CAP. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
VHF S FM CAP. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
VHF S FM CAP. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
VHFM. ass ignFai lureMode ( [VHF M FM, VHF M FM CAP] )
VHF S . ass ignFai lureMode ( [VHF S FM, VHF S FM CAP ] )
#### Cavity F i l t e r Fa i l u re Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s ####
CF M FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main Cavity F i l t e r Fa i l u r e Mode” )
CF S FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby Cavity F i l t e r Fa i l u r e Mode” )
CF FD = rbd . Exponent ia l ( ”Cavity F i l t e r Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , CF mu)
CF M FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (CF FD)
CF S FM . s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (CF FD)
CF M FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
CF M FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
CF S FM . s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
CF S FM . s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
CF M FM. se tPFInte rva l (CF PF)
CF S FM . se tPFInte rva l (CF PF)
CF M. ass ignFai lureMode (CF M FM)
CF S . ass ignFai lureMode (CF S FM)
#### SPD Fai lu re Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s ####
SPD M FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main SPD Fa i l u r e Mode” )
SPD S FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby SPD Fa i l u r e Mode” )
SPD FD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”SPD Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , SPD mu, SPD var )
SPD M FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (CF FD)
SPD S FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (CF FD)
SPD M FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
SPD M FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
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SPD S FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
SPD S FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
SPD M FM. se tPFInte rva l (CF PF)
SPD S FM. se tPFInte rva l (CF PF)
SPD M FM. set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . operatingTime )
SPD S FM. set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . operatingTime )
SPD M. ass ignFai lureMode (CF M FM)
SPD S . ass ignFai lureMode (CF S FM)
#### Antenna Fa i l u re Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s ####
ANTM FMRAD = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main Antenna Radome Fa i l u r e Mode” )
ANT S FM RAD = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby Antenna Radome Fa i l u r e Mode” )
ANT FD RAD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Antenna Radome Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
ANT RAD mu, ANT RAD var)
ANTM FMRAD. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (ANT FD RAD)
ANT S FM RAD. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (ANT FD RAD)
ANTM FMRAD. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
ANTM FMRAD. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
ANT S FM RAD. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
ANT S FM RAD. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
ANTM FMRAD. se tPFInte rva l (ANT RAD PF)
ANT S FM RAD. se tPFInte rva l (ANT RAD PF)
ANTMFMVSWR = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main Antenna VSWR Fa i lu r e Mode” )
ANT S FM VSWR = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby Antenna VSWR Fa i lu r e Mode” )
ANT FD VSWR = rbd . Exponent ia l ( ”Antenna VSWR Fa i lu r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
ANT VSWRmu)
ANTMFMVSWR. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (ANT FD VSWR)
ANT S FM VSWR. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (ANT FD VSWR)
ANTMFMVSWR. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
ANTMFMVSWR. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
ANT S FM VSWR. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
ANT S FM VSWR. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
ANTMFMVSWR. se tPFInte rva l (ANT VSWR PF)
ANT S FM VSWR. se tPFInte rva l (ANT VSWR PF)
ANTM. ass ignFai lureMode ( [ANTM FM RAD, ANTMFMVSWR] )
ANT S . ass ignFai lureMode ( [ANT S FM RAD, ANT S FM VSWR] )
#### Connector Fa i l u re Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s ####
CON 1 M FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main Connector 1 Fa i l u r e Mode” )
CON 1 S FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby Connector 1 Fa i l u r e Mode” )
CON 1 FD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Connector 1 Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
CON 1 mu , CON 1 var )
CON 1 M FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (CON 1 FD)
CON 1 S FM . s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (CON 1 FD)
CON 1 M FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
CON 1 M FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
CON 1 S FM . s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
CON 1 S FM . s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
CON 1 M FM. se tPFInte rva l (CON 1 PF)
CON 1 S FM . se tPFInte rva l (CON 1 PF)
CON 1 M FM. set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . c y c l e )
CON 1 S FM . set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . c y c l e )
CON 1 M. ass ignFai lureMode (CON 1 M FM)
CON 1 S . ass ignFai lureMode (CON 1 S FM)
CON 2 M FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main Connector 2 Fa i l u r e Mode” )
CON 2 S FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby Connector 2 Fa i l u r e Mode” )
CON 2 FD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Connector 2 Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
CON 2 mu , CON 2 var )
CON 2 M FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (CON 2 FD)
CON 2 S FM . s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (CON 2 FD)
CON 2 M FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
CON 2 M FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
CON 2 S FM . s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFault RD )
CON 2 S FM . s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( srtFai l RD )
CON 2 M FM. se tPFInte rva l (CON 2 PF)
CON 2 S FM . se tPFInte rva l (CON 2 PF)
CON 2 M FM. set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . c y c l e )
CON 2 S FM . set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . c y c l e )
CON 2 M. ass ignFai lureMode (CON 2 M FM)
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CON 2 S . ass ignFai lureMode (CON 2 S FM)
CON 3 M FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main Connector 3 Fa i l u r e Mode” )
CON 3 S FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby Connector 3 Fa i l u r e Mode” )
CON 3 FD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Connector 3 Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
CON 3 mu , CON 3 var )
CON 3 M FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (CON 3 FD)
CON 3 S FM . s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (CON 3 FD)
CON 3 M FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l inesFault RD )
CON 3 M FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l ine sFa i l RD )
CON 3 S FM . s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l inesFault RD )
CON 3 S FM . s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l ine sFa i l RD )
CON 3 M FM. se tPFInte rva l (CON 3 PF)
CON 3 S FM . se tPFInte rva l (CON 3 PF)
CON 3 M FM. set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . operatingTime )
CON 3 S FM . set IVar ( rbd . FailureModeType . operatingTime )
CON 3 M. ass ignFai lureMode (CON 3 M FM)
CON 3 S . ass ignFai lureMode (CON 3 S FM)
#### Tower Fa i l u re Cha r a c t e r i s t i c s ####
ANTMOUNTMFM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Main Antenna Mounts Fa i l u r e Mode” )
ANTMOUNT S FM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Standby Antenna Mounts Fa i l u r e Mode” )
ANTMOUNTFD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Antenna Mounts Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
ANTMOUNTmu, ANT MOUNT var)
ANTMOUNTMFM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (ANTMOUNTFD)
ANTMOUNT S FM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (ANTMOUNTFD)
ANTMOUNTMFM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l inesFault RD )
ANTMOUNTMFM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l ine sFa i l RD )
ANTMOUNT S FM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l inesFault RD )
ANTMOUNT S FM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l ine sFa i l RD )
ANTMOUNTMFM. se tPFInte rva l (ANTMOUNTPF)
ANTMOUNT S FM. se tPFInte rva l (ANTMOUNTPF)
ANTMOUNTM. ass ignFai lureMode (ANTMOUNTMFM)
ANTMOUNT S. ass ignFai lureMode (ANTMOUNT S FM)
TWRFM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Tower St ruc ture Fa i l u r e Mode” )
TWRFD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Antenna Mounts Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
TWRmu, TWR var)
TWRFM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (TWRFD)
TWRFM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l inesFault RD )
TWRFM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l ine sFa i l RD )
TWRFM. se tPFInte rva l (TWRPF)
TWR. ass ignFai lureMode (TWRFM)
TWRFOOTFM = rbd . FailureMode ( ”Tower St ruc ture Fa i l u r e Mode” )
TWRFOOTFD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Antenna Mounts Fa i l u r e Mode Fa i l u r e D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
TWRFOOTmu, TWR FOOT var)
TWRFOOTFM. s e tFa i l u r eD i s t r i b u t i o n (TWRFOOTFD)
TWRFOOTFM. s e tFau l tRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l inesFault RD )
TWRFOOTFM. s e tFa i l u r eRepa i rD i s t r i bu t i on ( l ine sFa i l RD )
TWRFOOTFM. se tPFInte rva l (TWR FOOT PF)
TWRFOOT. ass ignFai lureMode (TWRFOOTFM)
#### VHF Correc t i v e Maintenance
VHF CMDD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’VHF Transce ive r Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , VHF CM mu, VHF CM var)
VHFMCM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Main VHF Transce ive r Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
VHFMCM. setDurat ion (VHF CMDD)
VHFMCM. connectReplaceComponent (VHFM)
VHFMCM. connectIncrementCycle ( [CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 1 M] )
VHFMCM. addDownMaintenanceState (VHFM)
VHFM FM. setMaintenancePlan (VHFMCM)
VHF M FM CAP. setMaintenancePlan (VHFMCM)
VHF S CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Standby VHF Transce ive r Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
VHF S CM. setDurat ion (VHF CMDD)
VHF S CM. connectReplaceComponent (VHF S)
VHF S CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [ CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 1 S ] )
VHF S CM. addDownMaintenanceState (VHF S)
VHF S FM. setMaintenancePlan (VHF S CM)
VHF S FM CAP. setMaintenancePlan (VHF S CM)
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#### AC/DC PSU Correc t i v e Maintenance ####
PSU CM DD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”PSU Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
PSU CM mu, PSU CM var)
AC DC 1 CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”AC/DC PSU 1 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
AC DC 1 CM. setDurat ion (PSU CM DD)
AC DC 1 CM. connectReplaceComponent (AC DC 1)
AC DC 1 CM. addDownMaintenanceState (AC DC 1)
AC DC 1 FM. setMaintenancePlan (AC DC 1 CM)
DC DC 1 CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”AC/DC PSU 1 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
DC DC 1 CM. setDurat ion (PSU CM DD)
DC DC 1 CM. connectReplaceComponent (DC DC 1)
DC DC 1 CM. addDownMaintenanceState (DC DC 1)
DC DC 1 FM. setMaintenancePlan (DC DC 1 CM)
AC DC 2 CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”AC/DC PSU 2 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
AC DC 2 CM. setDurat ion (PSU CM DD)
AC DC 2 CM. connectReplaceComponent (AC DC 2)
AC DC 2 CM. addDownMaintenanceState (AC DC 2)
AC DC 2 FM. setMaintenancePlan (AC DC 2 CM)
DC DC 2 CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”AC/DC PSU 2 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
DC DC 2 CM. setDurat ion (PSU CM DD)
DC DC 2 CM. connectReplaceComponent (DC DC 2)
DC DC 2 CM. addDownMaintenanceState (DC DC 2)
DC DC 2 FM. setMaintenancePlan (DC DC 2 CM)
#### Radio Mux Correc t i v e Maintenance ####
MUX Fans CM DD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’ Radio MUX Fan Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , MUX Fans CM mu, MUX Fans CM var)
MUX M Fans CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ’Main Radio MUX Fans Cor r e c t i v e ’ \
’ Maintenance ’ )
MUX M Fans CM. setDurat ion (MUX Fans CM DD)
MUX M Fans CM. connectReplaceComponent (MUX M Fans)
MUX M Fans CM. addUpMaintenanceState (MUX M Fans)
MUX M Fans FM. setMaintenancePlan (MUX M Fans CM)
MUX S Fans CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ’ Standby Radio MUX Fans Cor r e c t i v e ’ \
’ Maintenance ’ )
MUX S Fans CM . setDurat ion (MUX Fans CM DD)
MUX S Fans CM . connectReplaceComponent (MUX S Fans)
MUX S Fans CM . addUpMaintenanceState (MUX S Fans)
MUX S Fans FM . setMaintenancePlan (MUX S Fans CM)
MUX Filters CM DD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’ Radio MUX F i l t e r Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance ’ \
’ Duration D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , MUX Filters CM mu , MUX Filters CM var )
MUX M Filters CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ’Main Radio MUX F i l t e r s ’ \
’ Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance ’ )
MUX M Filters CM . setDurat ion (MUX Filters CM DD)
MUX M Filters CM . connectReplaceComponent (MUX M Filters )
MUX M Filters CM . addUpMaintenanceState (MUX M Filters )
MUX M Filters FM . setMaintenancePlan (MUX M Filters CM)
MUX S Filters CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ’ Standby Radio MUX F i l t e r s ’ \
’ Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance ’ )
MUX S Filters CM . setDurat ion (MUX Filters CM DD)
MUX S Filters CM . connectReplaceComponent (MUX S Filters )
MUX S Filters CM . addUpMaintenanceState (MUX S Filters )
MUX S Filters FM . setMaintenancePlan (MUX S Filters CM )
MUXCMDD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’ Radio MUX Correc t i v e Maintenance Duration ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , MUX CMmu, MUX CM var)
MUXMCM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ’Main Radio MUX Correc t i v e Maintenance ’ )
MUXMCM. setDurat ion (MUXCMDD)
MUXMCM. connectReplaceComponent (MUXM)
MUXMCM. addDownMaintenanceState (MUXM)
MUXMFM. setMaintenancePlan (MUXMCM)
MUX S CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Standby Radio MUX Correc t i v e Maintenance” )
MUX S CM. setDurat ion (MUXCMDD)
MUX S CM. connectReplaceComponent (MUX S)
MUX S CM. addDownMaintenanceState (MUX S)
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MUX S FM. setMaintenancePlan (MUX S CM)
#### Cavity F i l t e r Correc t i v e Maintenance ####
CF CM DD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’ Cavity F i l t e r Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , CF CM mu, CF CM var)
CF M CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Main Cavity F i l t e r Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
CF M CM. setDurat ion (CF CM DD)
CF M CM. connectReplaceComponent (CF M)
CF M CM. addDownMaintenanceState (CF M)
CF M CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 2 M, CON 2 M, \
CON 2 M] )
CF M FM. setMaintenancePlan (CF M CM)
CF S CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Standby Cavity F i l t e r Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
CF S CM. setDurat ion (CF CM DD)
CF S CM. connectReplaceComponent (CF S)
CF S CM. addDownMaintenanceState (CF S)
CF S CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [ CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 2 S , CON 2 S , CON 2 S ] )
CF S FM . setMaintenancePlan (CF S CM)
#### SPD Correc t i v e Maintenance ####
SPD CM DD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”SPD Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
SPD CM mu, SPD CM var)
SPD M CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Main SPD Cor r ec t i v e Maintenance” )
SPD M CM. setDurat ion (SPD CM DD)
SPD M CM. connectReplaceComponent (SPD M)
SPD M CM. addDownMaintenanceState (SPD M)
SPD M CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 2 M, CON 2 M, \
CON 2 M] )
SPD M FM. setMaintenancePlan (SPD M CM)
SPD S CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Standby SPD Cor rec t i v e Maintenance” )
SPD S CM. setDurat ion (SPD CM DD)
SPD S CM. connectReplaceComponent (SPD S)
SPD S CM. addDownMaintenanceState (SPD S)
SPD S CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [ CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 2 S , CON 2 S , \
CON 2 S ] )
SPD S FM. setMaintenancePlan (SPD S CM)
#### Antenna Correc t i v e Maintenance ####
ANTCMDD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Antenna Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
ANT CM mu, ANT CM var)
ANTMCM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Main Antenna Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
ANTMCM. setDurat ion (ANT CMDD)
ANTMCM. connectReplaceComponent (ANTM)
ANTMCM. addDownMaintenanceState (ANTM)
ANTMCM. connectIncrementCycle ( [CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 2 M, CON 2 M, \
CON 2 M] )
ANTMCM. connectResetAge ( [CON 3 M, ANTM] )
ANTMCM. connectReplaceComponent (CON 3 M)
ANTM FMRAD. setMaintenancePlan (ANTMCM)
ANTMFMVSWR. setMaintenancePlan (ANTMCM)
ANT S CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Main Antenna Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
ANT S CM. setDurat ion (ANT CMDD)
ANT S CM. connectReplaceComponent (ANT S)
ANT S CM. addDownMaintenanceState (ANT S)
ANT S CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [ CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 2 S , CON 2 S , \
CON 2 S ] )
ANT S CM. connectResetAge ( [ CON 3 S , ANT S ] )
ANT S CM. connectReplaceComponent (CON 3 S)
ANT S FM RAD. setMaintenancePlan (ANT S CM)
ANT S FM VSWR. setMaintenancePlan (ANT S CM)
#### Tower Correc t i v e Maintenance ####
ANTMOUNTCMDD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’Antenna Mount Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , ANTMOUNTCMmu, ANT MOUNT CM var)
ANTMOUNTMCM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ’Main Antenna Mount Cor r e c t i v e ’ \
’ Maintenance ’ )
ANTMOUNTMCM. setDurat ion (ANTMOUNTCMDD)
ANTMOUNTMCM. connectReplaceComponent ( [ANTMOUNTM, CON 3 M] )
ANTMOUNTMCM. addDownMaintenanceState ( [ANTMOUNTM, ANTM] )
ANTMOUNTMCM. connectIncrementCycle ( [CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 2 M, \
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CON 2 M, CON 2 M] )
ANTMOUNTMFM. setMaintenancePlan (ANTMOUNTMCM)
ANTMOUNT S CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ’ Standby Antenna Mount Cor r e c t i v e ’ \
’ Maintenance ’ )
ANTMOUNT S CM. setDurat ion (ANTMOUNTCMDD)
ANTMOUNT S CM. connectReplaceComponent ( [ANTMOUNT S, CON 3 S ] )
ANTMOUNT S CM. addDownMaintenanceState ( [ANTMOUNT S, ANT S ] )
ANTMOUNT S CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [ CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 2 S , \
CON 2 S , CON 2 S ] )
ANTMOUNT S FM. setMaintenancePlan (ANTMOUNT S CM)
#### Tower Correc t i v e Maintenance ####
TWRCMDD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’Antenna Mount Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , TWRCMmu, TWR CM var)
TWRCM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Main Antenna Mount Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
TWRCM. setDurat ion (TWRCMDD)
TWRCM. addUpMaintenanceState (TWR)
TWRFM. setMaintenancePlan (TWRCM)
TWRFOOTCMDD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’Antenna Mount Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , TWRCMmu, TWR CM var)
TWRFOOTCM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Main Antenna Mount Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
TWRFOOTCM. setDurat ion (TWRFOOTCMDD)
TWRFOOTCM. addUpMaintenanceState (TWRFOOT)
TWRFOOTFM. setMaintenancePlan (TWRFOOTCM)
#### Connectors Correc t i v e Maintenance ####
CON 1 CM DD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’ Connector 1 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , CON 1 CM mu, CON 1 CM var)
CON 1 M CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Main Connector 1 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
CON 1 M CM. setDurat ion (CON 1 CM DD)
CON 1 M CM. connectReplaceComponent (CON 1 M)
CON 1 M CM. addDownMaintenanceState (CON 1 M)
CON 1 M CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 2 M, CON 2 M, \
CON 2 M] )
CON 1 M FM. setMaintenancePlan (CON 1 M CM)
CON 1 S CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Standby Connector 1 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
CON 1 S CM. setDurat ion (CON 1 CM DD)
CON 1 S CM. connectReplaceComponent (CON 1 S)
CON 1 S CM. addDownMaintenanceState (CON 1 S)
CON 1 S CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [ CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 2 S , CON 2 S , \
CON 2 S ] )
CON 1 S FM . setMaintenancePlan (CON 1 S CM)
CON 2 CM DD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’ Connector 2 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration ’ \
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , CON 2 CM mu, CON 2 CM var)
CON 2 M CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Main Connector 2 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
CON 2 M CM. setDurat ion (CON 1 CM DD)
CON 2 M CM. connectReplaceComponent (CON 1 M)
CON 2 M CM. addDownMaintenanceState (CON 1 M)
CON 2 M CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 2 M, CON 2 M, CON 2 M] )
CON 2 M FM. setMaintenancePlan (CON 2 M CM)
CON 2 S CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ’ Standby Connector 2 Cor r e c t i v e ’ \
’ Maintenance ’ )
CON 2 S CM. setDurat ion (CON 2 CM DD)
CON 2 S CM. connectReplaceComponent (CON 2 S)
CON 2 S CM. addDownMaintenanceState (CON 2 S)
CON 2 S CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [ CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 2 S , CON 2 S , \
CON 2 S ] )
CON 2 S FM . setMaintenancePlan (CON 2 S CM)
CON 3 CM DD = rbd . LogNormal ( ’ Connector 3 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance Duration ’
’ D i s t r i bu t i on ’ , CON 3 CM mu, CON 3 CM var)
CON 3 M CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Main Connector 3 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
CON 3 M CM. setDurat ion (CON 3 CM DD)
CON 3 M CM. connectReplaceComponent (CON 3 M)
CON 3 M CM. addDownMaintenanceState (CON 3 M)
CON 3 M CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 2 M, CON 2 M,\
CON 2 M] )
CON 3 M FM. setMaintenancePlan (CON 3 M CM)
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CON 3 S CM = rbd . Correct iveMaintenance ( ”Standby Connector 3 Cor r e c t i v e Maintenance” )
CON 3 S CM. setDurat ion (CON 3 CM DD)
CON 3 S CM. connectReplaceComponent (CON 3 S)
CON 3 S CM. addDownMaintenanceState (CON 3 S)
CON 3 S CM. connectIncrementCycle ( [ CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 2 S , CON 2 S , \
CON 2 S ] )
CON 3 S FM . setMaintenancePlan (CON 3 S CM)
#### Scheduled Maintenance ####
Radio SM OD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Radio In spe c t i on Occurrence D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
annual mean , annual var )
Radio SM DD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Radio In spe c t i on Duration D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
Radio SM mu , Radio SM var )
Radio SM M = rbd . ScheduledMaintenance ( ”Radio 1Y In spe c t i on Main Equipment” )
Radio SM M . setOccurrenceDis t (Radio SM OD)
Radio SM M . setDurat ion (Radio SM DD)
Radio SM M . addUpMaintenanceState ( [VHF M, MUX M Fans , MUX M Filters ] )
Radio SM M . addDownMaintenanceState (ANTM)
Radio SM M . s e tDe t e c tFa i l u r e ( [ AC DC 1 FM, DC DC 1 FM, VHF M FM, ANTMFMVSWR, \
CON 1 M FM, CON 2 M FM] )
Radio SM M . connectReplaceComponent (MUX M Filters )
Radio SM M . connectIncrementCycle ( [CON 1 M, CON 1 M, CON 2 M, CON 2 M] )
Radio SM S = rbd . ScheduledMaintenance ( ”Radio 1Y In spe c t i on Standby Equipment” )
Radio SM S . se tOccurrenceDis t (Radio SM OD)
Radio SM S . setDurat ion (Radio SM DD)
Radio SM S . addUpMaintenanceState ( [ VHF S , MUX S Fans , MUX S Filters ] )
Radio SM S . addDownMaintenanceState (ANT S)
Radio SM S . s e tDe t e c tFa i l u r e ( [ AC DC 2 FM, DC DC 2 FM, VHF S FM, ANT S FM VSWR, \
CON 1 S FM , CON 2 S FM ] )
Radio SM S . connectReplaceComponent (MUX S Filters )
Radio SM S . connectIncrementCycle ( [ CON 1 S , CON 1 S , CON 2 S , CON 2 S ] )
FILTER SM OD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”MUX F i l t e r Replacement Occurrence D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
biennia l mean , b i e nn i a l v a r )
FILTER SM M = rbd . ScheduledMaintenance ( ”2Y Main MUX F i l t e r Replacement” )
FILTER SM M. setOccurrenceDis t (FILTER SM OD)
FILTER SM M. setDurat ion (MUX Filters CM DD)
FILTER SM M. addUpMaintenanceState (MUX M Filters )
FILTER SM M. connectReplaceComponent (MUX M Filters )
FILTER SM S = rbd . ScheduledMaintenance ( ”2Y Standby MUX F i l t e r Replacement” )
FILTER SM S . se tOccurrenceDis t (FILTER SM OD)
FILTER SM S . setDurat ion (MUX Filters CM DD)
FILTER SM S . addUpMaintenanceState (MUX S Filters )
FILTER SM S . connectReplaceComponent (MUX S Filters )
Lines SM OD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Radio In spe c t i on Occurrence D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
biennia l mean , b i e nn i a l v a r )
Lines SM DD = rbd . LogNormal ( ”Radio In spe c t i on Duration D i s t r i bu t i on ” , \
Lines SM mu , Lines SM var )
Lines SM = rbd . ScheduledMaintenance ( ” Lines 2Y In spe c t i on ” )
Lines SM . se tOccurrenceDis t (Lines SM OD)
Lines SM . setDurat ion (Lines SM DD)
Lines SM . addUpMaintenanceState ( [ANTM, ANT S, ANTMOUNTM, ANTMOUNT S, \
TWR, TWRFOOT] )
Lines SM . addDownMaintenanceState (ANTM)
Lines SM . s e tDe t e c tFa i l u r e ( [ANTM FM RAD, ANT S FM RAD, CON 3 M FM, CON 3 S FM , \
TWRFM, TWRFOOTFM] )
ESSENTIAL VHF SYSTEM.addPM( [ Radio SM M , Radio SM S , FILTER SM M, FILTER SM S , \
Lines SM ] )
# Run s imu la t i on
ESSENTIAL VHF SYSTEM. setDebug (1 )
ESSENTIAL VHF SYSTEM. setMaxSimTime ( i n t (15∗ rbd .ANNUALHOURS) )
ESSENTIAL VHF SYSTEM. setMaxSimNumber (15)
ESSENTIAL VHF SYSTEM. setSimStep (5 )
ESSENTIAL VHF SYSTEM. s imulate ( )
# Output Resu l t s
pr in t ESSENTIAL VHF SERVICE . ge tAnnua lAva i l ab i l i t y ( )
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pr in t ESSENTIAL VHF SERVICE . getPMTime ( )
p r i n t ESSENTIAL VHF SERVICE . getCMTime ( )
